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Statement of the Supreme Court in 1895: 
“Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law 
imposes or in the benefits it confers on any citizens by 
reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class 
legislation, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses, 
and to general unrest and disturbance in society. It was 
hoped and believed that the great amendments to the 
Constitution which followed the late civil war had rendered 
such legislation impossible for all future time.” 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust 
Co.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Ask anyone whether the Constitution permits discrimination on the 
basis of religion, and the response will undoubtedly be no. Yet the 
modern Supreme Court has not recognized that the antidiscrimination 
command of the Fourteenth Amendment protects religion in the same 
way that the Amendment protects against discrimination on the basis of 
race or gender. In fact, the Supreme Court has permitted the legislature 
to facially discriminate against religion in funding programs.2 To make 
matters worse, thirty-seven state constitutions and the District of 
Columbia’s Code openly discriminate on the basis of religion in so-
called Blaine Amendments.3 
The exclusion of religion from the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
antidiscrimination command is all the more remarkable because the 
Supreme Court has used the Amendment’s antidiscrimination command 
to protect a wide variety of groups—most of whom are never mentioned 
elsewhere in the text of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has relied 
on the Amendment’s antidiscrimination command to strike down 
classifications based on gender,4 illegitimacy,5 physical disability,6 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, as recognized in 
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 524 (1988). 
 2. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (permitting a state to withhold 
scholarship money from individuals seeking a religious education, even though it provided 
scholarships to individuals seeking a secular education). 
 3. Kyle Duncan, Comment, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious 
Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 493 (2003) (counting so-called “Blaine Amendments”); 
D.C. CODE § 44–715 (2012). 
 4. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (The VMI Case); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 205 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973). 
 5. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 
(1973);  Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972). 
 6. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (holding that 
denial of zoning permit to home for mentally retarded individuals failed rational basis test under 
the Equal Protection Clause). But see id. (Marshall, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the 
3
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alienage,7 citizenship,8 and sexual orientation.9 And in Skinner v. State 
of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
antidiscrimination command to strike down a statute compelling 
sterilization for larceny but not embezzlement.10 Although the Supreme 
Court once restricted its equal protection doctrine to “discrete and 
insular minorities,”11 it has recently extended equal protection rights to 
whites, limiting affirmative action programs and other efforts to aid 
racial minorities.12 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit used the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s antidiscrimination command to strike down California’s 
Proposition 8, banning same-sex marriages.13 Curiously, the Supreme 
Court has not granted the same antidiscrimination protection to religion 
despite explicit suggestions in the text of the Constitution itself that 
religion ought to always be treated as a suspect class. 
We think this outcome is clearly wrong. The Supreme Court’s 
current view is that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment granted 
equal protection to groups that lacked civil or political rights in 1787 
(racial minorities), as well as to groups that lacked civil and political 
rights in 1787 and 1868 but who would gain those rights in the future 
(e.g., women, immigrants, gays and lesbians), yet the Fourteenth 
Amendment denied equal protection to groups that did have both civil 
and political rights in both 1787 and 1868 (religious groups). Such an 
outcome is quite frankly wrong. A more likely construction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is that it did guarantee equal protection for 
groups that already had civil and political rights prior to 1868, as well as 
to other groups newly recognized for protection starting in 1868. Thus, 
Michael A. Paulsen has quite rightly argued for an equal protection 
approach to the Establishment Clause,14 and Bernadette Meyler has 
argued quite rightly for an equal protection approach to the Free 
                                                                                                                     
judgment) (arguing that mentally retarded individuals should be considered a suspect class due 
to history of discrimination and strict scrutiny analysis should apply). 
 7. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that a school district could not 
charge children of illegal immigrants tuition to compensate for lost state funding).  
 8. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973) (holding that a state could not condition 
admission to the bar on citizenship). 
 9. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 10. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942); see also Harper v. Va. Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (striking down a poll tax under the equal protection clause). 
 11. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 12. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009); Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 
(2003). 
 13. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. dismissed 
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 2432 (2010). 
 14. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection 
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 326–31 (1986). 
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Exercise Clause.15 Other scholars as well have sought to interpret the 
two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment with reference to the 
Equal Protection Clause.16 But no one to date has made an argument 
from the original public meaning of the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that the antidiscrimination command of that Amendment 
bans all forms of discrimination on the basis of religion, including 
Blaine Amendments and public school monopolies, and that it would do 
so even if the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause had never 
been adopted! 
In this Article, we argue that, as a matter of original meaning, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, forbids all discrimination on 
the basis of religion just as it forbids all discrimination on the basis of 
race and gender. Our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
based on the research of Professor Melissa Saunders17 and Professor 
John Harrison,18 who have both argued that the Amendment outlawed 
class legislation, and on the research of Professor Steven Calabresi and 
Julia Rickert, who have argued that the Amendment also banned 
systems of caste.19 The historical evidence is overwhelming and 
persuasive. We argue that a ban on class legislation and systems of caste 
is broad in scope and that it includes a ban on all forms of 
discrimination on the basis of religion. Religion is a suspect 
classification such that discrimination on the basis of religion ought 
always to be subjected to strict scrutiny, which is strict in theory and 
fatal in fact.20 We reach this conclusion without regard to the original 
meaning of either the Establishment Clause or of the Free Exercise 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and their 
History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 274, 275 (2006). 
 16. Other scholars have also argued that the religion clauses involve a concept of equality. 
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 70 (2007) (explaining that “the religion clauses express equality norms 
that . . . are much like the more general norms in the Equal Protection Clause”); PHILLIP 
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 14 (2002); Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-
Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not Just the 
Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 666 (2008); Philip B. Kurland, Of Church 
and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1961) (stating that the Religion 
Clauses should be “read together as creating a doctrine more akin to the reading of the equal 
protection clause than to the due process clause”). 
 17. See generally Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and 
Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997). 
 18. See generally John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 
Yale L.J. 1385 (1992). 
 19. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); see also Mark C. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex 
Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
1366, 1376 (1990) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause banned systems of class and caste). 
 20. See Paulsen, supra note 14, at 329.  
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Clause either in 1791 or in 1868.   
The antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment 
would ban discrimination on the basis of religion even if the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not incorporate the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses. Discrimination on the basis of religion is a forbidden form of 
class legislation even when it is sanctioned in state constitutions, and it 
is always unconstitutional.21 And just as the constitutional and statutory 
bans on race discrimination and on sex discrimination ban state laws 
and workplace and educational environments that are hostile to African 
Americans or to women, the ban on discrimination on the basis of 
religion, which is specifically mentioned in the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, should also ban workplace or educational environments that are 
hostile to religion. A learning environment in which student religious 
groups face official hostility on account of their religious beliefs is quite 
simply illegal.  Moreover, Supreme Court decisions that seek to scrub 
the public square clean of all references to religion are themselves 
unconstitutional attempts to create a public environment that is hostile 
to religion.22 A Supreme Court rule banning public displays on 
government buildings of, for example, the Ten Commandments23 
creates an environment that is hostile to religion in the same way that a 
Supreme Court rule banning displays of pictures of Martin Luther King 
or of Susan B. Anthony would create an environment that is hostile to 
African Americans or to women.   
Our antidiscrimination argument with respect to religion is in line 
with the Supreme Court’s most important and most recent decision 
protecting religious liberty from government action. In its 2012 decision 
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, a unanimous 
Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution mandates a “ministerial 
exception” to generally applicable employment laws.24 In the Hosanna-
Tabor decision, a minister of a church claimed that she had suffered 
employment discrimination.25 The Supreme Court unanimously held 
that the plaintiff was a minister,26 and the Court explicitly rejected the 
Obama Administration’s argument that the government can subject 
ministers in churches to generally applicable employment 
discrimination laws.27 Hosanna-Tabor thus requires the government to 
consider the impact of its neutral, generally applicable employment 
                                                                                                                     
 21. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 252. 
 22. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (outlawing a 
display of the Ten Commandments); Lee v. Wesiman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (striking down 
school prayers at graduation ceremonies). 
 23. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 850.  
 24. 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012). 
 25. Id. at 699–701. 
 26. Id. at 708.  
 27. Id. at 706–07. 
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discrimination laws on religion. Since those employment discrimination 
laws make it just as illegal to discriminate on the basis of religion, as it 
is to discriminate on the basis of race or sex, it is hard to see how a 
religious employer could ever be stopped from firing any employee for 
religious reasons whether that employee is or is not a minister. 
Obviously, religious employers can hire exclusively members of their 
own religions just as it is obvious that Native American tribes can 
decide whether a person is or is not, for example, a Cherokee, and just 
as men can be excluded from all women’s colleges that have federal tax 
exempt status. The Hosanna-Tabor decision decisively rejects the claim 
that forbidding discrimination on the basis of race or sex discrimination 
under the Constitution is somehow more important under the 
Constitution and laws than is forbidding discrimination on the basis of 
religion. All three forms of discrimination are equally proscribed by the 
Constitution and by our civil rights laws. 
Our analysis begins with the premise that the proper way to interpret 
the Constitution is to evaluate the original public meaning of the 
Constitution’s text.28 We thus follow the methodology of Supreme 
Court justices Antonin Scalia29 and Clarence Thomas throughout this 
Article. In looking for the objective original public meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination command, we have looked 
at dictionaries, speeches, newspaper articles, documents, legislative 
histories, and historical events to determine the original public meaning 
of the constitutional text.30 We emphatically do not think that the 
framers’ subjective meaning or intent is a controlling analytical factor, 
just as a party’s subjective intent in signing a contract does not 
determine the meaning of the contract.31 Instead, we think that what 
matters is the objective public meaning of the text as defined during the 
historical time period in which it was written and ratified.32 It is 
therefore necessary to examine the historical record to discern how the 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (1997). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, 
Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 497–98 
(2007).  
 31. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 144 (1990) (“The search is not for a subjective intention. . . . [W]hat counts is what the 
public understood.”); John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Congress’s Enforcement 
Powers, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 353, 388 (2006) (discussing how the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were concerned that the Amendment could have broader implications than they 
expected or intended); Steven Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. 
Virginia, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1408–09 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment banned 
antimiscegenation laws, even though the framers subjectively intended otherwise). 
 32. See SCALIA, supra note 288, at 37–38. 
7
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framers understood the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning insofar as it 
bans discrimination.  
Adhering to the original public meaning of the text is especially 
important when evaluating a Fourteenth Amendment question. If a court 
takes the view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
civil rights can change and evolve over time, then no one is safe. Living 
constitutionalists must concede that not only could groups be added into 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection, but also that groups could be 
removed from the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection as well.33 This 
consequence was implicitly endorsed by the Warren Court in Harper v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections, in which the majority stated that “the 
Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a 
particular era . . . we have never been confined to historic notions of 
equality.”34 But perhaps some kinds of shackling are in fact good. If the 
Supreme Court would always agree to adhere to the original public 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, civil rights could never in the 
future be conditioned on the basis of race, and segregation would 
always be unconstitutional. But if the Supreme Court follows the 
Warren Court’s view in Harper, there are no constitutionally secured 
protections against segregation. Under originalism, segregation was 
unconstitutional in 1868, and Plessy v. Ferguson35 was wrong on the 
day it was decided.36 But under Harper, Plessy was correct in 1896, and 
segregation was permissible until the 1950s when the Supreme Court 
said otherwise.37 
We believe that the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad ban on all class 
legislation and systems of caste prohibits the government from singling 
out any groups or individuals for unique burdens or privileges or 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Eliminating groups protected under the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Carolene Products “Footnote Four.” 
There, the Court restricted the Amendment’s protection to “discrete and insular minorities,” 
even though the Amendment originally protected everyone, even members of the majority. 304 
U.S. at 153 n.4; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088–3120 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Second Amendment does not give individuals a 
substantive right to bear arms, even though the original meaning indicated otherwise). 
 34. 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). 
 35. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (endorsing the concept of “separate but 
equal”). 
 36. See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 31, at 1431–32 (setting out the originalist case 
against Plessy). 
 37. Similarly, Harper allows future courts to reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law” as including fetuses, not just people. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added); see 
Abortion Case I, Federal Constitutional Court (Germany), 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) (“‘Everyone’ 
within the meaning of [the Constitution] is ‘every living human being,’ or, put differently, every 
human individual possessing life; ‘everyone’ thus also includes the still unborn human being.”). 
After all, why should it matter that in 1868 a “person” did not include a fetus? 
8
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immunities. Class legislation, which benefits or injures a limited class 
of individuals, can in essence be viewed as the opposite of legislation 
enacted to promote the general welfare, which benefits all citizens.38  
We find it hard to believe that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment created a broad ban on class legislation, yet excluded 
religious individuals from protection against all forms of class 
legislation enacted on the basis of religion. The religion clauses of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights served as early, though limited, bans 
on some forms of class legislation directed against religion. Religion 
also enjoyed substantial protection in state constitutions in 1868, most 
of which had Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analogues.39  
Constitutional protection against discrimination on the basis of 
religion has deep roots in American history going back to the founding 
generation. The founders were well aware of the evils of discrimination 
on the basis of religion which had been widespread both in Europe and 
in Colonial America, and they sought to guard against it. The three 
religion clauses in the Constitution of 1787 and in the Bill of Rights 
served as an initial, though limited, protection against certain specific 
forms of discrimination on the basis of religion. State constitutions also 
protected against certain forms of discrimination on the basis of religion 
in varying ways. But unfortunately, discrimination on the basis of 
religion was quite prevalent during the antebellum period. Slaves in 
particular were subjected to harsh discrimination on the basis of 
religion, in addition to the general cruelty that they experienced. 
Abolition was partly sought to give slaves religious liberty. And the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment generally recognized that 
discrimination on the basis of religion was entirely unacceptable. When 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment condemned the systematic 
mistreatment of African Americans during Reconstruction, those 
framers frequently cited the Indian caste system as a comparable 
reprehensible social order. The Indian caste system was itself defined by 
and was in practice a class system based on religious distinctions.40 A 
typical nineteenth century dictionary definition of caste read, “In 
Hindostan, a tribe or class of the same profession, as the caste of 
Bramins; a distinct rank or order of society.”41 Bramins were the 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 252–53 n.29.  
 39. See Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State 
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply 
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 31–41 (2009). 
 40. See generally Charles Sumner, Lecture, The Question of Caste (Wright & Porter 
Printers, 1869), available at http://ia600306.us.archive.org/5/items/questionofcaste00sumn/ 
questionofcaste00sumn.pdf. 
 41. See, e.g., CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH, A PRONOUNCING AND DEFINING DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 64, 75 (1856); JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A UNIVERSAL AND CRITICAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 107–08, 128 (1849) (“Caste, n. A distinct, hereditary 
9
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priestly class at the top of India’s religious caste system.42 So, in 1868, 
the literal dictionary definition of an undesirable system of “caste” was 
one that made reference to a religious caste system! The unavoidable 
conclusion is therefore that when the framers banned systems of caste 
and class legislation in general, they surely meant to ban class systems 
that were maintained by discrimination on the basis of religion. 
Banning discrimination on the basis of religion is also consistent 
with global human rights law, which bans discrimination on the basis of 
religion just as emphatically as it bans discrimination on the basis of 
race or gender.43 At least forty-five countries protect against 
discrimination on the basis of religion alongside protections against 
discrimination on the basis of race and gender.44 Some of those 
countries include such major world powers as Canada, Germany, 
France, India, and South Africa. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms 
also outlaw discrimination on the basis of religion. And in the United 
States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protected against discrimination on 
the basis of religion alongside its protections against discrimination on 
the basis of race and gender.45 Simply put, when people come together 
to ban discrimination and to guarantee equality, they include religion 
along with race and gender on the list of suspect classes. 
We recognize that our reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
antidiscrimination command in religion-related cases might appear 
novel, since courts generally rely on the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to decide religion-related 
cases. We think the Supreme Court has probably felt obligated to take 
this path because the First Amendment’s text speaks so directly about 
religion. In contrast, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
mention religion explicitly, although it is the Fourteenth Amendment 
and not the First that makes the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause applicable at all to the fifty states. Notwithstanding the 
constitutional text, there is no reason to think that all religion questions 
must be answered by the First Amendment, and that no religion 
questions can be answered by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
antidiscrimination command standing alone. Indeed, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s antidiscrimination command does not specifically use the 
words “race” or “gender” any more than it uses the word “religion.” In 
                                                                                                                     
order or class of people among the Hindoos, the members of which are of the same rank, 
profession, or occupation; an order or class”); see also Sumner, supra note 400, at 6–10 
(discussing the Indian caste system at length). 
 42. Sumner, supra note 40, at 8.  
 43. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
 44. See Appendix. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006). 
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fact, the Supreme Court as long ago as in 1938 in Carolene Products 
“Footnote Four” said that the Fourteenth Amendment protects religion 
from discrimination, just as much as it protects against race or national 
origin discrimination!46 And the Court made that observation even 
though it also recognized that laws abridging First Amendment rights 
get strict scrutiny.47 The clear implication of Footnote Four is that 
religion gets Fourteenth Amendment protection in addition to and above 
and beyond any First Amendment protections that religion gets under 
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.48 And that truism has 
been cemented by subsequent courts’ almost ritualistic recitation that 
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforcement based 
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.”49 The Supreme Court has also never said that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination command does not forbid 
discrimination on the basis of religion. The issue of whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment bars discrimination on the basis of religion has 
never truly been argued before the Court because the parties and the 
Court generally have focused exclusively on the First Amendment 
religion clauses to date.50 So, the Supreme Court could start using the 
Fourteenth Amendment to adjudicate discrimination on the basis of 
religion cases without contradicting its existing incorporated First 
Amendment case law. Even lower courts could start using the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination guarantee in religion cases 
without getting into trouble for stare decisis reasons because the 
Supreme Court has never said that only the incorporated First 
Amendment can be used in religion cases.  
In Part I of this Article, we discuss the original public meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its antidiscrimination command. In Part II, 
we explain how the Fourteenth Amendment applies to ban 
discrimination on the basis of religion. In Part III, we discuss how the 
                                                                                                                     
 46. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See further discussion infra Part III.C. 
 49. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.9 (1979) (citing Oyler v. Boles, 
368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
456, 464 (1996); Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Engquist v. 
Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 596 (2008); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 
(1981)) (stating that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment most 
typically reaches state action that treats a person poorly because of the person’s race or other 
suspect classification, such as sex, national origin, religion, political affiliation, among others, or 
because the person has exercised a ‘fundamental right,’ or because the person is a member of a 
group that is the target of irrational government discrimination”). 
 50. Parties often mention the Equal Protection Clause as an afterthought, but they never 
treat equal protection as the principal argument. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 44–45, Locke 
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315). 
11
Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
920 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment compares to modern 
case law. In Part IV, we describe the connection between the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
Part V, we explain why Blaine Amendments violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment and respond to a critical counterargument against our 
thesis. In Part VI, we apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the public 
school system. We think that public schools in their current form 
discriminate on the basis of religion. We then close with some 
concluding thoughts.  
I.  THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT  
For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has mangled the words and 
basic structure of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s misreading 
of the Fourteenth Amendment began in 1873 in the Slaughter-House 
Cases, a case in which the Court, somewhat ironically, butchered the 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s opinion in the 
Slaughter-House Cases rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause—
the most important clause in the Fourteenth Amendment—essentially 
meaningless.51 In subsequent years, the Court continued to ignore the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, and eight Justices adhered to that 
stance as recently as 2010, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,52 although 
Justice Clarence Thomas did call for reconsidering the Slaughter-House 
Cases.53 Since 1873, the Supreme Court has relied solely on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the textual source of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination command.54 And in 
cases involving claims of individual fundamental rights, the Supreme 
Court has also ignored the Privileges or Immunities Clause and has 
instead analyzed those cases under its substantive due process 
doctrine.55  
This approach has been largely unsettling to observers, since it 
leaves unanswered some fairly obvious questions. First, what happened 
to the Privileges or Immunities Clause? Second, how does a 
constitutional guarantee of due process of law translate into a 
substantive due process doctrine under which certain rights are 
absolutely protected? And third, how does a clause that guarantees the 
equal protection of existing laws also guarantee equality in the making 
of new laws? Ironically, the Supreme Court has reached mostly the right 
results in its case law while proceeding in every case under the wrong 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the current approach is 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78–79 (1873). 
 52. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). 
 53. Id. at 3058–62.  
 54. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 55. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
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so unsatisfying as an original matter, we begin with an originalist 
account of the whole text of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A.  The Text and Structure of the Fourteenth Amendment 
To understand the original meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, one must begin with the original meaning of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.56 That Clause, which the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment thought was the most important Clause in the 
Amendment, says that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”57 The Privileges or Immunities Clause thus restricts the kind of 
laws a state can “make” or “enforce.” The Privileges or Immunities 
Clause is the only clause in the Fourteenth Amendment which directly 
addresses the question of what laws a state legislature can 
constitutionally “make.”  Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary defines the 
verb “to make” as “to form,” “to fashion,” “to mold,” or “to create.”58 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause thus applies to the formation of 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Modern scholarship on the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
began with John Harrison’s article Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, in which 
Harrison argued that the Clause was on an anti-discrimination guarantee and not a font of 
substantive due process individual rights. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1387–88. Phillip 
Hamburger reaches the same conclusion in Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 73 
(2011). See also DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 342–51 (1985). Akhil Reed Amar and Randy Barnett read the Clause as 
protecting both against discrimination and as conferring un-enumerated individual rights. AKHIL 
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE 
BY 157 (2012); RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 62–65 (2004). Kurt Lash argues in a series of three law review articles which he is 
turning into a book that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects both against discrimination 
and that it also protects enumerated but not un-enumerated individual rights. Kurt Lash, The 
Constitutional Referendum of 1866: Andrew Johnson and the Original Meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013); Kurt Lash, The Origins of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of 
Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010); Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329 
(2011). Robert Natelson argues in The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117, 1183–88 (2009) for the John Harrison and Phillip Hamburger 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Our own view of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it protects: 1) against 
laws that discriminate on the basis of class or caste and that are not just laws enacted for the 
good of the whole people; and that 2) it protects both enumerated individual rights and un-
enumerated individual rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition subject always to the 
caveat that the states can override such rights if they pass a just law that is enacted for the 
general good of the whole people. Our reading grows out of the foundational case of Corfield v. 
Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (1823). 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 58. “Make” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), available at 
http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/search/word,make.    
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laws. Laws can, of course, be made by the legislature as statutes, by the 
executive branch as regulations, or by the judiciary as judge-made 
common law. The Clause therefore forbids lawmakers from “making” 
any laws that “abridge,” i.e. that “shorten” or “lessen,” those rights 
which are the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.59 
This reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been advanced 
most vigorously in the modern era by Professor John Harrison and by 
Professor David Currie.60 
In addition to banning the making of discriminatory laws, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause also bans the enforcement of 
discriminatory state laws.61 Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary defines the 
verb “to enforce” as “to strengthen,” “to instigate,” “to animate,” “to 
give force to,” or “to put in execution.”62 This indicates that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause forbids the executive and judicial 
branches from executing any laws that “abridge” citizens’ privileges or 
immunities. This no-enforcement language effectively prevents state 
executive branches from being able to claim that they had no choice but 
to execute a state legislature’s unconstitutional laws. Taken together, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause stops state governments from making 
or implementing any laws that unconstitutionally “abridge” citizens’ 
privileges or immunities.63   
The meaning attached to the Privileges or Immunities Clause was of 
course squarely before the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House 
Cases. Since the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment makes 
everyone born or naturalized in the United States a citizen both of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside, the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States necessarily include both (1) 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1422.   
 60. See Harrison, supra note 18; CURRIE, supra note 56, respectively. 
 61. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1402.   
 62. “Enforce” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), available at 
http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/search/word,enforce. 
Enforce: 
1. To give strength to; to strengthen; to invigorate.  
2. To make or gain by force; to force; as, to enforce a passage. 
3. To put in act by violence; to drive. 
Stones enforced from the old Assyrian slings. 
4. To instigate; to urge on; to animate. 
5. To urge with energy; to give force to; to impress on the mind; as, to enforce 
remarks or arguments. 
6. To compel; to constrain; to force. 
7. To put in execution; to cause to take effect; as, to enforce the laws. 
8. To press with a charge. 
Id. 
 63. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1420–24, 1447–51. 
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their privileges or immunities of national citizenship and (2) their 
privileges or immunities of state citizenship.64 But the Slaughter-House 
majority denied this understanding. It seems quite obvious that the 
majority’s reading ignored the Fourteenth Amendment’s plain language. 
It was also general knowledge in 1866 to 1868 that a primary goal of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was to outlaw the Black Codes which 
abridged the state common law rights of contract, torts, and property of 
African Americans.65 To accomplish that objective, the Fourteenth 
Amendment simply has to be read as protecting the privileges or 
immunities of state citizenship as well as the privileges or immunities of 
national citizenship.66 But the Slaughter-House majority literally 
rendered the Fourteenth Amendment unintelligible. For that reason, the 
Supreme Court had to read back into the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses all the content that it had wrongly drained from the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
But the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause grants all 
persons the “equal protection of the laws.”67 In contrast to the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause says nothing about 
equality in the making or implementing of equal laws.68 The noun in the 
Equal Protection Clause is “protection,” and “equal” appears only as an 
adjective. The Clause is thus quite literally all about the “protection” of 
the laws.69 Therefore the text of the Equal Protection Clause declares 
that “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”70 If the Clause had been meant to ban the 
making or formation of discriminatory laws, it should have read, “no 
state shall deny to any person equal laws” or just “no state shall deny to 
any person equality.” The word “protection”—which again is the noun 
in the Equal Protection Clause—would have been unnecessary if the 
Clause was about equality in the making of laws.71 Instead, the word 
“protection” adds meaning to the Equal Protection Clause because it 
makes it clear that the Clause is fundamentally about providing equality 
in the protection of those state constitutions and state statutes and state 
common law rules that were already made and that were in the statute 
books or that were in the recorded state case law.72  
                                                                                                                     
 64. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1415. 
 65. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1416.  
 66. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1415.  
 67. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1433–34.  
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 69. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1433–34.  
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).  
 71. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1433–34. 
 72. This explanation contradicts the Supreme Court’s declaration in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 
that “the equal protection of the laws” means “the protection of equal laws.” See 118 U.S. 356, 
369 (1886). 
15
Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
924 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary defines the word “protection” as 
meaning “defense; shelter from evil; preservation from loss, injury or 
annoyance.”73 This definition shows that the Equal Protection Clause 
required the states to defend and shelter all people equally under their 
respective laws. No state could enforce its laws against murder to 
“protect” some people, such as white southerners, but not others, such 
as blacks or northerners residing in the South. Unlike the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause is thus centrally 
concerned with the application or operation of laws that are already on 
the books or that are reported common law rights and that do not 
discriminate on their face. The guarantee of the “equal protection of the 
laws” means that a state must enforce its facially neutral laws and 
common law rules equally with regards to all persons. A state cannot, 
for instance, use its police power to protect whites but not blacks, or 
enforce its contract law for the benefit of whites but not blacks. The 
Equal Protection Clause applies to both executive and judicial 
enforcement of otherwise valid laws. 
As a historical matter, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
sought to ensure that southern states would protect blacks from violence 
and from being denied the equal protection of those facially neutral laws 
that were already on the books.74 Philosophically, the Equal Protection 
Clause recognized the Lockean principle that individuals sacrifice the 
individual freedoms with which they are born and retain in the state of 
nature in exchange for the equal protection of the laws.75  
It is well-established that the American people understood that by 
enacting the Fourteenth Amendment they were writing into federal 
constitutional law the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which had abolished the 
Black Codes.76 The Black Codes were a series of racially discriminatory 
laws adopted by southern states in 1865 and 1866 to reduce freedmen to 
second-class social status.77 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 read as 
                                                                                                                     
 73. “Protection” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), available 
at http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/search/word,protection.  
 74. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1437 (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause 
enabled Congress to pass the Ku Klux Act of 1871). 
 75. See BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, Editor’s App. 47 (S. Tucker ed. 1803) 
[hereinafter “BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES”] (explaining “that the whole should protect all of 
its parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, 
that the community should guard the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for 
this protection) each individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which 
submission of all it was impossible that protection could be certainly extended to any”). 
 76. Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388.  
 77. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1402–05. Senator Lyman Trumbull maintained that 
abolition under the Thirteenth Amendment permitted Congress to pass laws protecting blacks 
from badges of slavery, such as the Black Codes, and to protect blacks’ legal rights. He 
accordingly said: 
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follows:  
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to 
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby 
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such 
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any 
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws 
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as 
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the 
contrary notwithstanding.78 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 thus guaranteed two forms of legal 
equality. First, it barred states from “making” or “enforcing” any law 
that failed to give citizens “of every race and color” the “same” 
common law rights as were “enjoyed by white citizens.” And second, it 
prevented the states from unequally enforcing otherwise valid laws that 
were facially nondiscriminatory so as to protect some classes of citizens 
and not others. This provision addressed such obvious problems as how 
blacks could possibly buy and own property if they could not rely on the 
police for “protection” when violent whites came to throw them off 
their land. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified to, at a 
minimum, constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866.79 President 
Andrew Johnson had vetoed the Act because he felt that it exceeded 
Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on 
                                                                                                                     
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled in the 
insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in nearly 
all the States they have discriminated against them. They deny them certain 
rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the very 
restrictions which were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of 
slavery, and before it was abolished. The purpose of the bill under 
consideration is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry into effect the 
constitutional amendment.  
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). 
 78. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
 79. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1408–09.  
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slavery.80 Congress responded by overriding his veto and ultimately 
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment.81 The substantive rights or 
privileges or immunities protected by the Act are all obviously state 
common law rights, such as the right to make contracts, own property, 
inherit, and testify.82 It was these common law rights of state citizenship 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause were meant to safeguard.83 All originalist scholars, including 
Raoul Berger, agree that at a minimum the Fourteenth Amendment 
constitutionalized the list of rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.84 The 
Slaughter-House Cases eviscerated that purpose and was therefore 
clearly wrong. 
The two primary forms of legal equality guaranteed in the Civil 
Rights Act were thus infused into the Fourteenth Amendment. As 
Professor Harrison has argued, the guarantee of equal enforcement of 
facially nondiscriminatory laws was encapsulated in the Equal 
Protection Clause, while the guarantee of equality in the “making” of 
laws was enshrined in the Privileges or Immunities Clause.85 Modern 
readers may wonder how the Privilege or Immunities Clause might be 
understood as ban on discriminatory law making.  
The answer is that the Clause forbids the making of laws that give 
one class of citizens an “abridged” or shortened or lessened set of rights 
as compared with another class of citizens.86 The verb “abridge” is used 
in precisely this antidiscriminatory way in the Fifteenth Amendment, 
which says, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”87 Of course, the verb 
“abridge” can also apply to individual abridgements of rights as when 
an individual’s right to the freedom of speech or of the press is 
                                                                                                                     
 80. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1404. 
 81. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1404. 
 82. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388.  
 83. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388. 
 84. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE CONSTITUTION 185 (1987) 
(“[T]he uncontroverted evidence, confirmed in these pages, is that the framers [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] repeatedly stated that the amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
were ‘identical’ . . .”); see also ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 75 (1992) (“It 
was the demonstrable consensus of the Thirty-ninth Congress that section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ‘constitutionalized’ the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”); MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE 
PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 72 (1999) (“Recall that, 
whatever else it did, the second sentence of section one constitutionalized the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act.”); 2 RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS 53 (8th ed. 2010) (“The Fourteenth Amendment was 
obviously designed to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”). 
 85. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1414–33. 
 86. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1397. 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added).  
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“abridged” in violation of the First Amendment. Rights can be 
shortened or lessened by one person at a time or by one class of people 
at a time. The original plain public meaning of the verb “abridge” in the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause thus obviously forbids both 
discriminatory “abridgements” and “abridgements” that occur as denials 
of individual rights that are deeply rooted in history and tradition.88 
Because the Slaughter-House Cases strangled the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause in its crib, discriminatory abridgements of rights are 
today analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause, while abridgements 
of individual rights are analyzed using substantive due process.89 
In the nineteenth century, the words “privileges” and “immunities” 
were synonymous with the phrase “positive law rights,” and these terms 
were often used side by side.90 The word “privilege” in particular comes 
from the Latin words “privy,” which means private, and “legis,” which 
means law.91 A “privilege” is therefore not a right enjoyed under natural 
law but is instead only a right that is enjoyed under positive law. Noah 
Webster’s 1865 Dictionary defined the word “privilege” as being “a 
right or immunity not enjoyed by others or by all,” and Webster’s cited 
the words “immunity,” “franchise,” “right,” and “liberty” as being 
synonyms.92 Webster’s defined the word “immunity” as meaning 
“[f]reedom from an obligation” or a “particular privilege.”93 The word 
“immunity” has the same positive law connotation as does the word 
“privilege”.94  And Webster’s defined the word “right” as meaning a 
“[p]rivilege or immunity granted by authority.”95 Similarly, William 
Blackstone described the “rights and liberties” of Englishmen as being 
“private immunities” and “civil privileges.”96 And a federal court in 
Magill v. Brown said that “‘privileges and immunities’ relate to the 
rights of persons, place or property; a privilege is a peculiar right, a 
private law, conceded to particular persons or places.”97  
                                                                                                                     
 88. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1423. 
 89. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1414.  
 90. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063–78 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the meaning of “privileges” and “immunities”). 
 91. THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 841 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988). 
 92. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1039 (C. 
Goodrich & N. Porter rev. 1865) [hereinafter “WEBSTER’S 1865”]; see also 2 C. RICHARDSON, A 
NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 627 (1839) (defining “privilege” as “an 
appropriate or peculiar law or rule or right; a peculiar immunity, liberty, or franchise”). 
 93. WEBSTER’S 1865, supra note 92, 661; see also RICHARDSON, supra note 94, at 403 
(defining “immunity” as “[f]reedom or exemption, (from duties,) liberty, privilege”). 
 94. BARNHART, supra note 91, at 510. 
 95. WEBSTER’S 1865, supra note 92, at 1140. 
 96. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 75, at 129. 
 97. Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 428 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 8,952). 
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The substance of these rights or “privileges or immunities” 
encompassed all of the common law rights of contract, property, torts, 
and inheritance guaranteed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.98 The Act 
thus guaranteed that all citizens of every race and color should enjoy the 
same state law rights as to property, contract, family law, and tort.99 As 
all commentators on the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
have argued, the drafters and ratifiers of the Amendment understood the 
words “privileges or immunities” to mean much the same thing as was 
meant by those exact same words in the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV.  This Clause was understood in 1868 as having the 
expansive meaning that Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington 
had given the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause while riding 
circuit in 1823.100 In Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Washington defined the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV in quite expansive 
terms. He said that: 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in 
confining these expressions to those privileges and 
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which 
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and 
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the 
several states which compose this Union, from the time of 
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What 
these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more 
tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be 
all comprehended under the following general heads: 
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; 
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government 
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The 
right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in 
any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, 
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of 
the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions 
of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and 
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an 
exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid 
by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as 
some of the particular privileges and immunities of 
                                                                                                                     
 98. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388.  
 99. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1388.  
 100. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1399. 
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citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general 
description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to 
which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated 
and established by the laws or constitution of the state in 
which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which 
might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and 
immunities . . . .101 
This sprawling list of constitutionally protected privileges and 
immunities encompasses a huge number of federal, state, and common 
law rights so long as they are deeply rooted in American history and 
tradition as the first bold faced passage above indicates. Newfangled 
rights, like the so-called right to privacy, are simply not privileges or 
immunities because the right to privacy is not deeply rooted in 
American history and tradition. 
Justice Washington also set up a second rights limiting principle in 
the second bold-faced passage in the excerpt quoted above. Justice 
Washington said that all privileges or immunities are “subject 
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe 
for the general good of the whole.”102 And this is where the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause’s ban on class legislation comes into play. The 
government can only pass a law that diminishes traditional common law 
privileges or immunities if the law serves the “general good of the 
whole [people]” but not if it is mere class legislation.103 Professor 
Harrison thus argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects Corfield’s expansive list of rights, but 
subject to the caveat that states can legislate to abridge rights when 
doing so protects the general good of the whole people.104 Professor 
Harrison therefore reads the word “abridge” in the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as forbidding only class-based legislation.105 The 
Clause allows states to make laws that further the good of the whole 
people, but states may not discriminate against classes of people either 
on the basis of race or some other criterion that does not benefit the 
public generally. In other words, Professor Harrison reads the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause as if it said, “No state shall make or enforce any 
law which abridges the rights of citizens of the United States in a way 
that improperly discriminates or that does not promote the general 
good of the whole people.” Professor Harrison goes to great lengths to 
show that the framers viewed the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551–52 (1823) (emphases added). 
 102. Id. at 522.  
 103. See id. 
 104. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1452. 
 105. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1422. 
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Fourteenth Amendment as being solely an antidiscrimination 
provision.106 Harrison thus claims erroneously that incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights was a mistake at least as a matter of law. He overlooks 
that a state can quite literally abridge rights one citizen at a time as well 
as by one class of citizens at a time. 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause describes the general rights of 
citizens as being privileges or immunities, instead of rights, because the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant by that Clause to protect 
only the rights of citizens and not the rights of non-citizens or of all 
people.107 The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in contrast, apply to all persons and not merely 
to citizens. The rights detailed in Corfield were thus special rights 
possessed only by citizens and not necessarily rights that were available 
to all inhabitants of the United States. The framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment left open the possibility that future legislatures might not 
want to give aliens all of the rights of citizens.108 Republican 
Representative Horatio Burchard of Illinois said, “The privileges and 
immunities of a citizen of the United States are those particular 
advantages or exemptions secured or granted to them, but not extended 
to all persons, and from which aliens may lawfully be debarred.”109 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause does not bar the states from 
altering the rights of its citizens that are deeply rooted in history and 
tradition so long as the alteration is made in a just, general law enacted 
for the good of the whole people. What is clearly banned, however, is 
legislation that favors one class or caste of people over another.110 Put 
another way, the Privileges or Immunities Clause bars discrimination by 
forbidding the states from giving greater privileges or immunities to one 
class of citizens as compared to another class of citizens.111  
What was the original public meaning of class legislation or of 
improper discrimination in 1868? Raoul Berger and former Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist claimed in the 1970s that the Fourteenth 
Amendment only banned discrimination based on race and national 
                                                                                                                     
 106. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1410–33. For instance, Representative Samuel 
Shellabarger said that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “[r]equires that the laws on their face 
shall not ‘abridge’ the privileges or immunities of citizens. It secures equality toward all citizens 
on the face of the law. It provides that those rights shall not be ‘abridged;’ in other words, that 
one man shall not have more rights upon the face of the laws than another man. By that 
provision equality of legislation, so far as it affects the rights of citizenship, is secured.” CONG. 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 71 (1871). 
 107. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1442–47 (discussing differences in rights available to 
citizens and aliens). 
 108. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1442 n.229.  
 109. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1442 n.229.  
 110. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1413.  
 111. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1413.  
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origin and nothing more.112 Justice Felix Frankfurter, and a majority of 
the New Deal Supreme Court held specifically that sex discrimination 
was not a suspect classification under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Goesaert v. Cleary, a decision that was in tension with language in 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital113 and that was correctly overruled in 
Craig v. Boren.114 Supporters of this New Deal rational basis test 
argument claim that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment simply 
sought to end discrimination against the freed slaves and nothing more. 
The Slaughter-House majority seemed to take a similar view saying: 
“We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way 
of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their 
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.”115 
But this narrow conception of the Fourteenth Amendment as barring 
only race discrimination and not other forms of discrimination is at war 
with both the text and the original public meaning of the Amendment. 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment is written broadly, 
guaranteeing “any person” equal protection of the laws and barring the 
states from making any law that abridges the privileges or immunities of 
“citizens of the United States.”116 The text of Section One gives 
absolutely no indication that the Amendment applies to only race 
discrimination and not to other forms of discrimination more generally. 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment thus stands in stark contrast 
with Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects only 
the right of “males” to vote.117 The text of Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also differs from the text of Section One of the 
Fifteenth Amendment which only forbids abridging the right to vote “on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”118 And 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment contrasts with the No 
Religious Test Clause which bars Congress from conditioning the right 
to hold public office on the basis of religion but leaves open the 
                                                                                                                     
 112. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 191 (1977); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[e]xcept in the area of the law in which the Framers 
obviously meant [Section One] to apply—classifications based on race or on national origin, the 
first cousin of race—the Court’s decisions may be described as an endless tinkering with 
legislative judgments, a series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle”). 
 113. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 114. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
210 (1976). 
 115. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872). 
 116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 117. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (ensuring that states shall not abridge the right to 
vote of “male inhabitants”). 
 118. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”). 
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possibility that eligibility to hold public office could be restricted on 
some other basis.119 Simply put, when the framers of both the original 
Constitution and of the Reconstruction amendments wanted a 
constitutional provision to apply to only race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude, they made their intent explicit in the text.120 
Thus, when the Framers of the Nineteenth Amendment wanted to give 
women the right to vote, they wrote an amendment that explicitly said, 
“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”121 If 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wanted to merely end class-
based legislation that was racially discriminatory, they would have said 
so explicitly. The fact that they chose broader language shows that they 
meant to ban all forms of class legislation and not merely the Black 
Codes. 
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment tracks other 
constitutional provisions which have a broad application despite the 
narrow historical contexts in which those provisions were ratified.122 
For example, the Thirteenth Amendment’s sweeping, unqualified 
language bans the enslavement of any individual,123 even though the 
Thirteenth Amendment was, as a historical matter, a direct response to 
the slavery of African Americans.124 Surely no one would claim that 
some new form of non-race-based slavery is permissible under the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  Obviously such a new system of slavery would 
be blatantly unconstitutional. 
Similarly, no one would claim that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, which bars the states from depriving “any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”125 only 
guarantees racial groups due process rights because in 1868 the framers 
were primarily concerned with protecting the due process rights of 
African Americans. The language “any person” should have the same 
meaning in the Equal Protection Clause as it does in the Due Process 
Clause. Because both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses 
apply to “any person,” it is quite incoherent to claim that that the Equal 
                                                                                                                     
 119. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to 
any Office or public Trust under the United States”). 
 120. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 278. 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (emphasis added). 
 122. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1421.  
 123. U.S. CONST.  amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”) 
(emphasis added). 
 124. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1401.   
 125. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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Protection Clause pertains only to race, national origin, or some other 
subset of society. To make this claim, one would have to explain how 
the term “any person” can have two different meanings within the same 
sentence. It is instead much more plausible to conclude that the 
unqualified language of the Fourteenth Amendment applies broadly to 
protect all classes of citizens from abridgements of their privileges or 
immunities and all classes of persons from denials of due process or of 
the equal protection of the laws. As we will now explain, Section One 
of the Fourteenth Amendment did in fact protect all citizens from class 
legislation and from the legal imposition of systems of caste.  
Before making this argument, we should note that some scholars, 
such as Professor Melissa Saunders, with whom we agree with regards 
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation, disagree with 
Professor Harrison’s and Professor Currie’s view of the Privileges or 
Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses that we have just articulated. 
Saunders is bothered by a handful of remarks made by a few legislators 
during Reconstruction indicating that they thought that the Equal 
Protection Clause in fact guaranteed equality in law making as well as 
in law execution.126 For instance, Representative James Garfield said 
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited the states from “mak[ing] or 
enforc[ing] laws which are not on their face and in their provisions of 
equal application to all the citizens of the State . . . like the air of 
heaven, covering all and resting upon all with equal weight.”127 The 
problem with Professor Saunders’ argument is that the isolated snippets 
of legislative history upon which she relies are not plausibly related to 
the original objective public meaning of the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as we have already discussed. Professor Saunder’s 
snippets reflect nothing more than the subjective understanding of a few 
lawmakers who misread the Amendment’s text. Legislative history may 
sometimes be helpful in explaining the objective public meaning of 
legal texts, but legislative history is manifestly not helpful when it 
openly defies the text’s objective dictionary meaning. It simply does not 
matter that Congressman Garfield did not understand that the noun in 
the Equal Protection Clause is “protection” and not “equal,” while it is 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause that is about the “making” of laws. 
Rebutting Professor Harrison’s textual analysis requires much more 
than just a few snippets of legislative history in conflict with the 
constitutional text. 
Nevertheless, it is not necessary that one agree with Professor 
Harrison, as we do, to accept the notion that Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a whole banned all class legislation. Whether 
                                                                                                                     
 126. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 288–93. 
 127. Id. at 289. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equality via two clauses or one 
is not critical. For that reason, both Professor Harrison and Professor 
Saunders recognize that the Amendment bans all class legislation even 
if they disagree as to how it does.128 
B.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Ban on Caste and Class Legislation 
The terms “caste” and “class” had related and at times overlapping 
meanings and both referred to social hierarchies which privileged some 
individuals and groups while disadvantaging and degrading others. Yet 
nineteenth century contemporaries generally assigned distinct meanings 
to each term. We discuss both terms below. 
1.  Definition of “Caste” and “Class Legislation” 
The word “class” was used in the context of “class legislation” 
which was any form of legislation that singled out groups or individuals 
for special privileges or burdens apart from those born by the rest of the 
members of society. During the antebellum period, class laws were 
often called “special” or “partial” laws129 because they did not apply to 
the people as a whole and because they often granted monopolies or 
other special privileges to a favored group or imposed unique burdens 
on a particular disfavored group.130 Generally, special laws created 
unique privileges for a particular class, and partial laws created unique 
disadvantages for a particular class, although the value of distinguishing 
between special and partial laws is debatable.131  
The word “class” had a generic definition in the nineteenth century. 
It was generally defined as a “rank; order of persons or things; scientific 
division or arrangement.”132 The designation therefore of a particular 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 1470; Saunders, supra note 17, at 249. 
 129. Professor Saunders reports, “In the mid-nineteenth century, lawyers and judges began 
to use the term “class legislation” as a synonym for partial or special laws. See, e.g., Monroe v. 
Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665, 673 (1867) (argument of counsel); Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 
573, 606–07 (1863) (using class legislation to describe legislation in which “operation is limited 
to . . . certain classes of persons”).” Saunders, supra note 17, at 252 n.29. 
 130. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 252 n.29 (citing numerous cases from the era that 
defined “special” or “partial” laws).  
 131. Professor Saunders is also mindful of this debate. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 269 
n.102 (citing Correspondence between the House of Representatives of the State of Maine and 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 58 Me. 590, 593 (1871) (opinion of Appleton, C.J., 
Walton, & Danforth, JJ.) (observing that “a discrimination in favor of one . . . is a discrimination 
adverse to all other[s]”), and Note, Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 1065, 1086 n.47 (1969) (“[W]hen a benefit is extended to one group but refused to another, 
the excluded group may be seen as suffering a relative burden.”)). 
 132. GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 75; WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 128 (“A rank or order 
of persons or things; a division; a set of pupils or students of the same form, rank, or degree; a 
general or primary division.”); “Class” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY 
(1828), available at http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/word/class (“An order or rank of 
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group of people as a protected class did not depend on whether that 
group was a minority, nor did it depend on whether that group had been 
previously subjected to persecution, nor did the class need to be 
distinguished by hereditary or immutable features. As Thomas Cooley 
put it in his treatise, “[E]very one has a right to demand that he be 
governed by general rules.”133 Cooley repeated John Locke’s famous 
tenet that legislators “‘are to govern by promulgated, established laws, 
not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and 
poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough.’”134  
In contrast, the word “caste” generally referred to rigid and 
immutable social divisions based on hereditary traits with which a 
person was born. A definition of the word “caste” did not appear in 
American dictionaries until the mid-nineteenth century.135 When 
dictionaries began defining the word and when people began using it in 
common parlance, the Indian caste system was almost always used as 
the word’s defining benchmark. This makes sense because the 
Portuguese first used the word “caste” to describe the Indian system of 
social hierarchy.136 A typical definition of caste: “In Hindostan, a tribe 
or class of the same profession, as the caste of Bramins; a distinct rank 
or order of society.”137 Senator Charles Sumner explained that a “[caste] 
system had two distinct elements: first, separation, with rank and 
privilege, or, their opposite, with degradation and disability[;] secondly, 
descent from father to son[;] so that it was perpetual separation from 
generation to generation.”138 Sumner observed that in the Indian caste 
system one person “claimed hereditary rank and privilege” and another 
                                                                                                                     
persons; a number of persons in society, supposed to have some resemblance or equality, in 
rank, education, property, talents, and the like; as in the phrase, all classes of men in society.”). 
 133. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 459 (3d ed. 1874) 
[hereinafter “CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS”]. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Neither Samuel Johnson’s 1786 Dictionary nor Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary 
contained a definition for the word “caste.” Charles Sumner said that “the word is too modern, 
however, for our classic English literature” and noted how dictionaries excluded the word. 
Sumner, supra note 40, at 7. 
 136. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 152 (1857) 
[hereinafter “WEBSTER’S 1857”] (“In Hindostan, a name (from casta, race) first given by the 
Portuguese to the several classes into which society is divided, having fixed occupations, which 
have come down from the earliest ages. There are four great and many smaller castes. 2. A 
distinct order in society.”). 
 137. See, e.g., GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 64, 75; WORCESTER,  supra note 41, at 107–08, 
128 (“Caste, n. A distinct, hereditary order or class of people among the Hindoos, the members 
of which are of the same rank, profession, or occupation; an order or class”); Sumner, supra 
note 40, at 6–10 (discussing the Indian caste system at length). 
 138. Sumner, supra note 40, at 7. 
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is “doomed to hereditary degradation and disability.”139 In India, people 
were born into a particular caste and were unable to change their caste. 
In describing the caste system of Europe, Sumner said: 
[P]eople were distributed into classes and the son 
succeeded to the condition of his father whether of 
privilege or disability the son of a noble being a noble with 
great privileges the son of a mechanic being a mechanic 
with great disabilities and this inherited condition was 
applicable even to the special labor of the father nor was 
there any business beyond its tyrannical control. According 
to Macaulay the tinkers formed an hereditary caste.140  
Accordingly, nineteenth century dictionaries defining “caste” referred to 
it as a “hereditary order,”141 “fixed occupations,” and a “distinct order in 
society”142—all of which express the principles of immutability and 
heredity which were the key features of caste.  
Notably, the nineteenth century definition of caste was not limited to 
only racial or even physical features. Instead a “caste” could mean “a 
tribe or class of the same profession,”143 people with “fixed 
occupations,”144 people with “the same rank, profession, or occupation,” 
or simply “an order or class.”145 These definitions clearly encompassed 
classifications based on status or conduct which had nothing to do with 
racial or physical features. And the nineteenth century definition of 
caste also included classifications based on religion.146 
A caste was therefore considered one kind of a class, and laws 
supporting a caste system were simply one form of class legislation. 
Accordingly, one of the definitions of “caste” was that it constituted a 
“class.”147 As Senator H. Wilson put it in arguing for black suffrage, 
class legislation was the means by which a system of caste could be 
structured and maintained.148 
One important qualification was that class legislation was 
permissible during the Antebellum period if it served an important 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 10 (referencing the Indian caste system). 
 140. Id. at 7. Sumner also referenced caste systems in Persia, Egypt, Peru, Assyria, and 
Attica. 
 141. WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 107–08, 128. 
 142. WEBSTER’S 1857, supra note 136, at 152 (emphasis added). 
 143. GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 64, 75. 
 144. WEBSTER’S 1857, supra note 136, at 152. 
 145. WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 107–08, 128. 
 146. See infra Part II.A. 
 147. WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 107–08, 128. 
 148. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app at 153 (1869) (statement of Sen. H. 
Wilson) (criticizing the argument that it is “the duty of statesmanship to maintain by class 
legislation the abhorrent doctrine of caste”).  
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public purpose, benefiting society as a whole.149 As Justice Field 
explained, “[s]pecial burdens are often necessary for general benefits,” 
such as “supplying water, preventing fires, lighting district, cleaning 
streets, opening parks, and many other objects.”150 Justice Field added 
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “[c]lass legislation, 
discriminating against some and favoring others,” but not “legislation 
which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application” to 
certain individuals or groups.151 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment 
permits laws that discriminate if they “are designed, not to impose 
unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with 
as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good.”152 
Class legislation therefore differs from laws regulating conduct which 
are generally applicable to all persons. For instance, criminal laws 
prohibiting stealing or civil laws delineating a standard of care in tort 
actions regulate the conduct of all persons. Thus the legislature could 
safely pass a law prohibiting embezzlement, but it could not pass such a 
law if it applied only to the employees of a specific bank.153 We will 
elaborate on class legislation doctrine more in Part III. 
2.  Historical Evidence of Opposition to Class Legislation 
Opposition to class legislation had deep roots in the common law 
and was a fundamental principle of the founders of this country.154 
Aversion to such laws was grounded in the Lockean philosophy that 
government existed for the purpose of protecting private citizens’ 
natural rights.155 And there was widespread belief that laws should have 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Justice Bushrod Washington said in Corfield that citizens’ privileges and immunities 
were “subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the 
general good of the whole.” 6 F. Cas. at 552. See also Saunders, supra note 17, at 261 n.68 
(providing examples, such as Commonwealth v. Blackington, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 352, 358–59 
(1837), a case involving a partial law challenge to a law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating 
liquors, and Hewitt v. Charier, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 353, 356 (1835), a case dealing with a partial 
law challenge to a law conferring a special benefit on licensed medical practitioners). 
 150. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885). 
 151. Id. at 32. 
 152. Id. at 31–32. 
 153. See Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 483 (1842) (special criminal law applicable only 
to employees of a certain bank). Professor Saunders provides more examples of cases in which 
the challengers maintained the laws at issue singled individuals or classes of people for special 
benefits or burdens. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 252 n.28 (citing, among other cases, Reed 
v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27–28 (Iowa 1849), Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121 (Vt. 1825), and Lewis 
v. Webb, 3 Me. 326 (1825)). 
 154. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 255–56; see also Yudof, supra note 19, at 1374–77. 
 155. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123–24 (describing how “[t]he 
great and chief end . . . of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under 
government, is the Preservation of their Property . . . their Lives, Liberties, and Estates”) 
[hereinafter “TWO TREATISES”]; BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 75, at 124 (“The 
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equal application to all members of society and should not be used as a 
means of favoring or disfavoring specific groups or individuals. As 
Locke put it, there should be “one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the 
Favourite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough.”156 
a.  Evidence from the Common Law and the Founding 
Even before the Founding in 1789, some states banned class 
legislation in their state declarations of rights or bills of rights.157 For 
instance, Virginia’s Declaration of Rights of 1776 prohibited the 
granting of “exclusive or separate Emoluments or Privileges from the 
Community, but in Consideration of public Services.”158 James 
Madison articulated the pervasive belief of the founders that 
government should be “neutral between different parts of the Society,” 
that “equality . . . ought to be the basis of every law,” and that laws 
should not place “peculiar burdens” on some individuals or “peculiar 
exemptions” on others.159  
Later generations recognized that one of the founders’ primary goals 
was to abolish class legislation and to form a government dedicated to 
providing for all of its citizens. As Representative Stephen L. Mayham 
said in 1870: 
[W]hen this Constitution was adopted there was no 
sentiment that was more universal in this nation than that of 
condemnation of all monopolies and privileged classes. It 
was to rid themselves of enormous and oppressive 
monopolies in the way of taxation and stamp duties that the 
colonists had severed their connection with Great Britain; 
and it was in the interest of equality and freedom of 
commerce, as well as freedom of person, that this 
Government was founded. It would be a slander upon the 
intelligence and patriotism of our fathers to say that this 
                                                                                                                     
principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which 
were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace 
without . . . mutual assistance.”); see also William Leggett, Editorial, True Functions of 
Government, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 21, 1834, reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF THE 
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LEGGETT 162–63 (Theodore Sedgwick, Jr. ed., 1840) 
(discussing how class legislation undermines the Lockean purpose of government). 
 156. TWO TREATISES, supra note 155, § 142. 
 157. See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate 
about Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 8 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 346 (1992). 
 158. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 4; Hamburger, supra note 157, at 346 n.124. 
 159. Saunders, supra note 17, at 256. Saunders also references the position of Jeffersonian 
Republicans that government should provide “equal rights for all, special privileges for none,” 
as well as the position of the Maine Whigs in the 1830s who advocated “[e]qual rights, equal 
laws, and equal privileges for all classes of the community.” (citations omitted). 
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provision of the Constitution, which is the only one under 
which this doctrine of protection is claimed, intended it to 
foster monopolies and create invidious distinctions of caste 
based upon business or wealth.160 
Senator James W. Nye similarly said in 1866:  
Our forefathers were made to chafe under monarchical 
insult and imposition. They learned to know by experience 
that common protection would never be awarded by 
privileged class. They entered into the contest in defense of 
their natural and inalienable rights, and made the cause of 
popular justice in the strength and ennobling feature of the 
conflict.161  
And Representative Owen Lovejoy said in 1860: 
The object of government, according to the theory of the 
revered sages who organized this Republic, is a very simple 
one, namely, to protect the people in the peaceful 
enjoyment of their natural rights. In other words, it is a 
mutual pledge, each to all and all to each, to secure this 
result; designating the modes in which this end shall be 
achieved. Consequently, pensions, bounties, peculiar 
privileges, class legislation, and monopolies, sought from 
Government, is for one portion of the people to become 
beggars or vampires of the rest. For classes thus to 
beleaguer Government is as disgraceful to communities as 
it is to individuals . . .162 
In his constitutional treatises, Thomas Cooley wrote extensively that 
the Constitution of 1787 contained a broad ban on class legislation that 
applied to both the federal government and the states.163 For one, 
Cooley saw “implied restrictions” on Congress’ taxing power in Article 
I, Section Eight,164 which states, “The Congress shall have Power To 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
                                                                                                                     
 160. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 180 (1870) (speech by Rep. Stephen L. 
Mayham) (discussing the merits of a tariff). 
 161. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1071 (1866) (statement of Sen. James W. Nye). 
Nye also condemned the conduct of southern states: “In the recent attempt at revolution the 
intended perpetuity of human bondage, added to the intended monopoly of wealth and political 
power, were the mainspringings of the rebellion.” Id. 
 162. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Special Sess. app. 174–75 (1860) (speech by Rep. Owen 
Lovejoy). 
 163. See THOMAS COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1880) 
[hereinafter “GENERAL PRINCIPLES”]. 
 164. Id. at 58–60, 98. 
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provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States.”165 As he said, “a tax can have no other basis than the 
raising of a revenue for public purposes, and whatever governmental 
exaction has not this basis is tyrannical and unlawful . . . . Where, 
however, a tax is avowedly laid for a private purpose it is illegal and 
void.”166 But Cooley also said that these “implied restrictions” applied 
to all the Article I, Section Eight powers, and not just to the taxing 
power:167 “Every legislative body is to make laws for the public good, 
and not for the benefit of individuals; and it is to make them aided by 
the light of those general principles which lie at the foundation of 
representative institutions.”168 Cooley also said that the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment embodied this public 
purpose doctrine. Inherent in the “underlying principle of the law of 
eminent domain” is the government’s power “to control and regulate 
those rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in common, 
and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, 
as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand.”169 
Tying together congressional power to tax and take property, Cooley 
explained that “[t]axation takes property from the citizen for the public 
use, but it does so under general rules of apportionment and uniformity, 
so that each citizen is supposed to contribute only his fair share to the 
expenses of government, and to be compensated for doing so in the 
benefits which the government brings him.”170 In contrast, eminent 
domain takes a specific piece of property from an individual and utilizes 
just compensation as a means of “equalization.”171 In his section on 
contract and property rights, Cooley also said that the Contracts Clause 
banned class legislation passed by the states, describing how the Clause 
only allows regulation of contracts for a public purpose.172 Cooley also 
described how the Constitution banned monopolies: “[E]xclusive 
privileges are to some extent invidious and very justly obnoxious, and it 
is not reasonable to suppose that the State would grant them, except 
when some important public purpose or some necessary public 
convenience cannot be accomplished or provided without making the 
                                                                                                                     
 165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 166. GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 163, at 57–58. 
 167. Cooley’s assertion is bolstered by some of the language in Article I Section 8, which 
allows Congress “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis 
added). 
 168. See GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 163, at 98. 
 169. Id. at 332. 
 170. Id. at 333. 
 171. Id. at 334. 
 172. See id. at 310–11. 
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grant exclusive.”173 A state could only grant an exclusive privilege that 
served a public purpose, such as for building a bridge.174  
Several other constitutional provisions further support Cooley’s view 
that the Constitution of 1787 banned class legislation. For instance, the 
Preamble declares that the purpose of the Constitution is to “provide for 
the common defence” and “promote the general Welfare.”175 And the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause only allows Congress to pass “general 
laws.”176 Bans on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws in Article I, 
Sections Nine and Ten perhaps were also designed to protect against 
class legislation. As discussed below, the Religion Clauses also banned 
class legislation at least with respect to religion.177 The Establishment 
Clause prevented the government from granting a special monopoly to 
one religion; and the Free Exercise and No Religious Test Clauses 
barred the government from subjecting those who were religious to 
unique burdens. So Cooley’s position that the Constitution banned class 
legislation starting in 1787 is well grounded in constitutional text. 
b.  Evidence from State Constitutions Around the Time of the Founding 
Around the time of the Founding, several states had incorporated 
various bans on caste and class legislation into their state 
constitutions.178 These provisions show that opposition to caste and 
class legislation has been strong since the Founding. These state 
constitutional provisions banning class legislation lend support to 
Cooley’s view that the federal Constitution may also have originally 
banned all federal class legislation. Alternatively, these clauses could 
indicate that the states thought that they had to include these protections 
in their state constitutions because the federal Constitution did not ban 
class legislation in contradiction to Cooley. Either way, these provisions 
demonstrate the deep-rooted opposition to class legislation in American 
                                                                                                                     
 173. Id. at 306. Cooley does not specify which constitutional provision bar the states from 
granting monopolies, but he seemed to find the prohibition in the Contracts Clause. 
 174. Id. at 235–36, 306. 
 175. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added); see also William Leggett, Editorial, True 
Functions of Government, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 21, 1834, reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF 
THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LEGGETT 162 (Theodore Sedgwick, Jr. ed., 1840) 
(describing how the “proper” function of government is “the making of general laws,” and that 
“all men are equally important to the general welfare, and equally entitled to protection”). 
 176. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof.”). 
 177. See infra Part II.B. 
 178. See generally Steven G. Calabresi et al., Individual Rights Under State Bills of Rights 
in 1787 and 1791: What Rights are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 
85 S. CAL. L. REV 1451 (2012). 
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history in the 1770s and 1780s. 
In 1787, three states, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia, 
explicitly banned feudalism, which is a quintessential form of class and 
caste, in their state constitutions.179 These states comprised twenty-three 
percent of the total number of states and forty-three percent of the 
national population in 1787.180 The provisions banning feudalism 
specifically evoked the language of class legislation and systems of 
caste, and these provisions declared hereditary privileges impermissible 
and they foreshadowed the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on caste and 
class legislation. For instance, Massachusetts’s constitution said that:  
No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any 
other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive 
privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what 
arises from the consideration of services rendered to the 
public; and this title being in nature neither hereditary, nor 
transmissible to children, or descendants, or relations by 
blood, the idea of a man born a magistrate, law-giver, or 
judge, is absurd and unnatural.181  
By 1790, eight states, including Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
North Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and 
Virginia, had provisions in their state constitutions banning the granting 
of titles of nobility.182 These states comprised forty-six percent of the 
number of states and fifty-seven percent of the total population.183 Once 
again, these provisions used the language of caste and class legislation 
in targeting hereditary rights as being especially repugnant. For 
instance, Maryland’s constitution read, “That no title of nobility or 
hereditary honors ought to be granted in this State.”184 And New 
Hampshire’s constitution similarly declared, “No office or place 
whatsoever in government, shall be hereditary—the abilities and 
integrity requisite in all, not being transmissible to posterity or 
relations.”185 
 
                                                                                                                     
 179. See id. at 1530. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part 1, art. 6; see also N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 
1776, § 22 (“That no hereditary emoluments, privileges or honors ought to be granted or 
conferred in this State.”); VA DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 4 (“That no man, or set of men, are 
entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in 
consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of 
magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary.”). 
 182. See Calabresi et al., supra note 178, at 1531–32. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See, e.g., MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS, § 42. 
 185. N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. 9. 
34
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/1
2013] RELIGION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 943 
 
By 1791, three states, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, 
had broad equality guarantees in their state constitutions.186 These states 
constituted twenty-one percent of the states and comprised twenty-four 
percent of the population.187 These equality provisions guaranteed that 
laws could only be enacted if they would benefit the population as a 
whole and if they did not single out specific groups for special burdens 
or privileges. For instance Vermont’s constitution stated that: “. . . it is 
our indispensable duty to establish such original principles of 
government as will best promote the general happiness of the people of 
this State, and their posterity, and provide for future improvements, 
without partiality for, or prejudice against, any particular class, sect, or 
denomination of men whatever.”188 Invoking the language of class 
legislation, these provisions further show the deeply rooted opposition 
to class legislation in this country. 
c.  Evidence from the Antebellum Period 
During the antebellum period, widespread opposition to class 
legislation was also found in state-level bans on special and partial 
laws.189 As the Maine Supreme Court said, “[I]t can never be within the 
bounds of legitimate legislation to enact a special law, or . . . grant[] a 
privilege and indulgence to one man” by stating that one man is exempt 
from application of a general law, while denying the benefits to “all 
other persons.”190 Instead, laws should be “prescribed for the benefit 
and regulation of the whole community” because all individuals have 
“an equal right” to their “protection.”191 Chancellor Kent similarly 
wrote in 1816 that laws should “have a general and equal application” 
and should be “impartial in the imposition[s] which [they] create.”192 
States pragmatically recognized that permitting explicit favoritism or 
discrimination would undermine the democratic process and encourage 
                                                                                                                     
 186. See Calabresi et al., supra note 178, at 1527–28; Delaware also had an equality 
guarantee which was concerned with class legislation directed against Christians. See DE. DECL. 
OF RIGHTS, § 3 (“That all persons professing the Christian religion ought forever to enjoy equal 
rights and privileges in this state, unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb the peace, the 
happiness or safety of society.”). 
 187. See Calabresi et al., supra note 178, at 1527–28. 
 188. See, e.g., VT. CONST. of 1786, Pmbl; PA. CONST. 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 8 
(“That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and 
property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expence of that 
protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto.”). 
 189. See generally Saunders, supra note 17, at 251–68. 
 190. Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 336 (1825). 
 191. Id. at 335. 
 192. WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D 163 (1898) (quoting an 
1816 opinion of Kent’s from when he was a member of the Governor’s Council of Revision). 
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corruption in government.193 Such an undemocratic system would favor 
the powerful and politically connected and disadvantage unpopular 
minorities.194 As the Supreme Court of Massachusetts said, “It is 
manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural 
justice . . . that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages 
which are denied to all others under like circumstances.”195 Courts also 
questioned whether it was constitutional to bar individuals from holding 
public office based on their political views.196 Instead, most agreed that 
the best way to protect minorities and society as a whole was through 
generally applicable laws that did not confer special privileges or 
burdens on certain groups. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained 
that when “general laws are enacted, which bear . . . on the whole 
community, if they are unjust and against the spirit of the constitution, 
the whole community will be interested to procure their repeal.”197 This 
obviously would not be the case where special or partial laws burdened 
only a few. Political groups, such as the Maine Whigs, also argued for 
“[e]qual rights, equal laws, and equal privileges for all classes of the 
community.”198  
Andrew Jackson and his followers spoke out especially strongly in 
opposition to class legislation politically at the national level in the 
1830s. As Jackson put it, government should “confine itself to equal 
protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the 
high and the low, the rich and the poor.”199 Although “[d]istinctions in 
society will always exist under every just government,” for “[e]quality 
of talents, of education, or of wealth can not be produced by human 
                                                                                                                     
 193. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 254 n.35 (highlighting the decisions in Durkee v. City 
of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 470 (1871) and Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 123 (Vt. 1825) 
(argument of counsel) to demonstrate the disfavor with which courts viewed legislation that 
promoted preferential treatment of certain individuals). 
 194. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 255 n.36 (noting the decision in Wally's Heirs v. 
Kennedy, 10 Tenn 554, 557 (1831), and Judge Catron's concurrence in Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 
Tenn. 260, 270–71 (1829) denouncing acts of the legislature that oppress “one or a few citizens” 
and calling them “too odious to be tolerated in any government where freedom has a name”); 
see also William Leggett, Editorial, Monopolies, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 29, 1834, reprinted 
in 1 A COLLECTION OF THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LEGGETT 85 (Theodore Sedgwick, 
Jr. ed., 1840) (“a]ll acts of partial legislation are undemocratic, that they are subversive of the 
equal rights of man . . . and, in their final operation, [they will] build up a powerful aristocracy, 
and overthrow the whole frame of democratic government.”). 
 195. Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 405 (1814). 
 196. See Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Bd. of Police, 15 Md. 376, 484 (1860); 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 390–91. 
 197. Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851); see also Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 
Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 606 (1831) (Green, J.) (“[T]he minority are safe, [if] the majority, who make 
the law, are operated on by it equally with others.”). 
 198. What the Whigs Want, BANGOR DAILY WHIG AND COURIER, Sept. 3, 1839, at 16. 
 199. President Jackson’s Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 10, 
1832), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp. 
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institutions,” government should not pass laws that “add . . . artificial 
distinctions” to the “natural . . . advantages” that some individuals have 
over others.200 Perhaps most famously, Jackson vetoed the re-charter of 
the Second National Bank of the United States, which he viewed as 
being a quintessential special law.201 Jackson thought the bank was a 
monopoly because of its significant role in the economy and because no 
other banks were permitted to operate under a federal government 
charter of incorporation. Jackson argued that the Constitution only 
permitted Congress to grant monopolies in very limited situations, such 
as for patents and copyrights. And he believed that without an explicit 
textual provision like the Patent and Copyright Clause, Congress lacked 
the power to grant monopolies even for patents and copyrights. In his 
message vetoing the renewal of the Bank’s charter, Jackson wrote that: 
Every act of Congress, therefore, which attempts by grants 
of monopolies or sale of exclusive privileges for a limited 
time, or a time without limit, to restrict or extinguish its 
own discretion in the choice of means to execute its 
delegated powers is equivalent to a legislative amendment 
of the Constitution, and [is] palpably unconstitutional.202 
Jackson thought government-created monopolies, such as the Bank of 
the United States, were violations of Locke’s principles of equality: 
Many of our rich men have not been content with equal 
protection and equal benefits, but [they] have besought us 
to make them richer by act of Congress. By attempting to 
gratify their desires we have in the results of our legislation 
arrayed . . . interest against interest, and man against man, 
in a fearful commotion which threatens to shake the 
foundations of our Union. . . . If we can not at once, in 
justice to interests vested under improvident legislation, 
make our Government what it ought to be, we can at least 
take a stand against all new grants of monopolies and 
exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our 
Government to the advancement of the few at the expense 
of the many . . . .203 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Id. 
 201. J. R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 144–45 (1978) (quoting 
Jackson). Jackson also said at the time that government should not add “artificial distinctions” 
by seeking “to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the 
potent more powerful”; Yudof, supra note 19, at 1376. 
 202. President Jackson’s Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 10, 
1832), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp. 
 203. Id.  
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Jackson therefore encouraged people to “take a stand against all new 
grants of monopolies and special privileges, against the prostitution of 
our Government to the advancement of the few at the expense of the 
many.”204 It is notable that Jacksonian equal protection was confined to 
economic or social class legislation, such as state-granted monopolies, 
and did not encompass class legislation that discriminated on the basis 
of race.205 
Many nineteenth century state constitutions explicitly prohibited 
class legislation. By 1868, thirteen out of thirty-seven states had 
provisions in their state constitutions that effectively barred special or 
partial laws.206 A typical provision read, “No law shall be passed 
granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities 
which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”207 
In states where state constitutions lacked such explicit language, courts 
used other broadly worded provisions to strike down special and partial 
laws.208 Thomas Cooley documented numerous state court decisions 
invalidating special and partial laws based on their respective state 
constitutions.209 Cooley said that the widely held, fundamental precept 
of state constitutional law was that “[t]hose who make the laws ‘are to 
govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular 
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor.’”210 Cooley explained, 
“Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be 
the aim of the law, because ‘[s]pecial privileges are always obnoxious, 
and discriminations against persons or classes are still more so.’”211 
There is also significant evidence that opposition to class legislation 
played a crucial role in the political fight against slavery. Although 
slavery certainly should have been recognized as violating bans on 
special or partial laws, many state courts rejected challenges to 
                                                                                                                     
 204. Id.  
 205. See Yudof, supra note 19, at 1379–80. 
 206. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 97. 
 207. OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 21. 
 208. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 258 (citing state court cases using provisions such as 
“no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the 
community, but in consideration of public services,” separation-of-powers provisions, and “law 
of the land” or “due process” clauses.).  
 209. Id. at 259–60. 
 210. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 392; see also Saunders, supra note 
17, at 260 n.62 (“[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a 
special statute which . . . singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law from that 
which is applied in all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation.”) (quoting 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 392). 
 211. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 393; see also People v. Twp. Bd. of 
Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 486 (1870) (Cooley, J.) (“[D]iscrimination by the State between different 
classes . . . and the favoring of one at the expense of the rest . . . is not legitimate legislation, and 
is an invasion of that equality of right and privilege which is a maxim in State government.”). 
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slavery,212 and many politicians as well were unsympathetic to the 
disfavored status of African Americans.213 Instead, many abolitionists 
successfully argued that slaveholders represented a powerful special 
interest group that had seized control of the government, potentially 
undermining the republic’s stability.214 These abolitionists specifically 
avoided arguing that slavery was immoral or that whites should 
empathize with the plight of the slaves.215 The argument was based on 
political power, and it appealed to a wide variety of political groups 
who worried about the economic, social, and political consequences of 
special and partial laws and who recognized that government should 
simply not be in the business of picking favorites.216 This approach to 
abolition became a unifying force for the Republican Party and attracted 
defectors from other political affiliations, such as Jacksonians, who 
objected to class legislation.217  
Debates over slavery often invoked the language of class legislation 
and caste. For instance, Representative Norton Townshend said in 1852: 
I protest against all these interpolations into the Democratic 
creed, and against any such interpretation of Democracy as 
makes it the ally of slavery and oppression. Democracy and 
slavery are directly antagonistic. Democracy is opposed to 
caste, slavery creates it; Democracy is opposed to special 
privileges; slavery is but the privilege specially enjoyed by 
one class-to use another as brute beasts and take their labor 
without wages; Democracy is for elevating the laboring 
masses to the dignity of perfect manhood; slavery grinds 
the laborer into the very dust . . . slavery is but the extreme 
of class legislation . . . slavery is nothing more than the 
privilege some have of living out of others . . . .218 
Representative John F. Farnsworth also said, “As a moral being, as a 
man, I hate slavery in the States of this Union as I hate serfdom in 
Russia—which, by the way, is about to be abolished in that Empire, 
                                                                                                                     
 212. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 264 n.80 (citing a string of state court decisions, 
including Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837) and Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 
Cush.) 198 (1849), that rejected the applicability of state constitutional provisions in challenges 
to racially discriminatory practices).  
 213. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 264–65 (citing Jacksonian Democrats’ opposition to 
blacks’ equality). 
 214. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73–74, 87–102 (1970). 
 215. Id. at 99. 
 216. Id. at 163–69. 
 217. Id. at 163–69. 
 218. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 713 (1852) (statement of Norton S. 
Townshend). 
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while we are quarrelling over the extension of slavery in this—just as I 
hate caste in India—just as I hate oppression everywhere.”219 President 
Andrew Johnson later described slavery as a “monopoly.”220 Even 
supporters of slavery recognized that slavery constituted a caste system. 
Senator Lewis Cass said:  
Between three and four millions of people, differing in race 
and color from the pre-dominant caste, are held in bondage. 
I have seen a good deal of slavery, and I believe its evils 
are much magnified, and that the slaves generally in our 
southern States are treated with as much kindness and 
consideration as are compatible with their relative 
condition of bond and free.221 
After slavery was abolished, many recognized that the mistreatment 
of blacks was not merely a problem of racial animus but was part of a 
much larger problem of class legislation. Senator Sumner summarized 
the widespread mood in 1866 in discussing the mistreatment of blacks 
in the South: 
The pretension thus organized is hateful on another ground. 
It is nothing less than a Caste, which is at once irreligious 
and un-republican. A Caste cannot exist except in defiance 
of the first principles of Christianity and the first principles 
of a Republic. It is Heathenism in religion and tyranny in 
government. The Brahmins and the Sudras in India, from 
generation to generation, have been separated, as the two 
races are now separated in these States. If a Sudra 
presumed to sit on a Brahmin’s carpet he was punished 
                                                                                                                     
 219. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., Special Sess. 120 (1861) (statement of Rep. John F. 
Farnsworth); see also CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 230 (1857) (statement of 
Lemuel D. Evans) (“ . . . servitude of caste, which is collective slavery . . . ”); CONG. GLOBE, 
33d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 769 (1854) (statement of Rep. Seward) (contrasting the lack of 
slavery in Europe with the existence of slavery in the United States and stating, “ . . . the slavery 
of caste, like African slavery. Such slavery tends to demoralize equally the subjected race and 
the superior one.”). 
 220. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 3 (1866) (message of President Andrew 
Johnson) (“Slavery was essentially a monopoly of labor, and as such locked the States where it 
prevailed against the incoming of free industry. Where labor was the property of the capitalist, 
the white man was excluded from employment, or had but the second best chance of finding it; 
and the foreign emigrant turned away from the region where his condition would be so 
precarious. With the destruction of the monopoly, free labor will hasten from all parts of the 
civilized world to assist in development various and immeasurable resources which have 
hitherto lain dormant . . . . The removal of the monopoly of slave labor is a pledge that those 
regions will be peopled by a numerous and enterprising population, which will vie with any in 
the Union.”). 
 221. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 399 (1850) (statement of Sen. Lewis Cass). 
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with banishment. But our recent rebels undertake to play 
the part of Bramhins, and exclude citizens, with better title 
than themselves, from essential rights, simply on the 
ground of Caste, which, according to its Portuguese origin, 
caste, is only another term for race. But this pretension is in 
yet other respects hostile to good government. It is 
essentially a Monopoly in a country which sets its face 
against all monopolies as unequal and immoral. If any 
monopoly deserves unhesitating judgment it must be that 
which absorbs the rights of others and engrosses political 
power. How vain it is to condemn the petty monopolies’ of 
commerce and then’ allow this vast, all-embracing 
monopoly of Human Rights. Clearly, most clearly, and 
beyond all question, such a government cannot he 
considered a republican in form. Call it an Oligarchy, call it 
an Aristocracy, call it a Caste, call it a Monopoly; but do 
not call it a Republic.222 
Senator Sumner clearly equated the caste-style mistreatment of African 
Americans to the burdens of government-granted monopoly power to 
favored groups or businesses. Granting a government monopoly license, 
or enacting any other type of economic class legislation, was therefore 
no different from the Indian caste system or the mistreatment of African 
Americans in this country. Sumner’s rhetoric was likely intended to 
persuade dissenters that African Americans deserved the same equal 
right to be free of class legislation that white Americans enjoyed. So 
Sumner compared the mistreatment of African Americans to the 
mistreatment of oppressed groups in other legal systems that everyone 
understood as unjust—namely, the Indian caste system and government 
grants of monopoly. Although comparing a government-granted 
monopoly to a caste system might sound odd to modern ears, in the 
nineteenth century government grants of monopoly were widely viewed 
as being antithetical to democracy and as being a throwback to Bad 
King George. For this reason, Sumner could credibly say: 
The Rebellion began in two assumptions, both proceeding 
from South Carolina: first, the sovereignty of the States, 
with the pretended right of secession; and secondly, the 
superiority of the white race, with the pretended right of 
Caste, Oligarchy, and Monopoly, on account of color.223 
 
                                                                                                                     
 222. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 683–84 (1866) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner). 
 223. Id. at 686. 
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Similarly, President Andrew Johnson decried the Black Codes because 
“‘there is no room for favored classes or monopolies,’ for ‘the principle 
of our Government is that of equal laws,’ which ‘accord equal justice to 
all men, special privileges to none.’”224 
In the years leading up to 1868, there was widespread support for 
abolishing class legislation, not simply constitutionalizing the ban on 
racial discrimination from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. An editorial in 
the Chicago Tribune in January 1866 explained that the Black Codes 
were a repugnant, aristocratic form of class legislation contrary to 
American values: 
We have seen, through bitter experience, the evils of class 
legislation as practi[c]ed by the States, in the form of slave 
and black codes. We cannot but perceive the evils of the 
system in England, and all monarchical governments, 
where the laws are allowed to recognize distinctions 
between persons and classes . . . . And if the several States 
can practi[c]e class legislation, as between whites and 
blacks . . . they can also create class distinctions in the 
future between native and adopted citizens, between rich 
and poor, or between any other divisions of society. The 
most effectual way to reach the root of this matter, is to 
amend the Constitution so as to forbid class legislation 
entirely by prohibiting the enactment of laws creating or 
recognizing any political distinctions because of class, race 
or color between the inhabitants of any State or Territory, 
and providing that all classes shall possess the same civil 
rights and immunities, and be liable to the same penalties, 
and giving Congress the power to carry the clause into 
effect. . . . [W]e believe that we might as well level the evil 
of caste at one blow, as to fight it by driblets and sections, 
through another long course of years.225 
The editorial’s rhetoric clearly goes well beyond a call merely for the 
ending of racial discrimination. Similarly, in February 1866 the North 
American Gazette described how Congress was discussing a 
constitutional amendment that would “secure for the citizens of any one 
State the same rights as are enjoyed by the citizens of other States, thus 
terminating the discriminations made against sections and classes and 
races.” 226 The view was, as James Wilson, Chair of the House Judiciary 
                                                                                                                     
 224. 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789-1897, 361–
62 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS”]; Saunders, supra note 17, at 273. 
 225. Editorial, Class Legislation, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1866, at 2. 
 226. Constitutional Amendments, PHILA. N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 1866, at 1.  
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Committee and sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, put it, that a 
democratic government should resist advancing legislation that 
promotes one class of citizens over another.227 Senator Sumner 
explained how banning class legislation effectively enforced the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery: 
You have, sir, decreed that colored persons shall enjoy the 
same civil rights as white persons; in other words, that, 
with regard to civil rights, there shall be no Oligarchy, 
Aristocracy, Caste, or Monopoly, but that all shall be equal 
before the law without distinction of color. And this great 
decree you have made as “appropriate legislation” under 
the Constitutional Amendment “to enforce” the abolition of 
slavery.228 
So strong was opposition to class legislation in the mid-nineteenth 
century, that some attempted to read a ban on class legislation into the 
meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, even though the text of the Act 
did not support such an understanding.229  
d.  Evidence from the History of the Ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
The legislative history shows that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment specifically intended to abolish all forms class legislation, 
which certainly included slavery and discrimination on the basis of 
race.230 The Thirty-ninth Congress that drafted the Fourteenth 
Amendment was comprised largely of Republicans and of Jacksonian 
Democrats who fervently opposed all forms of class legislation.231 
These Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats supported abolition and 
the guarantee of civil rights for African Americans, not necessarily out 
of a sense of morality or empathy for African Americans—though some 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment certainly felt that way—but out 
of a hatred for class legislation in all its hideous forms.232 And the 
Reconstruction Congresses sought to constitutionalize in the federal 
Constitution as it applied to the states the antebellum doctrine banning 
special or partial laws, which state courts had failed to use to protect 
                                                                                                                     
 227. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1866). 
 228. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 684 (1866) (statement of Charles Sumner). 
 229. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1760 (1866) (statement of Senator Trumbull 
that the Act “declares that in civil rights there shall be an equality among all classes of 
citizens”). Calabresi and Rickert explain how the Act does not support this assertion. See 
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 29. 
 230. Saunders, supra note 17, at 269–70. 
 231. Saunders, supra note 17, at 269–70. 
 232. Saunders, supra note 17, at 269–70.  
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African Americans.  
The legislative history reveals considerable opposition to the Black 
Codes, not because they discriminated on the basis of race,233 but 
because they singled out a certain class of individuals for unique 
disadvantage. Senator Lyman Trumbull, the cosponsor of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, criticized the Black Codes for “depriv[ing] [some] 
citizen[s] of civil rights which are secured to other citizens” and 
violating Blackstone’s maxim that “‘the restraints introduced by the law 
should be equal to all.’”234 Senator William Pitt Fessenden described the 
Black Codes as being unacceptable “class legislation.”235 Senator 
Henderson objected to the “unequal burdens” placed on freedmen.236 
Many others objected that the Black Codes effectively reduced 
freedmen to second class citizens.237 And President Andrew Johnson 
opposed the Black Codes because “there is no room for favored classes 
or monopolies,” for “the principle of our Government is that of equal 
laws,” which “accord[] ‘equal and exact justice to all men,’ special 
privileges to none.”238 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment carefully drafted a final 
version of the Amendment that made no specific mention of race 
precisely so as to ensure that the Fourteenth Amendment would be 
understood as banning all systems of class and caste, and not just 
discrimination on the basis of race. The Thirty-ninth Congress explicitly 
considered and rejected a draft of the Amendment that merely banned 
racial discrimination, and not systems of caste or class. That rejected 
version of the Fourteenth Amendment read,  
Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, 
nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons 
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
                                                                                                                     
 233. See JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 82–83 (1983) (pointing out that “for most speakers, what made the 
[Black Codes] so odious was not that [they] based classification on race as opposed to some 
other characteristic”). 
 234. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). 
 235. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1866); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. app. at 156 (1866) (statement of Rep. Delano (R-Ohio)) (referring to “unequal” and 
“discriminating” laws); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
Poland (R-Vt.)) (referring to “partial [] legislation”); The Proposed Amendment to the 
Constitution, N.Y. COM. ADVERTISER, Jan. 23, 1866, at 2 (referring to “class legislation”). 
 236. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3034 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson (R-
Mo.)) (arguing that Black Codes subject the freedmen to “unequal burdens”). 
 237. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 271 n.112 (citing a series of statements by members of 
the Thirty-ninth Congress).  
 238. 6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 224, at 361–62 (Dec. 4, 
1865). 
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Section 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year 
one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no 
discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the 
United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of persons of 
the right of suffrage, because of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. 
Section 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight 
hundred and seventy-six, no class of persons, as to the right 
of any of whom to suffrage discrimination shall be made by 
any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation.239 
Notably, this version used the language of class legislation (“classes of 
persons” in Section Two and “class of persons” in Section Three), but 
the scope of the ban on class legislation was limited to a ban on 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and previous condition of 
servitude. The new and final version rejected this narrow ban and 
instead forbade all caste and class legislation. 
And members of the Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Congresses 
understood that the objective public meaning of the final version of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was that the Amendment broadly banned all 
forms of caste and class legislation, and not just laws that discriminate 
on the basis of race. Senator Jacob Howard said that the Amendment 
“abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the 
injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to 
another.”240 Representative Thomas Eliot said the Amendment would 
“prohibit State legislation discriminating against classes of citizens.”241  
Representative Hotchkiss described the Amendment as having been 
constructed to ban “discriminat[ion] between its citizens and [all laws 
that] give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon 
another.”242 Senator Timothy Howe said that the Fourteenth 
Amendment would give the federal government “the power to protect 
classes against class legislation.”243 Republicans generally understood 
the Amendment as striking down feudalistic systems and aristocracy: 
“But,” say some, “this section is designed to coerce the 
South into according suffrage to her blacks.” Not so, we 
                                                                                                                     
 239. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 32 (citing BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE 
JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 83–84 (1914) for the text of 
the proposed amendment and referencing statements made by Senator Sumner that the proposed 
amendment’s scope was too narrow). 
 240. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
 241. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866). 
 242. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866). 
 243. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 883 (1868). 
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reply; but only to notify her ruling caste that we will no 
longer bribe them to keep their blacks in serfdom. An 
aristocracy rarely surrenders its privileges, no matter how 
oppressive, from abstract devotion to justice and right. It 
must have cogent, palpable reasons for so doing.244 
Senator Sumner also described the Amendment in broad, powerful 
terms: 
Rights, that Slavery, with all its brood of wrong, was 
upheld; and it is now in the name of State rights, that Caste, 
fruitful also in wrong, is upheld. The old champions 
reappear, under other names, and from other States, each 
crying out, that, under the national Constitution, 
notwithstanding even its supplementary amendments, a 
State may, if it pleases, deny political rights on account of 
race or color and thus establish that vilest institution, a 
Caste and an Oligarchy of the skin. . . . On these simple 
texts, conferring plain and intelligible powers, the 
champions insist that “color” may be made a 
“qualification;” and that, under the guise of “regulations,” 
citizens, whose only offense is skin not colored like our 
own, may be shut out from political rights; and that in this 
was a monopoly of rights, being at once a Caste and an 
Oligarchy of the skin, is placed under the safeguard of the 
National Constitution.245 
And Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania made it clear 
that the Amendment banned even nonracial class legislation: “[T]he 
same laws must and shall apply to every mortal, American, Irishman, 
African, German or Turk”246 because “the same law which punishes one 
man shall punish any other for the same offense . . . the law which gives 
a verdict to one man shall render the same verdict to another, whether 
he is Dutch, Irish, or Negro.”247 
Popular newspapers also recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment 
broadly banned all class legislation and systems of caste.248 The San 
                                                                                                                     
 244. Nat’l Republican Union Comm., Address to the American People, BANGOR DAILY 
WHIG & COURIER, Sept. 22, 1866, Issue 73, col. A. 
 245. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 902 (1869) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner). 
Senator Sumner often invoked the language of class legislation when discussing racial equality. 
For instance, he used the phrase, “oligarchy of the skin,” nine times on the Senate floor from 
1865 to 1872. Search using HeinOnline, May 18, 2012. 
 246. Thaddeus Stevens, The Pending Canvass!, Speech Delivered at Bedford, Pa. (Sept. 4, 
1866), in THADDEUS STEVENS PAPERS 11 (Beverly Wilson Palmer ed., 1993). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Calabresi & Ricket, supra note 19, at 35–36 (citing the San Francisco Daily 
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Francisco Daily Evening Bulletin said that the Amendment served as an 
“opportunity . . . for the masses to break down the domination of caste 
and aristocracy.”249 The Boston Daily Advertiser described the 
Amendment’s purpose as “compel[ling] the States to . . . throw the same 
shield over the black man as over the white, over the humble as over the 
powerful.”250 The Boston Daily Advertiser also said, “The National 
Union Committee put the case very well when they stated the object of 
the amendment of the Constitution to be, ‘to notify the ruling caste of’ 
the South that we will no longer bribe them to keep ‘their blacks in 
serfdom’”251 And the Cincinnati Commercial said that the Amendment 
constitutionalized “the great Democratic principle of equality before the 
law” and invalidated all “legislation hostile to any class.”252 The 
Commercial added:  
With this section engrafted upon the Constitution it will be 
impossible for any Legislature to enact special codes for 
one class of its citizens, as several of the reconstructed 
States have done, subjecting them to penalties from which 
citizens of another class are excepted if convicted of the 
same grade of offense, or confer privileges upon one class 
that it denies to another.253 
These sources indicate that the public meaning of the Amendment 
was a broad ban on all class legislation and systems of caste. As 
Calabresi and Rickert say:  
By connecting the old-world problems of aristocracy and 
feudalism with race discrimination and caste in America, 
these commentators provide more evidence that the 
American public conceived of the word caste at a higher 
level of generality than the word race. The Framers and 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have 
understood it to ban European feudalism or the Indian caste 
system, as well as the special-interest monopolies that so 
outraged Jacksonian Americans.254 
Significantly, the Thirty-ninth Congress did not believe that laws 
prohibiting interracial marriage would violate the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                     
Evening Bulletin describing the amendment as an “opportunity . . . for the masses to break down 
the domination of caste and aristocracy.”). 
 249. Southern Experiment, S.F. DAILY EVENING BULL., Nov. 9, 1866, Issue 29; col B. 
 250. Editorial, Reconstruction, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 24, 1866, Issue 123; col B. 
 251. BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 22, 1866, Issue 71; col. A. 
 252. The Constitutional Amendment, CINCINNATI COM., June 21, 1866, at 4. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 36. 
47
Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
956 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
Amendment, even though such laws seem to clearly discriminate on the 
basis of race. The majority view was that antimiscegenation laws would 
remain valid because they did not “discriminate against” a particular 
race or class but applied equally to everyone.255 The reasoning relied on 
a technicality, allowing antimiscegenation laws to escape the ban on 
class. Since under these laws whites could only marry whites and 
African Americans could only marry African Americans, it was argued 
that antimiscegenation laws applied to the two races equally. In 
retrospect, this argument overlooks that antimiscegenation laws were in 
fact forms of class legislation singling out interracial couples for a 
special burden without a legitimate public purpose and in reality served 
as nothing more than a smokescreen for degrading African Americans 
and people who choose to marry African Americans.256 But the 
legislative history on this topic makes it clear that the principal issue 
was whether the laws constituted class legislation, not whether they 
discriminated on the basis of race. 
Following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, members of 
the Congress that had produced the Amendment clearly understood that 
the objective public meaning of the Amendment was that it banned all 
forms of class legislation and all caste systems. Although some 
statements in the legislative history contradict Professor Harrison’s 
understanding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause guaranteed 
equality in law making, and the Equal Protection Clause guaranteed that 
the government apply the laws equally, at the very least all the 
legislative history supports the notion that the Amendment as a whole 
banned class legislation.257 James Garfield stated that Section One of 
the Fourteenth Amendment barred states from “making or enforcing 
laws which are not on their face and in their provisions of equal 
application to all the citizens of the State . . . like the air of heaven, 
covering all and resting upon all with equal weight.”258 And Senator 
Oliver Morton declared that the Equal Protection Clause means “that no 
person shall be deprived by a State of the equal benefit of the laws.”259 
Morton added that the Clause “was intended to strike at all class 
                                                                                                                     
 255. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 274–75 n.126 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 505 (1866) (statements of Sen. Fessenden (R-Me.) and Sen. Trumbull (R-Ill.))). 
 256. See generallty Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 31 (arguing that antimiscegenation 
laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation because they alter citizens’ 
privileges and immunities based on race). 
 257. Of course these statements do not firmly rebut Harrison because they can be explained 
as the subjective misunderstanding of some Republicans during Reconstruction. See supra p. 25 
(discussing). 
 258. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. H. app. 153 (1871). But see Saunders, supra note 
17, at 290–92 (noting scholarly debate as to whether the statements of Senator Garfield and 
Senator Morton actually did refer to the Equal Protection Clause). 
 259. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1872). 
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legislation, to provide that the laws must be general in their effects . . . it 
was intended to promote equality in the States, and to take from the 
States the power to make class legislation and to create inequality 
among their people.”260 Morton explained that “the word ‘protection,’” 
as used in the clause, “means not simply the protection of the person 
from violence, the protection of his property from destruction, 
but . . . the equal benefit of the law.”261 Senator Thayer of Nebraska 
declared, “For the first time in our history [the Fourteenth Amendment] 
struck down that prop of despotism, the doctrine of caste.”262 Senator 
George Edmunds of Vermont also commented that the Constitution 
“protected a right of her citizens against class prejudice, against caste 
prejudice, against sectarian prejudice.”263 
e.  Evidence from After Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
In the years following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court also understood that the Fourteenth Amendment had 
constitutionalized the antebellum doctrine against special or partial 
laws. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court dealt with a classic piece 
of antebellum class legislation: a monopoly. Justice Bradley’s dissent 
dutifully identified the state-granted slaughterhouse monopoly as class 
legislation and declared it unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equality guarantee.264 Justice Bradley wrote that “a law 
which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful 
employment deprives those citizens of the equal protection of the 
laws.”265 In a follow-up case eleven years later, Justice Bradley wrote 
that it is a “denial of the equal protection of the laws to grant to one 
man, or set of men, the privilege of following an ordinary calling in a 
large community, and to deny it to all others.”266 But the Slaugther-
House majority was unable to accept that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended to infringe on state rights so heavily.267 The only 
                                                                                                                     
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 322 (1870). 
 263. 3 CONG. REC. 1870 (1875). 
 264. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 122 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 766 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 267. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77–78 (“Was it the purpose of the fourteenth 
amendment, by the simple declaration that no State should make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security 
and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal 
government? And where it is declared that Congress Shall have the power to enforce that article, 
was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights 
heretofore belonging exclusively to the States? All this and more must follow if the proposition 
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way for the majority to justify the state-granted monopoly was to 
declare that the clause barring government-mandated class legislation 
(the Privileges or Immunities Clause) did not apply to the states. The 
Court’s reading of the Fourteenth Amendment has been resoundingly 
condemned as indefensible, and we agree that the Court’s reading is 
incorrect.268 The fact that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
excised from the Fourteenth Amendment in a case involving 
quintessential class legislation supports Professor Harrison’s thesis that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment dealing with law making and was designed to outlaw class 
legislation, such as monopolies.  
Despite the holding in the Slaughter-House Cases, future cases 
indicated that the Supreme Court still understood that the Fourteenth 
Amendment banned class legislation. For instance, in Gulf, C. & S.F. 
Ry. Co. v. Ellis, the Supreme Court struck down under the Fourteenth 
Amendment a state law that awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs injured 
by trains because the law subjected railroad companies to a peculiar 
burden not placed on other corporations or individuals.269 The Court 
explained that allowing states to subject “certain individuals or 
corporations to hostile and discriminating legislation is to make the 
protecting clauses of the fourteenth amendment a mere rope of sand, in 
no manner restraining state action.”270 The Court took it for granted that 
the Fourteenth Amendment banned all forms of class legislation and 
actually cited antebellum state cases to explain its Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence.271 The Court never contemplated that the 
                                                                                                                     
of the plaintiffs in error be sound. . . . [T]he effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments 
by subjecting them to the control of Congress in the exercise of powers heretofore universally 
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character. . . . We are convinced that no 
such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the 
legislatures of the States which ratified them.”). 
 268. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 n.1, 527 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(scholars of the Fourteenth Amendment agree “that the Clause does not mean what the Court 
said it meant in 1873”); Akhil Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 
601, 631, n.178 (2001) (“Virtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks 
that this [interpretation] is a plausible reading of the Amendment.”); Brief for Constitutional 
Law Professors as Amici Curiae, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 18-
1521), 2009 WL 4099504, at *33 (arguing that the scholarly consensus is that the majority 
opinion is “egregiously wrong”). 
 269. 165 U.S. 150, 165–66 (1897). 
 270. Id. at 154. 
 271. See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 17, at 297 n.233 (citing Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. 
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 156 (1897), which in turn quotes Dibrell v. Morris’ Heirs (Tenn.) 15 S. W. 
87, 95, Baxter, (“[W]hether a statute be public or private general or special, in form, if it 
attempts to create distinctions and classifications between the citizens of this state, the basis of 
such classification must be natural, and not arbitrary”), as well as Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. 
(2 Yer.) 230, 270 (1829) (“Every partial or private law . . . is unconstitutional and void.”)). 
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Amendment only applied to racial classifications, and the dissenting and 
concurring justices did not dispute the majority’s contention that the 
Amendment banned all class legislation. On that point, the court was 
unanimous.  
Other Supreme Court opinions similarly understood that the 
Fourteenth Amendment banned all class legislation. In an oft-cited 
opinion, Justice Field explained that under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
government could “not [] impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions 
upon any one, but [could] promote, with as little individual 
inconvenience as possible, the general good.”272 The laws must “operate 
alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and 
conditions” because “[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some 
and favoring others, is prohibited” by the Fourteenth Amendment.273 In 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., the Supreme Court said that “the 
great amendments to the Constitution which followed the late civil war 
had rendered [class] legislation impossible for all future time.”274 In 
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, the majority opinion explicitly 
said that the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibit[s] discriminating and 
partial legislation by any State in favor of particular persons as against 
others in like condition.”275 And even in Pace v Alabama, which upheld 
antimiscegenation rules, the majority similarly stated that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “prevent[ed] hostile and discriminating State legislation 
against any person or class of persons.”276 Even though the court at 
times initially indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment would not 
protect African Americans,277 the court soon changed course.278 
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court was unanimous in 
saying that the Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation. Justice 
Bradley, writing for the majority, described “class legislation” as 
“obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”279 
Justice Bradley explained that an example of class legislation would be 
a law “denying to any person, or class of persons, the right to pursue 
                                                                                                                     
 272. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885). 
 273. Id.; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 68 (1886) (citing Barbier as the correct 
explanation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 72 (1887) (same); 
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892) (same); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 183 
U.S. 79, 105 (1901). 
 274. 157 U.S. 429, 596–97 (1895). 
 275. 129 U.S. 26, 28–29 (1889). 
 276. 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1882). 
 277. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873) (“We doubt very much whether 
any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class . . . on 
account of their race, will ever be held to come within [its] purview.”). 
 278. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 382 (1898).  
 279. 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).  
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any peaceful avocations allowed to others.”280 In dissent, Justin Harlan 
wrote, “If the constitutional amendments be enforced, according to the 
intent with which, as I conceive, they were adopted, there cannot be, in 
this republic, any class of human beings in practical subjection to 
another class, with power in the latter to dole out to the former just such 
privileges as they may choose to grant.”281  
Riding circuit in 1882, Justice Field’s opinions also discussed the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation. He wrote that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “stands in the constitution as a perpetual shield 
against all unequal and partial legislation by the states,”282 and “‘that the 
law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all.’”283  
The weight of the historical evidence thus suggests that the 
Fourteenth Amendment banned all forms of class legislation and all 
systems of caste. The Amendment’s framers recognized the problems 
associated with not having such a ban, as evidenced primarily by the 
treatment of African-Americans up to that time. Consequently, they 
adopted a ban on all class legislation that had existed at the state level 
since before the Founding. Under Cooley’s view, the Amendment 
mirrored the Bill of Rights, simply articulating principles already 
embodied in the Constitution. As Cooley wrote: 
It was not within the power of the States before the 
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, to deprive citizens 
of the equal protection of the laws; but there were servile 
classes not thus shielded, and when these were made 
freemen, there were some who disputed their claim to 
citizenship, and some State laws were in force which 
established discriminations against them. To settle doubts 
and preclude such laws, the fourteenth amendment was 
adopted; and the same securities which one citizen may 
demand, all others are entitled to.284 
Either way, there can be no doubt that all class legislation violated the 
Constitution after 1868. 
                                                                                                                     
 280. Id. at 23–24. 
 281. Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 282. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 741 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (Field, 
J.). 
 283. Id. at 739. 
 284. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 466. Cooley also wrote in his 
treatise in a section entitled “unequal and partial legislation” that the Equal Protection Clause 
guaranteed that “the same securities which one citizen may demand, all others are entitled to.” 
See id. at 397. Dean Yudof also notes that Representative John Bingham from Ohio also made 
the same point in 1859. See Yudof, supra note 19, at 1373 n.43. 
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II.  RELIGION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
A.  Religion as a Caste  
The nineteenth century definition of caste surely included 
discrimination on the basis of religion. As already discussed, the 
definition of caste was not limited to discrimination on the basis or race, 
national origin, or physical appearance.285 The key features of a caste 
system were heredity and immutability which could accompany many 
kinds of systems of caste ranging from European feudalism to the 
Indian caste system, which was the paradigmatic caste system for the 
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. India’s 
caste system in turn was based explicitly on religious distinctions and 
was not openly based on racial distinctions. Nineteenth century 
dictionaries cited examples of a caste as including a “class of people 
among the Hindoos”286 and “the caste of [the] Bramins.”287 Hinduism 
played an important role in structuring and enforcing the Indian caste 
system, although the system was not entirely grounded in Hinduism. 
The Brahmins were the priestly class at the pinnacle of the hierarchy 
and served an important religious function, providing spiritual guidance 
and leading religious services. 
And other nonracial and religious hierarchies, such as European 
feudalism, the treatment of Jews in Europe prior to the French 
Revolution, as well as the many social distinctions that were made in 
Persia, Egypt, Peru, Assyria, and Attica, were all recognized as being 
caste systems in the mid-nineteenth century.288 In 1872, Senator Charles 
Sumner, one of the leaders of Reconstruction, remarked that: 
Religion and reason condemn Caste as impious and 
unchristian, making republican institutions and equal laws 
impossible; but here is Caste not unlike that which 
separates the Sudra from the Brahmin. Pray, sir, who 
constitutes the white man a Brahmin? Whence his lordly 
title? Down to a recent period in Europe the Jews were 
driven to herd by themselves separate from Christians; but 
this discarded barbarism is revived among us in the ban of 
color. There are millions of fellow citizens guilty of no 
offense except the dusky livery of the sun appointed by the 
heavenly Father, whom you treat as others have treated the 
Jews, as the Brahmin treats the Sudra. But pray, sir, do not 
pretend that this is the great Equality promised by our 
                                                                                                                     
 285. See supra Part II.A. 
 286. WORCESTER, supra note 41, at 107–08, 128. 
 287. GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 64, 75. 
 288. See, e.g., Sumner, supra note 40, at 7. 
53
Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
962 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
fathers.”289 
Senator Sumner’s explicit references to the mistreatment of Brahmins 
and Jews show that he understood that systems of caste can be based on 
religious distinctions. Representative Charles Van Wyck made the same 
point saying that: “The meanness of caste in this country on account of 
color is no more wicked than the caste of nation, religion, or blood in 
Great Britain.”290 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in a case involving the 
controversial theologian Francis Abbot, discussed how classifications 
based on religion lead to caste: 
A division of society into two ranks, a theological 
aristocracy on one side, a lower caste on the other,—the 
former wielding all the instruments of the law and all the 
power of the government to degrade men of the faith of 
Jefferson, Franklin, Ethan Allen, or Governor Plumer; 
commanding what doctrines shall not be preached; 
suppressing the freedom of the pulpit; abolishing the rights 
of property given to independent religious uses; and 
confiscating such property for the use of a state religion,—
all this is as repugnant to the plain and vital principles of 
the constitution, as to the sense and spirit of the people who 
made the constitution. The governmental work of that 
generation has been sufficiently extolled for eighty-five 
years past as a triumphant vindication of human rights, 
affording a sure protection against ecclesiastical oppression 
in particular, and perpetuating throughout the state such 
refuge as wheelwright found for a season at Exeter in exile 
for conscience’ sake. That work must be undone, and a 
degenerate age must be ready to welcome the return of the 
worse despotisms, before a system of religious caste can be 
introduced. When an infidel does not stand as well in law 
before the tribunals of justice as a Christian, in any sense of 
the word, our free institutions are a failure. To sneer at free-
thinkers of free thought is to make a thoughtless use of free 
speech, and to scoff at a privilege which we are bound to 
protect. The Constitution does not assume to create 
religious rights or to distribute them. It reverently 
recognizes and maintains them as original and universal, as 
rights which human government can neither grant nor 
                                                                                                                     
 289. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 382–83 (1872); Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 
19, at 43. 
 290. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 469 (1868).  
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withhold, which are not of human tenure, and which no 
man can give up. A single unresisted infringement, 
established as a precedent, subjugates the weak, and leaves 
them at the mercy of the strong. Every man and every 
parish is liable to hold unpopular theological opinions. And 
when the right to hold and inculcate such opinions is not 
sacred, and the violation of it is not sacrilege; when the 
constitutional defences of that right are dismantled, and it is 
left with no better security than the generosity and 
tolerance of an ecclesiastical court, or the caprice of a 
ruling class; when freemen are reduced to the consolation 
of remembering that the writ for burning heretics is 
obsolete, and of hoping that civilization will not suffer it to 
be revived,—the theory of our government is exploded and 
its original authority at an end.291 
On a superficial level, it could be argued that there is no 
discrimination on the basis of religion today such that it could be said 
that we have a religious system of “caste.” People can freely change 
religions—or choose not to practice any religion—without direct 
coercion by the government or private individuals. A person born into 
one religion is not stuck there for life. Even so, there are clearly some 
religions and religious subgroups which have some caste-like aspects to 
them. 
For example, Judaism likely qualifies as a caste, although it is not a 
caste that faces a lot of open discrimination in the United States at the 
moment. According to Jewish law, a Jewish person is defined as 
someone who either was born to a Jewish mother or converted to 
Judaism.292 Once a person is considered Jewish according to Jewish 
law, he or she cannot become a non-Jew.293 So, even if a Jew renounces 
his or her belief in Judaism or converts to another religion, he or she is 
still considered Jewish. Even such a person’s children and 
grandchildren would be considered Jewish, as long as the matrimonial 
descent is maintained. Being Jewish is thus hereditary and immutable 
and has inherent elements of caste. Prejudice and discrimination against 
Jews as an inferior caste is far less common today in the United States 
than it was prior to the 1960s, but it persists in some places even today. 
The definition of a Jew is also well known in the non-Jewish world 
and has historically been used as a basis for persecuting Jews and 
                                                                                                                     
 291. Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9, 275–76 (1868) (emphasis added). 
 292. See SHULCHAN ARUCH EVEN HAEZER 8:5; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KIDDUSHIN 66b, 
68b. 
 293. See RAMA, YOREH DE’AH 268:12; TALMUD BECHOROS 30B. 
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treating them as an inferior caste.294 For instance, the Nazis did not 
define a person as Jewish based on his or her religious beliefs, but based 
on the person’s inherited status as a Jew.295 Whether an individual 
defined himself or herself as a Jew or was a member of the Jewish 
community was irrelevant to the Nazi definition.296 Consequently, 
“[m]any Germans who had not practiced Judaism for years found 
themselves caught in the grip of the Nazi terror. Even people with 
Jewish grandparents who had converted to Christianity were defined as 
Jews.”297 The Nazis clearly viewed a person’s Jewish status as 
hereditary and immutable. Such entrenched persecution mirrors the 
immutability of the Indian caste system. It is also reminiscent of the 
disgraceful state laws in this country that defined individuals as 
“African American” based on the “proportion of colored blood” in the 
individual’s genealogy.298 
Another religion where children effectively inherit their parents’ 
religious status and beliefs is Islam. Children born to Islamic parents 
will usually be raised as Moslems and will be Moslems when they reach 
adulthood. Conversion from Islam to another religion is considered 
apostasy and is punishable by death, according to many Islamic scholars 
and regimes.299 Status as a Moslem is thus in essence inheritable and 
almost immutable just as is status as a Jew. Moslems inevitably are a 
kind of caste as are Jews. 
Children born to other religious parents may have caste-like 
attributes as well. Take, for instance, a child born into an Amish home. 
The child is born into a religious way of life without any choice in the 
matter. The child attends Amish schools and is taught Amish values and 
directed in Amish religious practices. Because of parental and social 
influences, the child likely has no opportunity or even ability to 
abandon the Amish religion until he or she is an adult. The child’s 
religious status as an Amish practitioner is thus to some degree 
hereditary and immutable. Even a child born into a less rigid religious 
                                                                                                                     
 294. In 1872, Senator Sumner explicitly referenced Jews as an oppressed caste. See supra 
p. 53. 
 295. The United States Holocaust Museum, http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/article. 
php?ModuleId=10007695 (last visited on Dec. 20, 2011). 
 296. Id.  
 297. Id. 
 298. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (“[T]here is a difference of opinion in 
the different states; some holding that any visible admixture of black blood stamps the person as 
belonging to the colored race . . . others, that it depends upon the preponderance of 
blood . . . and still others, that the predominance of white blood must only be in the proportion 
of three-fourths . . . .”) (case citations omitted). 
 299. See Tuan N. Samahon, The Religion Clauses and Political Asylum: Religious 
Persecution Claims and the Religious Membership-Conversion Imposter Problem, 88 GEO. L.J. 
2211 (2000). 
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home will likely not change religions by virtue of the dominating 
influence of his or her parents.  
Religious groups that fall within the definition of caste, such as Jews 
and Moslems, should certainly be protected from discrimination by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s no-caste principle. For this reason, we will 
argue below that a government program offering unequal educational 
opportunities for religious children relative to secular children violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment.300 Whether all religious individuals should 
receive the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection from discrimination on 
the basis of caste simply because some religious individuals constitute a 
caste, is a more difficult question. But answering it is unnecessary 
because the Amendment’s ban on all class legislation clearly protects all 
religious individuals including mainline Protestants, Catholics, 
members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, Mormons, and practitioners 
of Hinduism, Buddhism, and all other faiths. 
B.  Religion as a Class 
As already discussed, a system of forbidden class legislation is one 
that singles out particular groups or individuals for special privileges or 
burdens quite apart from those borne by the rest of the members of 
society. Class legislation is by definition legislation which does not 
apply broadly to the general populace and which grants monopolies or 
other special privileges to a favored group or impose unique burdens on 
a particular disfavored group. The original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment held that government could only make 
distinctions among classes of people if doing so was rational and 
necessary to serve a public purpose. Thus, in its 1897 ruling in Gulf, 
Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Co. v. Ellis, the Supreme Court reviewed 
the constitutionality of a law that awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs 
suing railroad companies but not to plaintiffs suing other corporations 
or individuals.301 The Supreme Court found that giving this benefit to 
plaintiffs suing railways but not to plaintiffs suing other corporations 
served no public purpose. So the Court struck down the law as 
unconstitutional class legislation. Under the principles enunciated in the 
Ellis case, classifications based on religion also serve no public purpose.  
They therefore violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class 
legislation. 
In fact, the Constitution’s Religion Clauses served as among the first 
bans on some forms of class legislation discriminating against religion 
starting in 1787 and 1791.302 The Free Exercise Clause and the No 
                                                                                                                     
 300. See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
 301. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fé Ry., 165 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1897). 
 302. See Hamburger, supra note 157, at 336–40. Hamburger describes how states and the 
framers accepted that the legislature could not discriminate on the basis of religion and that 
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Religious Test Clause both essentially barred Congress from passing 
special or partial laws that place unique burdens on religion. And the 
Establishment Clause prevents Congress from passing a special or 
partial law that grants one religion a unique privilege or immunity that 
effectively disfavors all other religions. The Establishment Clause 
essentially blocks Congress from granting a monopoly on religion to 
one specific religion. As Professor McConnell has said:  
[T]he Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was 
designed to “avoid undue concentrations of power”—
specifically, to prevent the federal government (and, after 
the Fourteenth Amendment, all governments) from 
assuming the power to control the religious life of the 
American people . . . . Just as we want no governmental 
control of news media, telecommunications, or the arts, the 
First Amendment stands for the premise that religious 
decisions should be made by individuals, families, and 
voluntary associations, and not by the state.303 
The Religion Clauses of the original Constitution and of the federal Bill 
of Rights were thus consistent with the Lockean principle of allowing 
only general rules applicable to all religions only on similar terms. To 
be sure, the three Religion Clauses did not by themselves provide as 
sweeping protection against discrimination on the basis of religion as is 
mandate by the antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.304 But they were a good first start. 
The Fourteenth Amendment dramatically expanded the limited ban 
on class legislation initially outlined in the 1787 and 1791 federal 
constitutional Religion Clauses. The Fourteenth Amendment broadly 
banned all class legislation across the board, whether based on religion 
or on any other improper classifications that gave some classes of 
citizens greater rights than were enjoyed by other classes of citizens. 
With regards to religion, the Amendment banned all forms of 
discrimination on the basis of religion, not just the few narrow forms 
specified in the Religion Clauses. There is no evidence in the legislative 
history that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to carve 
                                                                                                                     
individuals were entitled to the same privileges and rights as everyone else without regard to 
their religion. Hamburger quotes Madison that “in matters of religion no man’s right is abridged 
by the institution of civil society, and that religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.” Id. at 
340 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 121 
(1785)). 
 303. Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of 
Educational Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 848 (1999) [hereinafter “McConnell, Governments, 
Families, and Power”]. 
 304. See generally infra Part IV (discussing the limited protection of the religion clauses). 
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religion out of the broad ban on class legislation that they meant to 
enact. And it is therefore unlikely that the ban on religious class 
legislation after 1868 should have simply regurgitated the minimal ban 
on class legislation set forth in the original Religion Clauses. The 
framers knew how to narrow the scope of constitutional language when 
they wanted to do so,305 and there is not even a hint from the legislative 
history that the framers thought that religion should receive less 
protection than other groups. In contrast, the framers debated quite 
vigorously whether women should be protected from class legislation 
and what kind of protection from class legislation African Americans 
should receive.306 
And if class legislation protects against discrimination on the basis 
of race, it surely bans discrimination on the basis of religion because 
multiple protections for religion in the text of the Constitution predate 
the Fourteenth Amendment, indicating that from 1791 forward religion 
was already a suspect class. The Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses protect religious liberty. And the No Religious Test Clause 
guarantees that individuals will not be barred from holding public office 
based on their religion. In contrast, in 1787 and in 1791 there were no 
such clauses indicating that race was a suspect class. Indeed, African 
Americans were subjected to extraordinary oppression and were barred 
from holding public office and even from the rights of citizenship prior 
to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is extremely improbable 
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have created a 
new, far-reaching protection from class legislation that applied only to 
racial classes which had been totally unprotected from discrimination 
prior to 1868, yet deny protection to religious classes of people that 
actually had been recognized prior to 1868 as having suspect class 
status! The more rational approach would have been for the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to grant the new protection from class 
legislation to those groups which had been recognized as being suspect 
classes prior to 1868 and then decide which other groups like racial 
minorities or women should or should not also receive that same level 
of protection. 
And in fact the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment followed this 
logic precisely when considering whether women should receive 
protection from class legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
framers chose to ban class legislation that discriminated on the basis of 
                                                                                                                     
 305. For instance, the Privileges or Immunities Clause only applies to “[c]itizens of each 
State” Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment only guarantees males the right to vote; and 
the Fifteenth Amendment only outlaws abridging the right to vote based on “race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 306. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 74 (citing backlash from feminists over the 
inclusion of the word “male” in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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race but not class legislation that discriminated on the basis of gender, 
even though women should have been protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ban on caste systems and on class-based laws.307 The 
framers refused to begin considering gender a suspect class by 
following a two-step process. First, they carefully considered and 
extensively debated whether women should be included in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against hostile class legislation.308 
This step was necessary because prior to 1868 women had few 
constitutional rights and had been subjected to extensive discrimination. 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment needed therefore to consider 
whether to include women in the Amendment’s broad language or to 
create a carve-out excluding them from the Amendment’s protection. 
They chose the latter route. Next, they explicitly excluded women from 
the protection of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment in Section Two, 
which protects the voting rights of only “male citizens.”309 Professor 
Calabresi and Ms. Rickert note that feminists did not object to the 
broad, unqualified language of Section One banning systems of class 
legislation, which they understood as including protection for 
women.310 It was only the discriminatory language of Section Two 
which used the word “male” that they objected to.311 In contrast to the 
extensive discussion about excluding women from the Amendment’s 
protection against class legislation, there was absolutely no discussion 
of excluding religion from the Amendment’s protection, and there was 
obviously no textual exclusion either. The Fourteenth Amendment’s ban 
on class-based laws that discriminate against religion matches the ban 
the Amendment would have imposed against class-based laws that 
discriminate on the basis of sex had the word “male” not been 
deliberately inserted into Section Two. It is thus difficult to see how the 
Amendment’s framers could possibly have meant to exclude religion 
from the Amendment’s ban on systems of class and caste. 
And if the Fourteenth Amendment protects women from hostile 
class legislation, it surely protects religion from hostile class legislation 
as well. Professor Calabresi and Ms. Rickert have argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not begin protecting women until 1919 
when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified.312 They point out that the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly excluded women from 
the antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment by using 
                                                                                                                     
 307. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 66–70. 
 308. See id. 
 309. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (ensuring that states shall not abridge the right to 
vote of “male inhabitants”). 
 310. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 49. 
 311. Id.  
 312. See id. at 70–85; see also infra pp. 62–63 (discussing further). 
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the words “male inhabitants” in Section Two. But Calabresi and Rickert 
argue that when the Nineteenth Amendment granted women political 
rights including the right to vote, women automatically gained civil 
rights protection from hostile class legislation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well. Their reasoning is that granting a group of people 
political rights without granting that group civil rights is incoherent. 
They claim that the Fourteenth Amendment has an amoeba-like quality, 
automatically sucking up new groups with caste or class features to 
receive equal civil rights as those groups obtain equal political rights in 
future generations. It is hard to imagine that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would be able to automatically grant equal rights to groups, such as 
women, that never before enjoyed equality, even in 1868, yet exclude 
religious groups whose status as a suspect class dated all the way back 
to 1787.  
Finally, it should be highlighted that by 1868, all state constitutions 
protected religion, usually in multiple ways, even though state 
constitutions at that time contained little protection against racial 
discrimination. Twenty-seven out of the thirty-seven states (73%) had 
clauses in their state constitutions in 1868 when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified that banned the establishment of religion.313 
All thirty-seven state constitutions in 1868 had Free Exercise Clause 
analogues.314 Twenty-four states (65%) in 1868 had clauses prohibiting 
religious qualifications for holding public office.315 In contrast, only 
five states (14%) in 1868 had clauses barring some form of 
discrimination on the basis of race.316 It is hard to imagine that these 
same states, with resounding protections of religion as a suspect class 
prior to 1868 and only minimal protection of race as a suspect class, 
would come together and ratify a Fourteenth Amendment that banned 
only class legislation on the basis of race but not class legislation on the 
basis of religion. 
                                                                                                                     
 313. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 31–32. 
 314. Id. at 33. 
 315. Id. at 36. 
 316. ARK. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (1868) (barring deprivation of rights “on account of race, 
color, or previous condition”); FLA. CONST. art. 16, § 28 (1868) (“There shall be no civil or 
political distinction in this State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, 
and the Legislature shall have no power to prohibit, by law, any class of persons on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, to vote or hold any office, beyond the conditions 
prescribed by this Constitution”); LA. CONST. Title 1, art. 13 (1868) (guaranteeing “equal rights 
and privileges . . . without distinction or discrimination on account of race or color”); S.C. 
CONST. art. 1, § 39 (1868) (“Distinction, on account of race or color, in any case whatever, shall 
be prohibited”); TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (1868) (“[N]or shall any citizen ever be deprived of 
any right, privilege, or immunity, nor be exempted from any burden, or duty, on account of race, 
color, or previous condition.”). 
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C.  The Fourteenth Amendment Automatically Protects Groups with 
Political Rights 
In America, a logical and fundamental theory of rights is that groups 
that have political rights, such as the right to vote and run for public 
office, are also guaranteed equal civil rights.317 This truism exists 
because political rights—the right to be counted in society and the 
ability to participate in the shaping of society—are uniquely valued in 
society.318 Some people, such as children or convicted felons, have civil 
rights but lack political rights. Other people, such as resident aliens, 
have some civil rights but not others and have no political rights. But 
groups of people that have political rights certainly have civil rights as 
well.319 To say otherwise would mean that the legislature could, for 
example, strip a group of people of the right to contract or the right to 
work outside the home, but that it could not eliminate that group’s right 
to vote or hold public office. Such a construction is implausible. The 
history of women’s rights is instructive. 
In 1868, women did not have constitutionally protected political and 
civil rights. Although women should have qualified as a caste because 
of their immutable and hereditary physical features, women were not 
guaranteed equal civil rights or protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
from class based legislation because Section Two of the Fourteenth 
Amendment restricted voting rights protection to men only.320 It 
therefore became implausible to construe the antidiscrimination 
command of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment as including 
women when Section Two of the Amendment explicitly excluded them 
                                                                                                                     
 317. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 70–76. 
 318. See Steven G. Calabresi, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice 
for All?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 152 (2011); see also Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 
19, at 67–70. 
 319. The view that political rights can be granted or held back might seem strange to the 
modern observer because political rights are sometimes viewed as fundamental rights. See 
Harper v. Va. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (stating that “the right to vote is too 
precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned”). In Harper, the court dubiously 
held that a poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The majority explicitly rejected any 
need to adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution and instead relied on its perception of 
the evolving meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 669 (stating that “the Equal 
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era . . . we have never 
been confined to historic notions of equality”). In so doing, the majority failed to cite any 
original sources for the fundamental right to vote. And it failed to explain why it was necessary 
to ratify the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth Amendments if the 
evolving meaning of the Equal Protection Clause otherwise engulfed the purpose of those 
provisions. Rather, Justice Black’s dissent was likely more in line with the Constitution’s 
original meaning. See id. at 672–75 (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Equal Protection 
Clause merely mandates rational basis review of voting restrictions, not strict scrutiny). 
 320. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (amended 1920). 
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from its protections.321 And indeed feminists were outraged when they 
learned that the word “male” would be included in Section Two because 
they understood the dire implications.322 
But in 1919 when the Nineteenth Amendment granted women the 
right to vote, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality guarantee 
automatically expanded to protect women from class-based laws.323 The 
reason for this is that granting a group of people the right to vote while 
simultaneously denying that group of people equal civil rights is simply 
irrational.324 The reason the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified to give 
African-American men the right to vote just two years after ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is precisely because the Fourteenth 
Amendment only granted African-Americans equal civil rights, not 
equal political rights.325 And it is clear from the legislative history that 
the framers understood that the Fourteenth Amendment was insufficient 
to guarantee African-Americans the right to vote.326 It took the 
Reconstruction framers only two years to realize that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal civil rights for African-Americans 
needed to be supplemented by the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
equal political rights to the same group. Thus, when fifty-two years after 
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment women got the right to 
vote, women suddenly had the same political rights as did white and 
African-American men. From 1920 on, it became implausible to argue 
that women had a constitutional right to vote for president, senator, and 
governor, but they could not be trusted to make a contract or own 
property without their husband’s consent. 
It should be underscored that granting political rights under the 
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments does not render the Fourteenth 
Amendment superfluous. First, the Fourteenth Amendment banned all 
systems of caste and class-based laws, thus creating a new level of civil 
rights protection previously not guaranteed by the Constitution. This 
broad-based civil rights protection extends to many groups beyond just 
classes defined by race, gender, and religion. For instance, antebellum 
bans on class legislation mainly involved groups who were politically 
connected (or politically disfavored) or economic distinctions that were 
deemed unjustified or lacking in having a sufficient public purpose.327 
And other groups, such as children, immigrants, or the disabled would 
                                                                                                                     
 321. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 66–67. 
 322. Id. at 66. 
 323. See id. at 66–70. 
 324. Id. at 66–68. 
 325. See id. at 74–75 (discussing history of this issue). 
 326. Id. 
 327. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 251–64 (discussing the history and implications of 
reading the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth Amendments together). 
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also likely qualify for some protection from class based laws. Second, 
without the Fourteenth Amendment, legislatures could pass class 
legislation or establish caste systems, such as European feudalism or the 
Indian caste system, even though they could not take away the right to 
vote based on gender or race. Prior to 1868, the Constitution protected a 
variety of other civil rights, such as those enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights, but it did not outlaw systems of caste or class-base legislation 
explicitly as the Fourteenth Amendment did. Thus the Fourteenth 
Amendment ensures that critical civil rights not otherwise articulated in 
the Constitution or its Amendments get protected. 
The political rights of religious individuals are explicitly protected in 
the Constitution. The No Religious Test Clause guarantees that 
individuals will not be barred from holding office based on their 
religion.328 The Clause makes no distinction as to whether the test 
discriminates against a particular religion or against all religions 
generally. The Clause thus rejects the argument commonly used by 
proponents of religious discrimination that discrimination on the basis 
of religion furthers an antiestablishment purpose.329 And in fact, 
religious individuals were the only group of people—the only suspect 
class in modern language—to receive explicit protection of their 
political rights in the original Constitution of 1787.330  
The No Religious Test Clause not only bans laws imposing a 
religious test for holding office, but we think that it also implies that 
legislatures cannot restrict the ability to vote based on religion. It would 
be irrational to read the Constitution as prohibiting legislatures from 
barring individuals from holding public office based on their religion 
but as allowing legislatures to restrict voting rights based on religion. 
How could the Constitution possibly be read to trust someone to hold 
public office, including the office of the President, but not trust that 
person with the right to vote? Under the Twenty-sixth Amendment we 
allow citizens to vote starting from the age of eighteen,331 but we do not 
allow them to hold the greater trust of becoming a member of Congress 
until the age of twenty-five,332 a Senator until the age of thirty,333 or the 
President until the age of thirty-five.334 Suppose a law were passed that 
prevented people of all religions from voting, instead of just preventing 
                                                                                                                     
 328. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification 
to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”). 
 329. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721–22 (2004) (explaining that refusing to fund 
private religious organizations while funding parallel private secular organizations served an 
important antiestablishment interest). 
330.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
 331. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
 332. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 333. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl 3. 
 334. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
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members of a particular religion from voting?  Such a law would still be 
invalid under the implication of the No Religious Test Clause because 
the Clause makes no distinction as to whether the discrimination it 
forbids targets a specific religious group or all religious individuals 
generally. So it seems that once the original Constitution in 1787 
guaranteed religious individuals the right to hold federal public office, it 
also guaranteed them other political rights like the right to vote in 
federal elections. Since the Constitution specifies in Article I, Section 
Two that voting eligibility must be the same for voting in U.S. House of 
Representatives elections as it is in voting for members of the most 
numerous branch of the state legislature, the states as well as the federal 
government are constitutionally barred from denying any citizen the 
right to vote on the basis of religion.335 
Because religious individuals thus have fully protected political 
rights against the federal and state governments—the right to hold  
public office, the right to vote, and the right to serve on juries—they 
automatically, like women since 1920, have fully protected equal civil 
rights that protect them from federal and state class-based legislation. 
Neither Congress nor the state legislatures can restrict the political 
rights of a single religion or of all religions as a whole. And Congress 
and the state legislatures therefore also cannot restrict the civil rights of 
a single religion or of all religions as a whole. To say otherwise would 
lead to the illogical result that religious individuals had a 
constitutionally protected right to vote and be elected president, senator, 
or governor, but not to make contracts, buy property, or share a lunch 
counter with secular individuals. It would thus be utterly irrational to 
conclude that the antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not ban discrimination on the basis of religion. 
One possible counterargument is that because the individual political 
and civil rights of religious citizens are already protected by the very 
specific language of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, one 
ought not to read the Fourteenth Amendment’s general ban on 
discriminatory class-based legislation as superseding the very specific 
and on-point language of the Religion Clauses. This argument is 
perhaps best illustrated by the Supreme Court’s opinions affirming 
political rights for religious individuals under the Free Exercise 
Clause.336 In Torasco v. Watkins, for example, the Supreme Court held 
that a Maryland law requiring that a notary commissioner declare his or 
her belief in God violated the First Amendment (it was unclear whether 
                                                                                                                     
 335. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 2. 
 336. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 620 (1978) (striking down a Tennessee 
statute barring “ministers of the gospel, or priest[s] of any denomination whatever” from 
participating in the state’s constitutional convention (quoting TENN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 
(1796)). 
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the court was using the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment 
Clause).337 The Supreme Court explained that the No Religious Test 
Clause was necessary prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights for such 
claims of political rights, but that the First Amendment “broke new 
constitutional ground in the protection it sought to afford to freedom of 
religion.”338 Indeed the Supreme Court does not appear to have ever 
used the No Religious Test Clause as the basis for a decision it has 
rendered.339 And under current Supreme Court case law, laws that 
restrict the right to vote or that restrict many but not all civil rights 
based on religion likely violate both the Establishment Clause340 and the 
Free Exercise Clause.341 
But the Supreme Court’s case law on the Free Exercise, 
Establishment, and No Religious Test Clauses is largely inconsistent 
with the original meaning of these clauses, and there is state conduct, 
such as the adoption of Blaine Amendments, that under current case law 
does not violate the Religion Clauses but which should be read as 
violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination principle. The 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses combat only certain specific 
types of governmental actions that hurt religious citizens but that do not 
implicate political rights.342 These two clauses create protections 
uniquely required for religion. In contrast, the No Religious Test Clause 
guarantees religious individuals’ political rights. The Torasco court’s 
declaration that the No Religious Test Clause is superfluous following 
ratification of the First Amendment is indefensible as an original matter 
or under any plausible theory of textual interpretation. 
To see why the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination 
command adds and should add concrete protections for religion above 
                                                                                                                     
 337. See, e.g., Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1961). 
 338. Id. at 492.  
 339. A search for “no religious test” in all Supreme Court cases turned up sixteen results, 
none of which used the clause to render a decision. 
 340. See infra Part IV.B. (explaining the Establishment Clause tests in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997), as well as the 
Free Exercise Clause); see also Colo. Christian U. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1257–59 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that a law banning funding to only “pervasively sectarian” schools violated 
the original meaning of the Establishment Clause because the Establishment Clause demanded 
“equal treatment of all religious faiths without discrimination or preference”); Douglas Laycock, 
“Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 875, 922–23 (1986) (explaining that the Establishment Clause prohibited both 
discrimination against specific religious groups and discrimination against all religious groups 
in general). 
 341. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Thomas 
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)). Such a law also might violate the Due Process Clause 
because of enforceability problems, such as determining who was sufficiently religious to have 
his or her right to vote restricted. 
 342. See infra Part IV. 
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and beyond those afforded by the Religion Clauses, it is necessary to 
briefly canvass the protection of religion from hostile class legislation 
since 1787. 
D.  History of Religious Equality in America 
The protection of religious liberty from hostile class legislation has a 
very long history in this country predating the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by centuries.343 Several of the original thirteen 
North American colonies were purposely established to be safe havens 
for religious minorities and some of those colonies through their laws 
ensured religious toleration, albeit imperfect in our modern eyes.344 And 
it is generally recognized that the core purpose of the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment was the protection of 
religion from certain kinds of hostile class legislation and the 
furtherance of religious liberty.345 The equal protection of religion can 
be seen in state constitutions, in pre-1868 court cases, in the political 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in the legislative history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This diverse and widespread historical 
evidence shows an overwhelming sensitivity to the need to protect 
religion from hostile class legislation. As Thomas Cooley wrote, “[T]he 
general voice has been, that persons of every religious persuasion 
should be made equal before the law, and that questions of religious 
belief and religious worship should be questions between each 
                                                                                                                     
 343. See generally Hamburger, supra note 157, at 295–367 (discussing history of religion 
and equal protection in the Eighteenth century). 
 344. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1424–30 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, 
Origins] (noting the religious toleration in Maryland, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
and Carolina and discussing the development of religious protection in the colonies). 
 345. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 16, at 5 (arguing that the religion clauses must be “read 
together as creating a doctrine more akin to the reading of the equal protection clause than to the 
due process clause, i.e., they must be read to mean that religion may not be used as a basis for 
classification for purposes of governmental action”); see also Sch. Dist. v Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (the “single end” of the religion clauses is “to promote and 
assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the 
conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of that end”); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 678 (1980) 
(arguing that the “central aim of the Religion Clauses [is] protection of religious liberty”); 
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The 
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1282–83 
(1994); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 (1985) 
[hereinafter “McConnell, Accommodation”] (“[R]eligious liberty is the central value and 
animating purpose of the Religion Clauses . . . .”); Meyler, supra note 15; Lawrence G. Sager, 
The Free Exercise of Culture: Some Doubts and Distinctions, 129 DAEDALUS 193, 193–207 
(2000); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 9 (2004). 
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individual man and his Maker.”346 It is therefore inconceivable that the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to incorporate a ban on 
class-based laws that discriminated on the basis of race but not against 
class-based laws that discriminated on the basis of religion. Religion 
had by 1868 been a suspect class since colonial times. Surely, if racial 
classifications are to receive strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and to be upheld only in the face of a compelling public 
purpose, the same must be true of laws that classify on the basis of 
religion. 
1.  Historical Persecution of Religion and the Founders’ Response 
The framers of the Constitution and Bill of rights were well aware of 
the ugly history of religious persecution in England when they wrote 
those documents.347 For instance, church elections were famously 
manipulated by the King. King Henry II thus allowed the church to hold 
“free” elections but ordered it to elect his clerk;348 and King Henry VIII 
assumed full personal control of the church and claimed the power to 
appoint church officials.349 Prior to the rise of King Charles I, the 
Church of England dominated the landscape in Elizabethan and Stuart 
England, and the supporters of the Church of England thoroughly 
suppressed religious dissenters such as Protestants and Roman 
Catholics.350 By the 1630s, high Church Anglicans allied with Charles I 
and his Catholic Queen causing Protestant dissenters to flee England for 
the safety of living in the Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut Colonies. 
This exodus for the new world continued in the 1640s during the 
waging of the English Civil War between Oliver Cromwell and the 
dissenting Protestants and Charles I and his high church Anglicans. 
Following the English Civil War, Protestants executed King Charles I 
and his Archbishop of Canterbury and similarly persecuted dissenters 
from Puritanism. Cromwell and his allies confiscated property, denied 
free religious exercise, and imprisoned non-Protestants.351 Following 
the return of the monarchy in 1660, the persecution of Protestant 
                                                                                                                     
 346. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 467. 
 347. See  McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1421–74; see also Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702–04 (2012) (recounting the 
history of religious persecution in England and how it impacted the framers when they wrote the 
First Amendment); Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114–17 (1943) (commenting that 
the First Amendment was designed to protect religious individuals from persecution by banning 
such practices as “taxes on knowledge” (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244–
49 (1936)). 
 348. See W. L. WARREN, HENRY II 312 (1973). 
 349. See G. R. ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 327–32 
(1960). 
 350. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1421. 
 351. See id. at 1421–22.  
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dissenters resumed and the persecution of Catholics continued.352 The 
Test Act of 1672 denied public and military office to non-Anglicans and 
required that everyone follow the religious practices of the Church of 
England.353 
Eager to escape the religious persecution of England, many 
dissenters fled to America, but unfortunately they brought some bad 
English habits with them. The Puritans in the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony, for example, persecuted dissenters, even executing some 
Quakers.354 In Virginia, Puritans and Catholics were expelled because 
the Church of England was the established church there, and Baptists 
were horsewhipped.355 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 
eventually guaranteed equal treatment of religions but only for 
Christians,356 and Massachusetts proved to be unfriendly to 
Presbyterians, Baptists, and Quakers.357 Many other states also had 
religious test oaths requiring public officials to declare their adherence 
to a particular religion.358 By 1787, eleven states prohibited non-
Christians from holding public office, and four prohibited non-
Protestants from holding office.359 
Jews also suffered tremendous persecution in England historically,360 
as they did throughout Europe.361 In the Twelfth and Thirteenth 
Centuries, Jews were subjected to mob violence in England perpetrated 
by both the royal crown and private individuals.362 Blood libels 
persisted, and there were many incidents of mobs murdering Jews and 
stealing Jewish property.363 During this time, Jews were singled out for 
many special legal disadvantages, including higher taxes, prohibitions 
                                                                                                                     
 352. See id.  
 353. See id. 
 354. Id. at 1422–23. 
 355. Id. at 1423. 
 356. MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. III (1780) (“And every denomination of Christians, 
demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the commonwealth, shall be equally 
under the protection of the law: and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another 
shall ever be established by law.”). 
 357. McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1423. 
 358. See J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Note, Applying the Break: Religion and the 
Peremptory Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569, 597 n.192 (1995) (describing how in Georgia, South 
Carolina, and New Hampshire only Protestants could serve in the legislature but how other 
states, such as Vermont and Pennsylvania, had less severe restrictions). 
 359. McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1474. 
 360. See generally Shira Shoenberg, Virtual Jewish History Tour: United Kingdom, JEWISH 
VIRTUAL LIBRARY, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/England.html (last visited Oct. 26, 
2012) [hereinafter “Virtual Jewish History Tour: United Kingdom”]. 
 361. See Report on Global Anti-Semitism, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/global2004.html (last visited Oct. 26, 
2012) (describing anti-Semitism in many other European countries). 
 362. See Virtual Jewish History Tour: United Kingdom, supra note 360. 
 363. Id. 
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on owning land, bans on inheritance from parent to child, and 
substantial restrictions on trade and occupation.364 Finally, in 1290, 
King Edward I formally expelled all the Jews from England a full 202 
years before the Spanish Inquisition expelled the Jews from Spain. It 
was not until the 1650s, under Oliver Cromwell, that the Jews were 
again allowed back into England, and Jews in England continued to 
have limited legal rights and religious freedom from the 1650s until the 
mid-nineteenth century.365 
It was against this backdrop of bloody religious warfare and 
intolerance that the framers of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights 
sought to guarantee religious liberty. By enacting the Establishment 
Clause, in the very first clause in the Bill of Rights, the framers ensured 
that there would never be a national church. As James Madison said, the 
Establishment Clause responded to the concern that “one sect might 
obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion 
to which they would compel others to conform.”366 By enacting the Free 
Exercise Clause in the Bill of Rights, the framers barred the government 
from discriminatorily targeting religious worship. And regarding the No 
Religious Test Clause, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, later Chief 
Justice of the United States, wrote: 
[T]he sole purpose and effect of [the ban on religious tests 
for office] is to exclude persecution, and to secure to you 
the important right of religious liberty . . . . In our country 
every man has a right to worship God in that way which is 
most agreeable to his own conscience. If he be a good and 
peaceable citizen, he is liable to no penalties or incapacities 
on account of his religious sentiments; or in other words, he 
is not subject to persecution.367 
The Religion Clauses thus worked in concert to guarantee religious 
liberty and guard against the religious persecution which had pervaded 
England and the colonies.368 For this reason, Thomas Jefferson 
described both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause 
as “building a wall of separation between Church & State.”369 
                                                                                                                     
 364. Id. 
 365. Id. 
 366. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730–31 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (remarks of J. Madison). 
 367. Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder VII, in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 448, 449 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds., 1983) 
(originally published in the Connecticut Courant, Dec. 17, 1787); McConnell, Origins, supra 
note 344, at 1474. 
 368. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
703 (2012). 
 369. 16 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282 (Albert Ellery 
Bergh ed., 1905), available at http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff16.htm. 
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Prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, several states proposed 
amendments to the original Constitution of 1787, which give us a sense 
of the passion the framers had for protecting religious freedom. For 
instance, New York proposed “[t]hat the people have an equal, natural, 
and unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, 
according to the dictates of conscience.”370 New Hampshire proposed, 
“Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights 
of conscience.” 371 And James Madison proposed, “The civil rights of 
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor 
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal 
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”372 
These proposed amendments demonstrate how extraordinarily 
significant religious liberty was to the founders. Though the final 
version of the Free Exercise Clause that was ultimately ratified did not 
guarantee the level of equality mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the notion that religious individuals should not be equal before the law 
would have been considered odious to the framers of the original 
Constitution.  
2.  State Constitutions and Court Cases Prior to 1868 
Many early state constitutions guaranteed equality of religion in ways 
that mirrored the bans we discussed earlier on special and partial 
laws.373 For instance, Vermont’s 1786 territorial constitution, which was 
one of the first constitutions to contain a broad equality guarantee in 
American history,374 stated: “[I]t is our indispensable duty, to establish 
such original principles of government, as will best promote the general 
happiness of the people of this State, and their posterity, and provide for 
future improvements, without partiality for, or prejudice against, any 
particular class, sect, or denomination of men whatever . . . .”375 The 
language “sect, or denomination” referred to religion and reflected the 
                                                                                                                     
 370. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 327 (J. Elliot 2d ed., 1836) (July 26, 1788) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1480–81 
(noting that Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island made similar proposals). 
 371. See 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 370, at 326 (emphasis added). 
 372. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 366, at 434 (proposal of James Madison, June 8, 
1789) (emphasis added). 
 373. Meyler, supra note 15, at 293–94. 
 374. See Calabresi et al., supra note 178, at 1527 (listing Massachusetts and Pennsylvania 
as the other two states to initially contain equality guarantees). 
 375. VT. CONST. of 1786, pmbl. Delaware’s constitution also had a provision that involved 
banning religious discrimination, but it did so somewhat awkwardly and even discriminatorily 
in retrospect. See DEL. DECL. OF RIGHTS, § 3 (1776) (“That all persons professing the Christian 
religion ought forever to enjoy equal rights and privileges in this state, unless, under colour of 
religion, any man disturb the peace, the happiness or safety of society.”). 
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view that religion was a suspect classification and discrimination on the 
basis of religion was the quintessential form of improper discrimination 
with which the framers were concerned at that time. Some state 
constitutions guaranteed that an individual’s civil rights would not be 
burdened or privileged on account of his religion. A typical provision 
read, “The civil rights, privileges, or capacities of any citizen, shall in 
no way be diminished, or enlarged, on account of his religious 
principles.”376 Some state constitutions even created a positive 
legislative duty to protect religion and possibly foster free exercise. For 
instance, the Texas Constitution said, “[I]t shall be the duty of the 
Legislature to pass such laws as (may) shall be necessary to protect 
every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of their own 
mode of public worship.”377 Some guaranteed an individual’s right to 
exercise his religion without the influence of governmental burdens or 
privileges. For instance, the Maryland Constitution provided: 
That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such 
manner as he thinks most acceptable to him; all persons, 
professing the Christian religion, are equally entitled to 
protection in their religious liberty; wherefore no person 
ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate on 
account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his 
religious practice. 378  
                                                                                                                     
 376. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 6; see also N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX (“[N]o 
Protestant inhabitant of this Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on 
account of his religious principles, [and] all persons professing a belief in the faith of any 
Protestant sect . . . shall fully and freely enjoy every privilege and immunity, enjoyed by others 
their fellow-subjects.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, pmbl. (“[G]overnment ought to be instituted . . . 
for the security and protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who 
compose it to enjoy their natural rights . . . without partiality for, or prejudice against any 
particular class, sect, or denomination of men.”);  id. at art. II (“Nor can any man, who 
acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, 
on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship.”); S.C. CONST. of 
1778, art. XXXVIII (“[A]ll denominations of Christian Protestants in this State, demeaning 
themselves peaceably and faithfully, shall enjoy equal religious and civil privileges.”); VT. 
CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art. III (“[N]or can any man be justly deprived or abridged of any civil 
right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments, or peculiar mode of religious 
worship.”); VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 11 (“No man shall be . . . enforced, restrained, 
molested or burdened, in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer on account of his religious 
opinions or belief; but all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their 
opinions in matters of religion, and the same shall in no wise affect, diminish or enlarge their 
civil capacities.”). 
 377. TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. I, § 4; see also Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 40 
(noting that Nebraska and Ohio had similar provisions). 
 378. MD. CONST. OF 1776, DECL. of RIGHTS, para.  33 (1776) (emphasis added); see also 
ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 7 (“[N]o preference shall ever be given by law to any religious 
sect, society, denomination, or mode of worship . . . .”); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 4 (“The 
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These provisions provided religious practitioners with significantly 
enhanced protection from class legislation than did the Free Exercise 
Clause and Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. And they 
reflect a commitment to religious equality. 
A few states even explicitly endorsed religious equality. The 
Massachusetts constitution, though establishing Christianity as the state 
religion, explicitly endorsed equality for the different branches of 
Christianity: “[E]very denomination of [C]hristians, demeaning 
themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the Commonwealth, shall 
be equally under the protection of the law: And no subordination of any 
one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law.”379 
Similarly, Maryland’s clause read, “[A]ll persons are equally entitled to 
protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought, by any 
law to be molested in his person or estate, on account of his religious 
persuasion, or profession, or for his religious practice.”380 
By 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, many states 
had outright bans against class legislation imbedded in their religion 
clauses. Professor Calabresi and Sarah Agudo have pointed out that 
twenty-seven out of the thirty-seven states (73%) had clauses in their 
state constitutions that banned the establishment of religion.381 But most 
of these clauses did much more than merely prevent the legislature from 
passing a law “respecting an establishment of religion,” as the federal 
Constitution mandates.382 Instead they actually banned religious class 
legislation. A typical clause read, “No preference shall be given by law 
to any Christian sect or mode of worship.”383 Giving a preference to a 
religious group is a special law, comparable to giving an economic 
preference to a class of merchants. A related but distinct formulation of 
state establishment clauses read, “[N]o person shall by law be 
compelled to join or support, nor be classed with, or associated to, any 
congregation, church, or religious association.”384 Compelling 
individuals to join or support a certain religion effectively grants a 
monopoly to that religion because it eliminates the ability of 
“consumers of religion” to select their preferred religion. The supply of 
                                                                                                                     
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or 
preference, shall forever be allowed in this State . . . .”). 
 379. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. III (1780) (emphasis added). 
 380. See, e.g., MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 36 (1867) (emphasis added); see also ME 
CONST. of 1819, art. 1, § 3 (“[A]nd all persons demeaning themselves peaceably, as good 
members of the State, shall be equally under the protection of the laws, and no subordination nor 
preference of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law, nor shall 
any religious test be required as a qualification for any office or trust, under this State . . . .”). 
 381. Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 31–32. 
 382. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 383. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 1, § 4. 
 384. Id. art. 7, § 1. 
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religion is restricted to a single religion, demand for religion is affixed 
by the government, and the competitive market for religion is 
terminated. In sum, twenty-two states (59%) in 1868, a majority, had 
this stronger language in their establishment clauses when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. These clauses clearly indicate that 
a majority of the states in 1868 recognized the problem of religious 
class legislation and sought to eradicate it more fully than would be 
accomplished simply by approving a replica of the federal 
Establishment Clause. 
Some early court cases also emphasized the equal protection of 
religion in their opinions.385 In the 1799 case of Runkel v. Winemiller, 
Judge Chase granted a writ of mandamus to a minister in a dispute with 
his congregation, relying on the principle that “the pastors, teachers and 
ministers, of every denomination of [C]hristians, are equally entitled to 
the protection of the law, and to the enjoyment of their religious and 
temporal rights.”386 In this context, equal protection meant that 
contractual obligations and rights applied equally to all members and 
leaders of a church without any special privilege or burden.387 In the 
1876 decision in Ferriter v. Tyler, the Vermont Supreme Court declared 
that the Vermont constitution was: 
[D]esigned . . . to secure to every subject equal civil rights, 
irrespective of his religious faith; so that his being a 
Catholic or a Protestant—his being a Calvinist or an 
Arminian—his being an orthodox evangelical or a free-
thinker—his being a Baptist or a Universalist—an 
Episcopalian or a Quaker, should not make him the object 
of discriminating legislation or judicial judgment to his 
disadvantage, as compared with those of different faith and 
practice,—so that no law should be aimed or executed 
against him because he professed and practiced one form of 
religious belief or disbelief rather than another, within the 
limits of personal immunity consistent with good order and 
the peace of society under the government.388 
                                                                                                                     
 385. See Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. 292, 307 (1815) (involving a dispute over glebe 
rights, the Court quoted the Vermont legislature’s preamble to a related act concerning glebe 
lots: “[B]y the first principles of our government it is contemplated that all religious sects and 
denominations of Christians, whose religious tenets are consistent with allegiance to the 
constitution and government of this state, should receive equal protection and patronage from 
the civil power”). 
 386. Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 H. & McH. 429, 450 (1799). 
 387. Id. at 450–51. 
 388. Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 465 (1876) (holding that a school did not have to grant a 
religious exemption and could expel a child for missing school to attend church on a religious 
holiday). 
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3.  Religion and Abolition  
Religion played an important role in the abolition of slavery.389 The 
first American and British abolitionists were deeply religious 
individuals who recognized the moral depravity of slavery.390 Quakers, 
Methodists, and Presbyterians were some of the early abolitionists.391 
Religious abolitionists viewed slavery as “irreconcilable with the 
manifested will of our Great Creator, and with the imperative 
declaration of our blessed Savior ‘all things whatsoever ye would that 
men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the 
prophets.’”392 As Justice Joseph Story put it while riding circuit, slavery 
was illegal because it was “repugnant to the great principles of Christian 
duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good faith and 
morality, and the eternal maxims of social justice.”393 Religious 
abolitionists believed that it was their religious duty to end slavery, and 
they embarked on a large-scale political campaign in New England and 
in Congress itself where groups of clergymen and other religious 
individuals sought to end slavery under the law.394 Other abolitionists 
took a more radical view: “By what rule is [assisting runaway slaves] 
justifiable? By the commands of the bible, and the whole spirit of the 
gospel.”395 
White slave owners often restricted African-American slaves’ 
religious practices to prevent religiously inspired rebellions. Southern 
                                                                                                                     
 389. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious 
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1131–37 (1994); see 
also CHARLES RAPPLEYE, SONS OF PROVIDENCE: THE BROWN BOTHERS, THE SLAVE TRADE, AND 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 225–31 (2006). 
 390. See THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK REDNECKS AND WHITE LIBERALS 116 (2005) (“[T]he 
principal impetus for the abolition of slavery came first from very conservative religious 
activists—people who would today be called ‘the religious right.’”). 
 391. See Bradley S. Tupi, Religious Freedom and the First Amendment, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 
195, 246 (2007) (citing W. O. BLAKE, THE HISTORY OF SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE 169–72 
(1858)). 
 392. The Soc’y of Friends of Ind., Address to the Citizens of the State of Ohio, Concerning 
What Are Called The Black Laws (1848), reprinted in SLAVERY, RACE, AND THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM, 1700–1872, SER. NO. 7, in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 
101, 101 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988). 
 393. United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (Story, Circuit Justice, 
C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551). Benjamin Rush also said, “Slavery is repugnant to the 
principles of Christianity . . . . It is rebellion against the authority of a common Father. It is a 
practical denial of the [effect] of the death of a common Savior. It is [encroaching on the 
authority] of the great Sovereign of the universe who has solemnly claimed an exclusive 
property in the souls of men.” See Tupi, supra note 391, at 246–47 (quoting MINUTES OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONVENTION OF DELEGATES FROM THE ABOLITION SOCIETIES 24 (1794)). 
 394. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1132–33 (describing their abolition campaigns). 
 395. Id. at 1132 n.119 (quoting REV. W. BEARDSLEY, NARRATIVE AND FACTS, RESPECTING 
ALANSON WORK, JAS. E. BURR AND GEO. THOMPSON, PRISONERS IN THE MISSOURI PENITENTIARY, 
FOR THE ALLEGED CRIME OF NEGRO STEALING (1842)). 
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slave owners and governments became concerned that religion was 
leading to abolition and to slave rebellion. Notably, Charles Finney, a 
preacher in New York, led a popular religious revival in 1824–1825 
based on a liberal theology that emphasized social work.396 Many of 
Finney’s followers significantly furthered the abolitionist cause and 
became prominent abolitionists in the mid-nineteenth century.397 Nat 
Turner and Denmark Vesey were also preachers who led significant 
rebellions against white slave owners.398 Nat Turner’s bloody rebellion 
led to the death of seventy whites and caused many whites to fear that 
religion was a potential threat to their system of slavery.399 Denmark 
Vesey invoked the Bible to inspire rebellion. As one slave testified, “At 
this meeting Vesey said . . . that we ought to rise up and fight against 
the whites for our liberties . . . . [H]e read to us from the Bible, how the 
Children of Israel were delivered out of Egypt from bondage.”400  
As a result, southerners established harsh laws restricting slaves’ 
ability to exercise their religion, including draconian regulations on 
black religious assemblies.401 For instance, in the District of Columbia, 
“all meetings for religious worship, beyond the hour of ten o’clock at 
night, of free negroes, mulattoes or slaves, shall be and they are hereby 
declared to be unlawful.”402 And in South Carolina, it was “unlawful for 
‘assemblies of slaves, free negroes, mulattoes and mestizoes’ to meet 
‘in a confined or secret place.’”403  Law enforcement personnel could 
administer “corporal punishment, not exceeding twenty lashes, upon 
such slaves, free negroes, &c., as they may judge necessary for 
deterring them from the like unlawful assemblage in the future.”404 
Many laws prohibited slaves from preaching or religious practice unless 
                                                                                                                     
 396. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1131–32 n.114. 
 397. Id.  
 398. See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for 
Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1051–52 
(1996). 
 399. Lash, supra note 389, at 1133. 
 400. See Rutherford, supra note 398, at 1052 n.9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Rolla’s 
Statement, in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 76 
(Herbert Aptheker ed., 1990)). 
 401. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1134–35 n.133 (detailing some of the oppressive laws in 
different states). 
 402. WORTHINGTON G. SNETHEN, THE BLACK CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN 
FORCE SEPTEMBER 1ST, 1848, at 46 (A. & F. Antislavery Society, 1848), reprinted in 2 
STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 179, 224 (reprinting and quoting 
Ordinances of the Corporation of Washington (Oct. 29, 1836)). 
 403. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1134–35 n.133 (quoting GEORGE M. STROUD, SKETCH OF 
THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
89 (1827), reprinted in 1 STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 157, 245 (Paul 
Finkelman ed., 1988) (citing 2 Brevard’s Digest)). 
 404. Id. 
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in the presence of whites.405 Under this tight regulation, religious 
gatherings invariably espoused proslavery ideology and encouraged 
slaves to “obey their masters.”406 There were also laws prohibiting 
blacks from reading the Bible,407 becoming ministers,408 preaching,409 
and leaving their plantations on “Sundays, fast days, and holy days.”410  
This religious oppression repulsed many observers and drove many 
to support abolition.411 As Charles Sumner wrote: 
Is it not strange that the Church, or any body of men, upon 
whom the faintest ray of Christianity has fallen, should 
endeavor to exclude the African, ‘guilty of a skin not 
coloured as their own,’ from the freest participation in the 
privileges of worshipping the common God?—It would 
seem as if prejudice, irrational, as it is uncharitable, could 
no further go.412 
Former slave and prominent abolitionist Henry Highland Garnet 
declared in a speech, “Nearly three millions of your fellow citizens, are 
prohibited by law . . . from reading the Book of Life.”413 
Charles Gardner also observed, “[A]ccess to that heavenly chart, 
which is laid down by Jehovah as the only safe rule of faith and 
practice, the liberty of reading and understanding how he may serve G-d 
acceptably.”414 He further said, “See then, the wickedness of those laws 
which go contrary to the law of God, and say to the slave, ‘You shall 
                                                                                                                     
 405. See, e.g., Act of 1805, ch. XLVII, 1805 VA. ACTS (barring slaves from going to 
religious ceremonies except those conducted by whites); Act of December 1831, ch. 94, 1845 
MD. LAWS (prohibiting all religious meetings for blacks unless conducted by whites); Act of 
1847, § 2, 1847 MO. LAWS 104 (preventing blacks from preaching unless a police officer was 
present to “prevent all seditious speeches”). 
 406. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1134–35 (citing to 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS 
435 n.17 (C Peter Ripley ed., 1991)).  
 407. Id. 
 408. See, e.g., Act of 1832, ch. IV, 1832 N.C. SESS. LAWS 7. 
 409. See, e.g., Act of 1847, § 2, 1847 MO. LAWS 104 (“[N]o meeting or assemblage of 
negroes . . . for the purpose of religious worship, or preaching, shall be held or permitted when 
the services are performed or conducted by negroes . . . unless some sheriff, constable, marshal, 
police officer or justice of the peace, shall be present.”). 
 410. Rutherford, supra note 398, at 1051. 
 411. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1137. 
 412. Letter from Charles Sumner to John Jay (May 25, 1843), in 1 THE SELECTED LETTERS 
OF CHARLES SUMNER 129, 129–30 (Beverly W. Palmer ed., 1990). Kurt T. Lash cited this 
statement from Sumner as an example of how abolitionists advanced their position by asserting 
slavery violated religious freedoms. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1137 n.142. 
 413. Speech by Henry Highland Garnet: Delivered Before the National Convention of 
Colored Citizens, Buffalo, New York (Aug. 16, 1843), in 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS 
403, 406 (C. Peter Ripley ed., 1991).  
 414. Speech by Charles W. Gardner, delivered at the Broadway Tabernacle, New York, 
New York (May 9, 1837), in 3 THE BLACK ABOLITIONIST PAPERS, supra note 413, at 206. 
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not read these Scriptures, nor understand them, nor teach them to your 
children, nor obey them.’ Is it not morally right, and politically safe, to 
abolish such a system?”415  
4.  Recognizing the Need to Protect Religion 
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment shows that the 
framers of that Amendment recognized the oppression of slaves’ 
religious practices and existing discrimination on the basis of religion 
and sought to rectify it.416 James Wilson, Chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee and sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, noted slavery’s 
“incessant, unrelenting, aggressive warfare upon . . . the purity of 
religion.”417 Lyman Trumbull, the cosponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, also highlighted the religious oppression of blacks, specifically 
noting laws preventing them from “exercising the function of a 
minister” and making it “a highly penal offense for any person . . . to 
teach slaves.”418 Congressman James Ashley said that “[slavery] has 
silenced every free pulpit within its control.”419 And Senator Henry 
Wilson said, “[r]eligion . . . never has been and never will be allowed 
free exercise in any community where slavery dwarfs the consciences of 
men.”420 Wilson also remarked, “The bitter cruel relentless persecutions 
of the Methodists in the South, almost as void of pity as those which 
were visited upon the Huguenots in France, tell how utterly slavery 
disregards the right to free exercise of religion.”421 Senator George 
Edmunds of Vermont later commented that the Constitution bans 
discrimination based on classifications that are “sectarian,” 422 which 
was a code word for “Catholic” in the nineteenth century and reflected 
bigotry towards non-Protestant denominations.423  
                                                                                                                     
 415. Id. at 211. 
 416. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1146–49. 
 417. Id. at 1146 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199 (1864)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 418. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 419. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1864)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 420. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 421. Id. at 1148 n.190 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 422. 3 CONG. REC. 1870 (1875) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment “protected a right 
of her citizens against class prejudice, against caste prejudice, against sectarian prejudice”); 
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 41 n.188.  
 423. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000); see Douglas Laycock, Comment, 
Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes 
but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 188–89 (2004); see also Steven K. Green, The 
Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 41, 53–54 (1992). 
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In 1866, President Andrew Johnson recognized the history of 
religious persecution and pointed out how the American Constitution 
protects religious liberty:  
The ancient republics absorbed the individual in the State, 
prescribed his religion, and controlled his activity. The 
American system rests on the assertion of the equal right of 
every man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; to 
freedom of conscience, to the culture and exercise of all his 
faculties.424  
Representative Banks similarly condemned the way in which 
establishments of religion had historically been used as a means of 
oppression: 
[I]n a State which has an established religion, any citizen 
might be compelled to conform to its doctrines, and to 
leave his descendants to the same mental and moral 
servitude, deprived of the freedom of belief, and without 
that freedom of worship to which, according to the laws of 
nature and of God, every man is entitled. Society is 
necessary to the existence of man, and government 
indispensable to his civilization, prosperity, and power. But 
the perpetual subjection of every person born within its 
jurisdiction, without consent and in disregard of protest or 
removal, is not necessary in any form of political society. It 
does not rest upon any theory of justice, and the whole 
course of civilization disproves its justice or wisdom.425 
Banks went on to praise American democracy for furthering religious 
liberty. 
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also recognized the free 
exercise of religion as one of the privileges or immunities protected by 
that Amendment and as being a fundamental right.426 In 1871, John 
Bingham, the author of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, stated that 
the free exercise of religion was within the “scope and meaning” of 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.427 Henry L. Dawes 
                                                                                                                     
 424. President Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1865), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29506. 
 425. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., app. 95–96 (1868) (Report to Committee on 
Foreign Affairs by Rep. Banks). 
 426. See MICHAEL K. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 43 (1986); Lash, supra note 389, at 1146–49. Scholars also discuss 
how the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Free Exercise Clause. Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1149, 1157–58 (1991). 
 427. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871). 
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similarly remarked that the Privileges or Immunities Clause had 
“secured the free exercise of . . . religious belief.”428 In listing the rights 
secured by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Senator Jacob Howard 
mentioned “the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution.”429 John Sherman said that the “right 
to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own conscience is not 
only a right, but a privilege which in a Christian country a man ought to 
enjoy.”430 Congressman Maynard commented that “privileges and 
immunities” includes the “personal right” of “freedom . . . in 
religion.”431 Senator John Stockton mentioned the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses as an example of how the Fourteenth Amendment 
“prohibits the states from doing what the Congress was always 
prohibited from doing.”432 These statements are unsurprising since it 
was recognized that one of the privileges and immunities violated by 
slavery was the free exercise of religion.433 
And the legislative history also reflects that the framers recognized 
the religious oppression in other countries and connected it to caste and 
class-based systems of law and the problems of discrimination in this 
country.434 Senator Charles Sumner condemned the religious caste 
system in India and the persecution of the Jews in Europe prior to the 
French Revolution, implying that there was a need to protect against 
contemporary religious discrimination.435 Representative Charles Van 
Wyck said, “The meanness of caste in this country on account of color 
is no more wicked than the caste of nation, religion, or blood in Great 
Britain.”436 Senator Garrett Davis also compared the oppression of 
blacks to the oppression of Jews and Gypsies in other countries: “the 
negro slaves, as separate and distinct and insoluble almost as Jew and 
Gypsy.”437 Following ratification, Representative William Purman 
                                                                                                                     
 428. Cf. id. at 475. 
 429. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1865). 
 430. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872). 
 431. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 310 (1871). 
 432. Id. at 572. 
 433. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (Henry Wilson expressing 
this view). 
434. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1872). 
 435. Id. at 381–83. 
 436. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 469 (1868). 
 437. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1866); see also  CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 
1st Sess. 453 (1860) (statement of Mr. Clingman) (“Why northern as well as southern men, and 
even Canadians, characterize them as the most worthless of the human race. Formerly the 
Abolitionist ascribed their degradation to the want of political and social privileges. But during 
the middle ages, in Europe, the Jews were not only without political privileges, but were, as a 
class, odious and severely persecuted, yet they were, nevertheless, intelligent, energetic, and 
wealthy. In point of fact, in some portions of the northern states, the negro has been made a pet 
of, and but for his native inferiority, must have thriven and even become distinguished.”). 
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recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation 
directed at religion, asking rhetorically, “Shall hostile legislation in 
States be permitted to oppress any class of citizens on account of 
religion, nativity, politics, or complexion, or deny to any such class their 
inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness, and thus defeat the very spirit and provision of the 
Constitution itself?”438 In discussing the ramifications of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Representative Samuel McKee said:  
[I]f any gentleman chooses to associate with a colored man, 
with a black man, or any other man or race of men, even 
the Hindoo or the Hottentot, he can do it. I believe in every 
man having the same show in this world for life, and when 
he develops all the capacities that fit men for the highest 
rights of citizenship, then let him have them.439 
Court opinions also explicitly recognized that the Fourteenth 
Amendment banned religious class legislation. In Pollock v. Farmers’ 
Loan & Trust Co., Justice Field, in his concurring opinion, said: 
Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law 
imposes or in the benefits it confers on any citizens by 
reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class 
legislation, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses, 
and to general unrest and disturbance in society. It was 
hoped and believed that the great amendments to the 
Constitution which followed the late civil war had rendered 
such legislation impossible for all future time. But the 
objectionable legislation reappears in the act under 
consideration. It is the same in essential character as that of 
the English income statute of 1691, which taxed Protestants 
at a certain rate, Catholics, as a class, at double the rate of 
Protestants, and Jews at another and separate rate.440 
Riding circuit in 1879, Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, Justice Field struck down 
a law permitting prison guards to shave the queues of prisoners because 
the law was directed at the religious practices of Chinese immigrants 
and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class 
legislation on the basis of religion.441 Justice Field wrote that “hostile 
                                                                                                                     
 
 438. 2 CONG. REC. 423 (1874). 
 439. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 452 (1866). 
 440. Pollock v. Farmers, 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895) (Field, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
 441. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255–56 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 
1879). 
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and discriminating legislation by a state against persons of any class, 
sect, creed or nation, in whatever form it may be expressed, is forbidden 
by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution.”442 Similarly, in 
American Sugar-Refining Co. v. Louisiana, Justice Brown stated: 
Of course, if such discrimination were purely arbitrary, 
oppressive, or capricious, and made to depend upon 
differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, 
political affiliations, or other considerations having no 
possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers, 
such exemption would be pure favoritism, and a denial of 
the equal protection of the laws to the less favored 
classes.443 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also recognized that religious groups 
“certainly have the same right to equal protection of the laws as secular 
organizations.”444 
This history shows that protecting religion was very much on the 
minds of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is hard to 
imagine that the framers would have limited the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to rectifying the existing problem of discrimination on the 
basis of race without rectifying the existing problem of discrimination 
on the basis of religion. Arguably, the framers felt that by granting 
African-Americans rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, African-Americans would automatically receive all other 
constitutional protection, including free exercise.445 But if that were 
true, then it would have been sufficient to simply guarantee African- 
Americans the same constitutional rights as all other citizens. Instead 
the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed to all citizens equality in their 
privileges or immunities of federal and of state citizenship. Thus was 
born a whole new constitutional right—the right not to be discriminated 
against in class legislation. It is extremely unlikely that the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment would observe and condemn religious 
oppression directed at African-Americans and yet take no action to 
                                                                                                                     
 442. Id. at 256 (emphasis added). 
 443. Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900); see also Connolly v. Union 
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 568–69 (1902) (McKenna, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Brown 
in Am. Sugar Ref. Co.)); Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 6 Alaska 173, 179 (D. 
Alaska 1919), aff’d, 255 U.S. 44 (1921). 
 444. In re Garrabad, 54 N.W. 1104, 1106 (Wis. 1893); see also Fountain Park Co. v. 
Hensler, 155 N.E. 465, 468 (Ind. 1927) (holding that a statute granting the power of eminent 
domain to a religious group constituted improper class legislation). 
 445. This assumption was evidently untrue with regards to political rights because two 
years later the framers had to reconvene to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment granting blacks 
political rights. But it might have been true with regards to other civil rights, such as religious 
practice. 
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guarantee religious freedom for everyone in the future, especially at a 
time when the framers were taking action to prevent racial 
discrimination in the future. It is considerably more plausible that the 
framers observed the problems of both religious and racial oppression 
and ratified a two-in-one solution to wipe them both out.446  
E.  Foreign Constitutions and Laws Guaranteeing Equality 
At least forty-five foreign constitutions ban discrimination on the 
basis of religion, just as they ban discrimination based on other 
impermissible classifications, such as race and gender.447 Although 
foreign constitutions are generally not helpful for establishing the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,448 they do indicate that, 
as a general rule, when constitutional framers get together to guarantee 
equality, they protect religion from discrimination too.449 These foreign 
constitutional provisions show that banning discrimination on the basis 
of religion is a core principle of western constitutional democracy. 
Judges that are concerned with keeping American constitutional law in 
line with generally accepted western democratic principles surely would 
recognize that discrimination on the basis of religion, like 
discrimination on the basis of race and gender, is intolerable. 
The evidence here is overwhelming and is cited in an appendix to 
this Article because it is too lengthy to include here in text or 
footnotes.450 The list shows that the vast majority of western 
constitutional democracies countries have constitutionally guaranteed 
equality for religion, and even some nondemocratic countries ban 
discrimination on the basis of religion too.451 Almost every European 
                                                                                                                     
 446. A significant counterargument is that evidence of the framers’ intent to exclude 
religion from the Fourteenth Amendment is demonstrated by the history of Blaine Amendments, 
which openly discriminate against religion in the funding of private organizations. We address 
this issue in the section on Blaine Amendments, infra Part V. 
 447. This list is by no means exhaustive but gives us a fairly accurate snapshot of modern 
worldview on religious discrimination. See Appendix for text of these provisions. In the 
Appendix, we also include provisions from Israel’s Declaration of Independence, the Soviet 
Union’s constitution, and the Hawaiian constitution, although we did not count any of these 
provisions towards the list of forty-five. Also, Belgium’s constitution probably guarantees 
religious equality. Its equality provision states, “No class distinctions exist in the State.” 1994 
CONST. art. 10 (Belg.). Belgium’s Constitution further guarantees equal funding for religious 
schools. Id. at art. 24. But because it does not specifically ban religious discrimination, we 
excluded it from the list.  
 448. See The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A 
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
519, 525–27 (2005) (Justice Scalia’s explanations of why foreign law is not relevant for 
determining the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution). 
 449. Id. at 524 n.3, 526. 
 450. See Appendix. 
 451. We recognize that the way in which courts in each of these countries interpret these 
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constitution guarantees equality for religion, and every continent has at 
least one country with an equality guarantee prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of religion. Large diverse countries, such as India,452 
Germany,453 and Russia,454 have these provisions; smaller, more 
homogenous countries, such as Iceland,455 Ireland,456 and Estonia,457 
have them too. Older constitutions, such as the Dutch458 and 
Canadian459 ones, have these guarantees; newer constitutions such as 
the ones from Chechnya460 and Bosnia and Herzegovina,461 also have 
them. The general trend among countries worldwide is to include 
equality guarantees for religion in constitutions. A typical provision—
the Canadian Equal Protection Guarantee—reads, “Every individual is 
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection 
and benefit of the law, without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
                                                                                                                     
provisions is just as important as whether countries have these provisions at all. For instance, a 
court could theoretically interpret its provision as only banning laws targeting specific religions 
but not laws targeting religion in general. Or a court might think that only freedom of 
conscience or private religious exercise is entitled to equal protections but not religious 
exercises that relate to the public domain or which affect other members of society. Indeed, the 
British government recently argued in court filings that a Christian’s wearing a cross in public 
and a Christian pharmacist’s refusal to sell contraception were not protected forms of religious 
exercise. See Eweida & Chaplin v. United Kingdom; Ladele and McFarlane v. United Kingdom. 
And the British government further argued that discrimination against religious individuals in 
the workplace is unproblematic as long as those individuals have the right to resign and seek 
employment elsewhere. Ladele and McFarlane at 9, 11; Eweida & Chaplin at 11. So further 
research into the way in which courts in these countries apply their Equal Protection Clauses is 
necessary for a complete comparative analysis. Nevertheless, the mere existence of these 
provisions is significant and useful for our purposes. And we think that the plain meaning of 
these clauses strongly indicates a worldwide recognition that discrimination on the basis of 
religion is unacceptable—no matter how individual courts might theoretically limit the breadth 
of those provisions. 
 452. INDIA CONST. art. 15, 16, 29, 30, 325. 
 453. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], May 23, 1949, art. 3 (Ger.). 
 454. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 14, 19 
(Russ.). 
 455. STJÓRNARSKRÁ LÝÐVELDISINS ÍSLANDS [CONSTITUTION] 1964, art. 64 (Ice.). 
 456. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40, 44. 
 457. PÕHISEADUS [CONSTITUTION], June 28, 1992, art. 12 (Est.).  
 458. GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [CONSTITUTION], 1983, ch. 1 
art. 1 (Neth.). 
 459. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, para. 15 (U.K.). 
 460. КОНСТИТУЦИЯ ЧЕЧЕНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ, [CONSTITUTION], Mar. 27, 2003, art. 16 
(Chechnya). 
 461. USTAV BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE [CONSTITUTION] art. I para. 7, art. II, para. 4 (Bosn. & 
Herz.). 
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sex, age or mental or physical disability.”462 
International conventions have similarly protected religion. The 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms states, “The enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”463 The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, “Everyone is entitled to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.”464 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also provides extensive protection 
against discrimination on the basis of religion for individuals in the 
workplace, as it does for discrimination on the basis of race and gender. 
For instance, the Act states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . . 465 
We should add that under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 not only is 
discrimination on the basis of race and gender barred, but also the 
existence of a racially hostile or sexually hostile work environment is 
barred as well.466 Companies thus cannot hire in a nondiscriminatory 
way but allow for the existence of a hostile work environment. The 
same thing must of course be true regarding the ban on religion 
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Just as no private 
employer can legally refuse to hire or promote someone on the basis of 
religion, no employer can maintain a workplace that is hostile to 
religion or that discriminates on account of religion either.  If a religious 
group seeks to use office space for religious reasons or if employees 
                                                                                                                     
 462. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, para. 15 (U.K.) (emphasis added). 
 463. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (emphasis added). 
 464. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 2 (Dec. 12, 1948) 
(emphasis added). 
 465. 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 466. See id. 
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want to wear religious symbols, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be 
read as giving them that right. 
Taken together, these foreign and international human rights clauses 
barring discrimination on the basis of religion indicate that when people 
get together to ban discrimination and guarantee equality, they include 
religion alongside race and gender. The same thing happened in the 
United States with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For some reason, 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has never caught on to this global and 
American trend for banning discrimination on account of religion. 
III.  CLASS LEGISLATION AND MODERN CASE LAW 
A.  Class Legislation Doctrine 
In assessing whether a particular statute constituted class legislation, 
nineteenth century courts applied a two-step test. First, courts asked 
whether a law created a unique burden or privilege either against or in 
favor of a defined class of people. If the answer to this first question 
was “yes” then the court would ask whether the law furthered a public 
purpose and is a just law enacted for the good of the whole people, in 
which case it would be constitutionally permissible. In other words, 
under the nineteenth century test for disallowing class legislation, laws 
can discriminate as long as they “are designed, not to impose unequal or 
unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little 
individual inconvenience as possible, the general good.”467 The 
nineteenth century two-step test could probably be described as a 
rational basis test with a legitimate public purpose requirement.  
Under the current rational basis test, a law simply needs to have a 
rationale, no matter how dubious the goal or whether the stated rationale 
is actually the one that the legislature relied on in passing the law. In 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of a law forbidding “any person not a licensed 
optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or 
replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances.”468 Practically, 
this meant that “no optician can fit old glasses into new frames or 
supply a lens, whether it be a new lens or one to duplicate a lost or 
broken lens, without a prescription.” 469 The Court held that the law had 
a rational basis and was therefore constitutional.470 
 
But under a class legislation analysis of the kind we defend here, the 
law in Williamson v. Lee Optical should have been struck down. The 
                                                                                                                     
 467. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31–32 (1885). 
 468. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 485 (1955). 
 469. Id. at 486. 
 470. See id. at 491. 
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law created a special privilege for optometrists and ophthalmologists, 
artificially boosting demand for their services when unlicensed 
individuals could have performed the same work perfectly well and 
safely. There was absolutely no public purpose being served by the law 
since it did not have a public welfare objective, such as the promotion 
of the public health or safety. And the law probably even hurt 
consumers by artificially driving up costs and nonsensically adding red 
tape. Instead, the law was merely special interest legislation designed to 
generate business for optometrists and ophthalmologists. To be sure, the 
threshold for overcoming the public purpose requirement is not and 
should not be very high absent the making of a suspect classification—
the government need only show that the law in question serves a 
rational public purpose. But a naked desire to help or hurt one group of 
people or industry over another is not by itself proof of a public 
purpose. The Lee Optical court’s error was its failure to take seriously 
its responsibility to assess the validity of the purpose, which the law in 
question pursued. 
The nineteenth century two-step test for invalidating class legislation 
does not apply in the same way to all Fourteenth Amendment cases. In 
cases involving fundamental rights, such as those enumerated and 
protected in the Bill of Rights, or with respect to suspect classifications 
which are presumptively irrational, such as classifications on the basis 
of race, sex, or religion, the nineteenth century two-step test leads to a 
strict scrutiny analysis.471 No law discriminating on the basis of race, 
sex, or religion should be upheld unless it survives strict scrutiny and 
serves a compelling and general governmental interest.472 This approach 
is sensible as a practical matter because most laws discriminate, and are 
nonetheless constitutional in part because the mere requirement that 
laws serve a “public purpose” or provide “general welfare benefit” is in 
practice a pretty flabby level of protection. The government could 
probably justify many if not most kinds of discriminatory laws under a 
public purpose rationale. And leaving core constitutional rights and 
protections, or making suspect classifications without a thicker 
guardrail, would leave vital constitutional guarantees open to significant 
trampling. So, layering a strict scrutiny requirement on top of the 
nineteenth century two-step test is perfectly sensible and consistent with 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality guarantee and with the post 
United States v. Carolene Products and incorporation case law.473 
The Supreme Court’s 1942 opinion in Skinner v. Oklahoma474 is 
instructive. There, the court received a Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
471.  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
472.  Id. 
 473. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
474.  316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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challenge to an Oklahoma law requiring sterilization of prisoners 
convicted of two or more “felonies involving moral turpitude.”475 By its 
own terms, the Oklahoma law included convictions for larceny as being 
felonies that involved moral turpitude but it exempted convictions for 
high class felonies involving “revenue acts, embezzlement, or political 
offenses.”476 The old common law distinctions between larceny and 
embezzlement were highly technical and overall not very meaningful. 
For instance, if a person entered a chicken coop and stole chickens, he 
would commit an act of larceny and could be sterilized; but if he were 
instead the bailee of the chickens and misappropriated them, then that 
action would constitute embezzlement, and he could escape 
sterilization.477 The law was based on the now-debunked “science” that 
society could eliminate crime by sterilizing repeat offenders thereby 
preventing those criminals from disseminating their criminally inclined 
genes.478 
Among the enthusiastic defenders of the “science” of eugenics were 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and the new leader of Nazi Germany, 
Adolph Hitler. Holmes had famously opened the door to eugenic 
sterilization in Buck v. Bell, a case which upheld as constitutional—in 
spite of a class legislation equal protection claim—a compulsory state 
sterilization law of the unfit, including the mentally retarded.479  Justice 
Holmes concluded his opinion with the words: “Three generations of 
imbeciles are enough.”480 Justice Pierce Butler, later a foe of the New 
Deal, was the lone dissenter, and he filed no opinion. 
Professor Victoria Nourse has detailed how, when Skinner v. 
Oklahoma was decided in 1942, everyone still understood the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a ban on class legislation, and some scholars 
and lawyers viewed sterilization laws as a classic example of the evils 
of class legislation at work.481 Previous sterilization cases, such as Buck 
v. Bell, were decided in part on class legislation grounds,482 and the 
lawyers in Skinner made their arguments in that case explicitly in class 
legislation terms.483 Skinner was ultimately decided as a class 
                                                                                                                     
 475. Id. at 536 (quoting Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, 
§§ 171, et seq. (West 1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 476. Id. at 537 (quoting Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, 
§ 195. (West 1935)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 477. See id. at 539 (detailing some examples). 
 478. See VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND  THE NEAR 
TRIUMPH OF EUGENICS 150 (2008). 
 479. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
480. Id.  
 481. See NOURSE, supra note 478, at 28–29, 167–68 (describing the class legislation 
approach at the time). 
 482. See id. at 185 n.35 (citing other sterilization cases). 
 483. Id. at 67–68, 141, 149. 
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legislation case and is relevant for seeing how strict scrutiny and class 
legislation analyses intersect.484 
The Oklahoma law that was challenged in Skinner raised several 
class legislation problems. First, larceny and embezzlement were 
basically the same kind of offense.485  They were both forms of thievery 
distinguished only by a technicality which bore no relevance to the 
severity of the criminal action.486 Arbitrary, coin-flip quality 
distinctions constitute class legislation and this law made such an 
arbitrary coin-flip distinction. It was as irrational and class-based as a 
law allowing titles of nobility or any other form of hereditary 
favoritism. Second, a deeper look at the distinction between larceny and 
embezzlement reveals that larceny included “low class” crimes, such as 
stealing chickens, while embezzlement included “high class” crimes, 
such as misappropriation of funds.487 Thus, under the Oklahoma law in 
Skinner, a lowly chicken thief got sterilized while a white-collar 
financier, convicted of bank fraud, was exempt from sterilization. The 
law thus created an aristocracy of crime, violating Locke’s maxim that 
there should be “one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and 
the countryman at plough.”488 Third, some of the prisoners held in the 
prison out of which the Skinner case arose wondered why they were the 
only ones being sterilized when many other people, such as the mentally 
impaired, were not subject to compulsory sterilization even though they 
probably carried defective or degenerate genes as well.489 And fourth, 
some critics of the eugenics movement worried in 1942 that eugenics 
laws would open the door to sterilizing other disfavored groups.490 
Presumably, the prevailing majority in the legislature could use 
sterilization to eradicate dissenters or to target racial minorities. In fact, 
Adolph Hitler’s Germany was engaged in precisely such an effort, in 
1942, at the very time that Skinner was decided. 
The Skinner court initially subjected the Oklahoma law to the 
nineteenth century class legislation two-step test under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. First, the Court recognized that the law discriminated 
against people convicted of larceny relative to people convicted of 
embezzlement.491 And second, the Court deferred to the legislature’s 
public policy goals showing typical New Deal Supreme Court deference 
to the legislature, however arbitrary the law in question might have 
                                                                                                                     
484. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
485.  Id. at 538–39. 
486.  Id. 
487.  Id. 
 488. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTEND AND END OF CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT ch. 10, at 142 (1690); NOURSE, supra note 478, at 167–68. 
 489. Id. at 67–68. 
 490. Id. at 28–29 
 491. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538–39. 
89
Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
998 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
seemed.492 Just as predicted, the public purpose qualification proved 
quite flabby. 
But the Court did not end its Fourteenth Amendment analysis there. 
It went on to make three crucial observations, which served as the basis 
for subjecting the law to strict scrutiny. First, the Court commented that 
the law “involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and 
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race.”493 Second, the Court remarked, “The power to sterilize, if 
exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil 
or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the 
dominant group to wither and disappear.” 494 And third, the Court noted, 
“There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any 
experiment[,] which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is 
forever deprived of a basic liberty.” 495 Based on these observations, the 
Court applied strict scrutiny and found the law’s arbitrary line-drawing 
untenable when balanced against the fundamental right exercised and 
the substantial damage caused.496 
Skinner v. Oklahoma thus stands as a nineteenth century class 
legislation case where a fundamental liberty—the right to procreate—
was being denied to low class thieves but not to high class thieves. This 
was something that not even the deferential New Deal Supreme Court 
could ignore. The law in question discriminated among different classes 
of thieves, but it did not do so to promote the general interest but did so 
instead to promote the interests of high class thieves. Thankfully, the 
justices put a stop to this law and with their decision they helped to stop 
the eugenics movement that Justice Holmes had done so much to 
promote in Buck v. Bell. 
Justice Field spelled out another important qualification to the 
nineteenth century public purpose requirement in Barbier v. 
Connolly.497 There, the Supreme Court upheld a San Francisco city 
ordinance subjecting laundries in certain parts of San Francisco to 
allegedly special and “burdensome” restrictions because the public 
concerns could “be remedied only by the state.”498 The ordinance was 
defended on the ground that it promoted the public health and safety.499 
Such arguments of public health and safety are usually a trump card for 
the government in the post Lochner v. New York era.500 Courts will 
                                                                                                                     
 492. See id. at 539–40. 
 493. Id. at 541. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. 
 496. Id. at 541–43. 
497. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). 
 498. Id. at 32. 
499.  Id. at 30–31. 
 500. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 51, 55–56, 58, 61, 64 (1905) (examples of the 
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usually uphold laws challenged on class legislation grounds at least in 
situations where a law is addressing a public health and safety problem 
that is of such an extraordinary magnitude that it can only be remedied 
by the state.  
Skinner and Barbier therefore bring out important qualifications to 
the nineteenth century two-step test for unconstitutional class 
legislation. Skinner shows that even if a discriminatory law has a public 
purpose, it can still be subjected to strict scrutiny if it: (1) infringes in a 
discriminatory way as to a fundamental right like the right to procreate, 
(2) if the law in question has far-reaching consequences and is subject 
to political abuse, or (3) if the means used by the law are unreasonably 
damaging and disproportionate. Barbier, in contrast, shows that the 
Supreme Court will usually defer to the political branches as to the 
significance of the public health and safety problem that the government 
claims it is addressing. 
The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class 
legislation is therefore fairly easily harmonized with the modern 
Supreme Court’s use of strict scrutiny when classifications are made on 
such suspect grounds as race, sex, or religion. In strict scrutiny cases, 
modern courts under present-day Supreme Court doctrine ask whether a 
law that makes a suspect classification serves a compelling government 
interest pursued under the least restrictive means.501 Under a nineteenth 
century class legislation approach of the kind originally imposed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a court would ask the slightly different 
question whether the law served a public and not some private purpose, 
and not just whether the law was justified by a compelling government 
interest. The distinction between the nineteenth century test and the 
modern test could prove critical in affirmative action cases where the 
legislature seeks to help a disadvantaged group. Otherwise, the modern 
strict scrutiny analysis is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ban on class legislation as long as one recognizes that religion is every 
bit as much of a suspect classification as are race and sex.  
B.  Modern Case Law and Class Legislation 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation includes a ban 
on facial discrimination targeting a specific class. This approach is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s case law that, for instance, a racial 
classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively 
                                                                                                                     
reasoning the Court used in rejecting legislatures’ public welfare arguments in favor of 
economic substantive due process). 
 501. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01 (2006) (discussing the standard 
for strict scrutiny and various cases). 
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invalid.502 Thus segregation and Jim Crow laws easily fall into the 
category of forbidden class legislation. Anti-miscegenation laws are 
also invalid because they define legal rights based on race.503 A white 
person is allowed to marry another white person but a black person does 
not have that same right.504  In the context of religion, the Court has also 
recognized that “the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not 
discriminate on its face.”505 Thus, in McDaniel v. Paty, the Supreme 
Court struck down as unconstitutional a law barring ministers from 
holding public office.506  
The constitutional ban on class legislation includes some forms of 
legal discrimination amongst religious groups. Courts have 
appropriately considered these cases on equal protection grounds. For 
instance, in Native American Council of Tribes v. Solem, the Eight 
Circuit held that restrictions on Native American inmates’ religious 
practices violated the Equal Protection Clause because similar 
restrictions did not exist for other religious groups.507 And in Colorado 
Christian University v. Weaver, then-Judge Michael W. McConnell’s 
opinion struck down a state educational funding scheme that permitted 
public money to go to religious schools but barred it from going to 
“pervasively sectarian” schools.508 Although the Tenth Circuit held that 
the law in question violated the Establishment Clause, it also declared 
that discrimination on the basis of religion is subject to “heightened 
scrutiny” and could violate the Equal Protection Clause.509 The Tenth 
Circuit also said that “neutral treatment of religions” is a requirement of 
the Equal Protection Clause, just as it is of the Establishment Clause.510 
The ban on class legislation is also consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s approach to facially neutral laws, which serve as a pretext for 
improper discrimination when the laws are administered. For instance, 
in 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that an 
ordinance prohibiting the operation of laundry businesses in wooden 
buildings was unconstitutional because it was only enforced in practice 
against Chinese immigrants.511 The Court dutifully noted that the 
                                                                                                                     
 502. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 503. See Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 31, at 1419–20 (arguing that Loving v. Virginia 
was consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, which banned all class 
legislation). 
 504. Id.   
 505. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). 
 506. 435 U.S. 618, 628–29 (1978). 
 507. 691 F.2d 382, 384–85 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 508. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1258, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 509. Id. at 1266. 
 510. Id. at 1257. 
 511. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). 
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Fourteenth Amendment banned class legislation and held that the 
ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was enforced 
improperly by drawing an “arbitrary line” between “two classes,” even 
though the underlying law did not facially discriminate on the basis of 
race or national origin.512 In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court 
held that evidence of discriminatory intent was necessary to prove that a 
facially neutral law violated the Equal Protection Clause even when the 
law in question had a racially disparate impact and was not justified by 
a compelling governmental interest.513 The Supreme Court later made it 
clear that a plaintiff need not prove that a law is motivated “solely [by] 
racially discriminatory purposes” but simply that improper 
discrimination was a “motivating factor.”514 In Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Supreme 
Court laid out a variety of factors that may be evidence of 
discriminatory intent.515 “Once racial discrimination is shown to have 
been a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind enactment[s] 
of . . . law, the burden shifts [from the plaintiff] to the law’s defenders 
to demonstrate that the law would have been enacted without this 
factor.”516 Those holdings are consistent with Yick Wo and the original 
meaning of the Amendment’s ban on class legislation.517 
In the context of racial discrimination and private sector employment 
contracts, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has always barred discrimination 
on the basis of religion as well as on the basis of race and sex.518 The 
Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. that if an employer’s 
hiring criteria disparately impacts a particular racial group, the 
employer bears the burden of showing that the hiring criteria has “a 
manifest relationship to the employment in question” and is justified by 
                                                                                                                     
 512. Id. at 368, 374. 
 513. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237, 248 (1976). 
 514. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977). 
 515. In Arlington Heights, the court provided a non-exhaustive list: (1) disparate impact on 
a particular race; (2) the historical background of the law, “particularly if it reveals a series of 
official actions taken for invidious purposes”; (3) the sequence of events leading up to the action 
taken; (4) departures from the normal procedural sequence; (5) substantive departures, 
“particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decision-maker strongly favors a 
decision contrary to the one reached”; and (6) the legislative or administrative history of the 
action. Id. at 266–68. 
 516. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985). 
 517. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (“The fact of this discrimination is 
admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it 
exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in 
the eye of the law is not justified. The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public 
administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.”). 
518.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2 (2006). 
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business necessity.519 
When inspecting facially neutral laws for signs of discrimination on 
the basis of religion, the Court has transplanted its analysis from its race 
and sex discrimination cases. As Justice Harlan noted in the context of 
the Establishment Clause, “neutrality in its application requires an equal 
protection mode of analysis.”520 In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court said, “The Free Exercise Clause, 
like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. 
The Clause ‘forbids subtle departures from neutrality’ . . . [and] protects 
against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.”521 The 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Court went on to use the Arlington 
Heights factors to show that a facially neutral City of Hialeah ordinance 
banning animal sacrifice was enacted for the  purpose of discriminating 
unconstitutionally on the basis of religion and thus abridging Free 
Exercise Clause rights.522 
Much of the Supreme Court’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
strike down various impermissible classifications in the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s is also quite consistent with our view that the Fourteenth 
Amendment enacts a general ban on class legislation and systems of 
caste. Discrimination based on national origin, gender,523 
illegitimacy,524 and many kinds of physical disability,525 constitutes a 
caste system because these groups are defined in part by heredity or by 
immutable characteristics. The Court has also struck down some state 
laws discriminating on the basis of citizenship. We think that, while 
some such state laws may be preempted by federal law, state laws that 
discriminate on the basis of citizenship should not for that reason be 
held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination 
command. As already discussed, the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
                                                                                                                     
 519. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
 520. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 521. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 540 
(1993) (“Here, as in equal protection cases, we may determine the city council’s object from 
both direct and circumstantial evidence.”) (citations omitted) (quoting Gillette v. United States, 
401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971). 
 522. Id. at 540 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266–68 (1977)). 
 523. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
690–91 (1973); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555, 558 (1996). 
 524. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537–38 
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972).  
 525. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding 
that denial of zoning permit to home for mentally retarded individuals failed rational basis test 
under the Equal Protection Clause). But see id. at 473–78 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in the judgment in part) (arguing that mentally retarded individuals should be 
considered a suspect class due to history of discrimination and strict scrutiny analysis should 
apply). 
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was quite deliberately written to protect only citizens from the making 
of discriminatory laws, and it implicitly permits the making of 
discriminatory laws that facially discriminate against non-citizens.526 
Non-citizens are protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses, which apply to all persons and not merely to all citizens.527 We 
therefore think that In re Griffiths, in which the Supreme Court held that 
a state could not condition admission to the bar on citizenship,528 was 
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
But we think that Plyler v. Doe, a case in which the Supreme Court held 
that a school district could not charge children of illegal immigrants 
tuition, presents a closer call because those children were persons who 
were entitled to the equal protection of the state laws setting up free 
public schools.529 
In the 1960s and 1970s, there was something of a movement to 
constitutionalize a right to receive welfare payments. Professor Frank 
Michelman has been a major advocate of constitutional rights to 
welfare, arguing that the equality principles of the Fourteenth 
Amendment require the government to pay money to the poor.530 
Professor Michelman’s argument is essentially a liberal form of 
Lochner.531 Just as Lochner tried to constitutionalize laissez-faire 
economic theory,532 Professor Michelman attempts to constitutionalize 
the post-New Deal and Great Society welfare state, perhaps even to give 
a major impetus to further efforts to achieve socialism. Professor 
Michelman’s argument that the government has a constitutional 
obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to pay money to a group of 
people based on circumstances not caused by the government seems to 
us to be wrong and is not to be found anywhere in the Constitution’s 
text or history. Even the recovery by private citizens of money from the 
federal government in Bivens actions requires that the federal 
government have directly caused the physical damage that is the basis 
of a lawsuit to a specific individual.533 And Congress had to pass 
                                                                                                                     
 526. See supra Part I.A. 
527.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 528. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973). 
 529. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 230 (1982). 
 530. Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 966 (1973); see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme 
Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 7, 11 (1969). The Supreme Court appeared sympathetic to Michelman’s 
philosophy in Goldberg v. Kelly, in which the Court held that a welfare recipient had a right to a 
hearing before being deprived of welfare benefits. 397 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1970). But the Court 
never went further. 
531.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
532.  Id. at 64. 
 533. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). 
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Section 1983 to make state officials similarly liable for money damages 
when they cause an injury.534 But nowhere in the Constitution is there 
any notion of government liability to pay money of the kind Professor 
Michelman describes. In fact, state welfare payments as they presently 
exist might have been originally considered an unconstitutional form of 
class legislation, since they single out poor individuals for unique, 
government-provided benefits. 
We recognize that interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to include 
a broad ban on all class legislation is to adopt an approach to the 
Amendment’s anti-discrimination guarantee that is inconsistent with the 
legendary discussion in United States v. Carolene Products Footnote 
Four. In that footnote, the Supreme Court indicated that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s anti-discrimination command protects “discrete and 
insular minorities,”535 an argument that was later elaborated by John 
Hart Ely.536 The language emphasizing protection only for discrete and 
insular minorities necessarily implies a narrow reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment under which the Amendment’s anti-
discrimination command would not apply to women or other majority 
victims of class legislation. But the Supreme Court has rejected Ely’s 
approach in recent years537 and the Court has decided many recent 
Fourteenth Amendment cases without even citing the Carolene 
Products test.538 
Moreover, the holding in Carolene Products is consistent with the 
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment bans class legislation generally. 
In Carolene Products, Congress prohibited shipments of a certain kind 
of imitation milk which it found could be “injurious to the public health, 
and its sale constitutes a fraud on the public.”539 The law thus singled 
out sellers of imitation milk for a special burden, but it did so under a 
public purpose justification—public health concerns and protecting the 
public from fraud.540 Those are sufficient justifications for upholding 
                                                                                                                     
534.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 535. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 536. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–36 
(1980). 
 537. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2009) (striking down 
discrimination against whites); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 720, 747 (2007) (applying strict scrutiny to an affirmative action program and striking 
down the program); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (limiting an affirmative action 
program); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (striking down an 
affirmative action program).  
 538. See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1995); Trimble 
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977); Craig v. Borden, 429 U.S. 190, 208–09 (1976); Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). 
 539. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 147. 
540. Id. 
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the law; the Supreme Court was right in the Carolene Products case 
itself. 
C.  Carolene Products Footnote Four and Religion 
More dramatically, United States v. Carolene Products Footnote 
Four explicitly declared that the Fourteenth Amendment bans 
discrimination on the basis of religion. In the second and third 
paragraph of Footnote Four, the Court said that a law would be 
“subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment” if it was “directed at 
particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities.”541 The Court 
thus explicitly understood the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-
discrimination command as protecting individuals from laws that 
discriminate on the basis of religion, just as it protects individuals from 
laws that discriminate on the basis of national origin and race.542 And 
the Supreme Court made this observation about the ban on laws that 
discriminate on the basis of religion, even though the Court had just 
finished saying in the first paragraph of Footnote Four that laws will be 
given less deference if they burden rights guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights,543 which of course itself contains two Religion Clauses.544 If the 
Court had thought that religion was only protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a consequence of its incorporation of the First 
Amendment, the Court would not have mentioned religion as a 
forbidden basis for discrimination after its initial reference to the Bill of 
Rights and the Religion Clauses in the first paragraph of Footnote Four. 
By listing religion in the third paragraph of Footnote Four, alongside 
national origin and race, the Supreme Court showed that religion was 
not merely protected by the First Amendment but was also protected by 
the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment.545 
Strikingly, the Supreme Court listed discrimination on the basis of 
religion before both discrimination on the basis of national origin and 
discrimination on the basis of race, perhaps recognizing that first and 
foremost the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment bans discrimination on the basis of religion.546 The 
Supreme Court also failed to mention gender discrimination at all as 
being forbidden in Footnote Four, even though women had been 
guaranteed the right to vote for eighteen years before the Carolene 
                                                                                                                     
 541. Id. at 152–53 n.4. 
542.  Id.  
543.  Id. at 152 n.4. 
544. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (containing both the Free Exercise and the Establishment 
Clause). 
545.  Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
546.  Id. 
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Products case was decided.547 This too shows the unique constitutional 
weight that the Court attached to the protection of religious liberty 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Footnote Four also shows that the Fourteenth Amendment banned 
laws targeting all religion generally, and not just laws targeting specific 
religious groups. On its face, Footnote Four does not appear to stand for 
this proposition because the Supreme Court refers in Footnote Four to 
“particular religious . . . minorities”548 which could be read to imply that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect either religion generally or 
majority religions. But to support itself in Footnote Four, the Supreme 
Court approvingly cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a case involving a 
law, which burdened all religious groups generally.549 In Society of 
Sisters, the State of Oregon had passed a law requiring all children 
between ages eight and sixteen to attend public school.550 The law did 
not provide exemptions for parents who wanted to send their children to 
private religious schools and thus created a substantial burden on all 
religious families and schools.551 The Supreme Court held that the law 
“unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to 
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”552 
The Court therefore invalidated a law burdening all religious families 
and schools—whether minority or majority religions—without any 
discussion about the unique burdens on one particular religion.553 And 
the Carolene Products Court saw this Oregon law as the primary 
example of forbidden discrimination on the basis of religion under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.554 The Court cited no other cases. 
Even Footnote Four’s famous language that “discrete and insular 
minorities” deserve special protection555 implicitly includes most 
religions, especially in the United States where there is no one majority 
faith. The words “discrete and insular” suggest that a targeted group 
must be distinct and narrowly defined for Footnote Four to apply. 
Religion as a whole in the United States does not fit this definition, but 
fervently religious groups, such as the Amish, Orthodox Jews, religious 
Muslims, or particular religious Christian groups, certainly could be 
included. And the words “discrete and insular” also could apply to 
groups that have historically suffered prejudice or stigma. The Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
547.  U.S. CONT. amend. XIX. 
 548. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
549.  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925). 
 550. Id.  
 551. See id. at 530–31. 
 552. Id. at 534–35. 
553.   Id. 
 554. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (citing only Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 
510). 
 555. Id. 
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Court has used this approach to ban gender discrimination even though 
women constitute a majority of the U.S. population.556 Even mainstream 
religious groups like Episcopalians, Catholics, Quakers, and Unitarians 
are minorities in the United States557 and would be protected under 
Footnote Four. If so, the many religious groups that have suffered 
persecution in this country all deserve Fourteenth Amendment 
protection. Even today, there is still much anti-religious bias and stigma 
attached to those who are religious and who profess their belief in a 
higher being.558 
This observation leads us to discuss the majority opinion of the 
Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, the case which struck down 
as unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 
so far as it applied to the states.559 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
in City of Boerne v. Flores explicitly questioned the extent to which 
discrimination on the basis of religion is still pervasive in this 
country.560 The Court noted that, in contrast to the Voting Rights Act 
context, Congress had produced no findings in passing RFRA of the 
existence of generally applicable laws motivated by religious bigotry 
that needed redressing in the forty years leading up to the passage of 
RFRA.561 Because of the lack of findings of religious discrimination, 
the Supreme Court questioned whether Congress had the power to 
create a prophylactic measure to protect religion under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.562 The Supreme Court essentially implied that 
reinstating the Sherbert-Yoder free exercise of religion balancing test563 
was pointless because religious discrimination was not a real problem 
anymore. 
The first problem with the Court’s opinion in City of Boerne is that 
discrimination on the basis of religion is unfortunately alive and well in 
modern times. The Anti-Defamation League, for example, reported 
1,211 documented anti-Semitic incidents in the United States alone just 
                                                                                                                     
 556. LINDSAY M. HOWDEN AND JULIE A. MEYER, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, AGE 
AND SEX COMPOSITION:  2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 2, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (May 2011), 
http://www.census.gov/population/age/; see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 
(1973) (discussing the “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination”). 
557.  See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, SELF-DESCRIBED RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF 
ADULT POPULATION: 1990, 2001, AND 2008 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ 
2012/tables/12s0075.pdf. 
 558. See Catholic League, 2011 Report on Anti-Catholicism (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www 
.catholicleague.org/category/annual-report/2011-report-on-anti-catholicism/; Tupi, supra note 
391, at 242–61. 
559.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 560. See id. at 530–31. 
 561. Id.  
 562. Id. at 532. 
 563. See discussion of the Sherbert-Yoder Test infra Part IV.A. 
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in the year 2009.564 And the U.S. State Department reports that 
discrimination on the basis of religion and religious intolerance continue 
to be major worldwide concerns, including in many western democratic 
countries.565 It is quite reasonable to worry that anti-religious animus in 
society could seep into the legislative process and lead to the passage of 
neutral, generally applicable laws that have a discriminatory impact on 
religion. In fact, the Supreme Court had to strike down just such a 
discriminatory law in Church of the Lukumi Babalu when the City of 
Hialeah passed a facially neutral law targeting the animal sacrifice 
practices of members of the Santeria religion.566 While on the Third 
Circuit, then-Judge Samuel Alito wrote an opinion striking down a 
police department’s policy of granting secular exemptions to its no-
beard policy but refusing to grant exemptions for religious reasons.567 
And in 2011, a local California ballot initiative seeking to ban 
circumcision had sponsors with anti-Semitic affiliations.568 Similarly, a 
city might seek to save money, not by explicitly banning religious 
individuals from public schools, but by making public schools so 
secular and so hostile to religion that religious parents would feel unable 
to let their children attend public schools. Concern exists over laws that 
discriminate on the basis of race and gender, and it is quite unclear why 
it should not also exist with respect to laws that discriminate on the 
basis of religion.  
And second, the Supreme Court’s observation in City of Boerne that 
Congress did not present findings in that case of specific, neutral, 
generally applicable laws that had a discriminatory impact on religion569 
should not have led to the Court’s conclusion that RFRA was pointless. 
Quite possibly, few discriminatory laws were passed because judicial 
protections, such as the Sherbert-Yoder free exercise balancing test, and 
other laws, such as RFRA or its many state-level equivalents, had 
successfully deterred legislatures from discriminating on the basis of 
                                                                                                                     
 564. Anti-Defamation League, 2009 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents: Overview (2009), 
http://www.adl.org/main_Anti_Semitism_Domestic/2009_Audit.htm.  
 565. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, July-
December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report: Executive Summary (2011), available 
at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168441.htm. To select reports for individual 
countries, go to http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/index.htm.  
566.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526 (1992). 
 567. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 
366–67 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 568. See Daily Mail Reporter, Circumcision Should Be Banned but I Don’t “Have the Time 
or Energy”: California Mother Drops Bid to End the Practice, MAIL ONLINE (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2001035/California-mother-Jena-Troutman-drops-bid-
ban-circumcision.html#ixzz1r0xqjaRF; Joshua Rhett Miller, Woman Pushing to Ban 
Circumcision in California City Drops Proposal, FOX NEWS (June 7, 2011), http://www.fox 
news.com/politics/2011/06/07/backer-circumcision-ban-in-california-city-withdraws-proposal/. 
569.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–31 (1997). 
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religion. Who knows what kind of havoc legislatures could potentially 
wreak in the absence of those deterrents? Even assuming that a lack of 
findings means that there is no actual problem of religious 
discrimination, why should the legislature be precluded from 
preemptively guarding against potential discrimination on the basis of 
religion? Just as many people proactively take care of their health, it 
seems sensible to proactively prevent discrimination on the basis of 
religion before it actually happens. And finally, the Supreme Court’s 
evaluation of discrimination on the basis of religion fails to take into 
account the plethora of Blaine Amendments in a huge majority of state 
constitutions which explicitly ban government funds from going to any 
religious organizations570—a degree of facial discrimination unheard of 
today with regards to race. So the Court’s conclusion that RFRA cannot 
be justified is simply incorrect. 
The upshot of our discussion of Carolene Products is that using the 
Fourteenth Amendment to ban discrimination on the basis of religion 
does not contradict the modern Equal Protection Clause case law. 
Footnote Four explicitly said that the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
all of us from discrimination on the basis of religion, just as it protects 
all of us from discrimination on the basis of national origin and race.571 
And “discrete and insular minorities” certainly include religious 
minorities, even assuming that discreteness and insularity are important 
to anti-discrimination law—a conclusion which we tend to doubt. The 
Supreme Court recognized in Carolene Products that religion gets 
Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination protection, even though 
religion also gets strict scrutiny as a result of its inclusion in the 
Religion Clauses of the Bill of Rights.572 Subsequent Supreme Court 
opinions have enshrined religion in the Fourteenth Amendment with 
almost ritualistic statements that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits selective enforcement ‘based upon an unjustifiable standard 
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’”573 In Kiryas 
Joel, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor said, “the Religion Clauses—the 
Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Religious Test 
                                                                                                                     
 570. See infra Part V (discussing Blaine Amendments). 
 571. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 572. Id. 
 573. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.8 (1979) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 
464 (1996); Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 938 (2010) (citing Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of 
Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 596 (2008); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982)) (“The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment most typically reaches state action that treats a 
person poorly because of the person’s race or other suspect classification, such as sex, national 
origin, religion, political affiliation, among others, or because the person has exercised a 
‘fundamental right,’ or because the person is a member of a group that is the target of irrational 
government discrimination.”). 
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Clause, . . . and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to religion—all 
speak with one voice on this point: Absent the most unusual 
circumstances, one’s religion ought not affect one’s legal rights or 
duties or benefits.”574  
These statements show that many contemporary courts and Supreme 
Court justices are not at all restrained in invoking the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s anti-discrimination command to answer questions 
involving religious liberty. The Supreme Court has never said that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command does not apply 
to discrimination on the basis of religion or that the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses must be used to answer all constitutional questions as 
to the scope of religious liberty. So, the Supreme Court or even lower 
federal and state courts could simply start using the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s anti-discrimination command today in cases where there 
has been discrimination on the basis of religion. 
IV.  THE FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES AFTER THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
We now consider the impact that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
general anti-discrimination command had or should have had on the 
interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which 
are incorporated through Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process to apply against the states.575 Because both the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause were really bans on certain 
specific forms of discrimination on the basis of religion, it is vital that 
we ask whether and how the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
general ban on discrimination on the basis of religion affects the 
Supreme Court’s present-day Free Exercise Clause and Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. To answer this question, we think it is helpful to 
focus on the definition of class legislation and on the evils that the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to eradicate by 
constitutionalizing a ban on class legislation. It is also vital that we 
remember that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade discrimination on 
the basis of religion at the same time that it forbade other forms of 
discrimination as well.  
We believe that the Fourteenth Amendment’s general ban on 
discrimination on the basis of religion expanded the scope of Free 
Exercise Clause protections but that it did not enlarge the reach of the 
Establishment Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that laws 
burdening religion or discriminating against religion must promote the 
                                                                                                                     
 574. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 575. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment 
Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise 
Clause). 
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general good of the whole people. This means that we should 
sometimes provide religious exemptions from facially neutral laws that 
effectively discriminate on the basis of religion because religious 
individuals and secular individuals are not similarly situated. But the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation on the basis of 
religion does not open the courtroom door to citizen suits in which a 
mere whiff of establishment was perceived, even though actual damages 
were never incurred and no litigant has standing. Nor does it imply that 
we should scrub the public square free of all religious expression and 
symbols. To do that would be to actually discriminate on the basis of 
religion, which is precisely what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was written to foster equality and liberty, 
not to repress it.576 Reexamination of the Supreme Court’s Religion 
Clause case law is therefore warranted. 
A.  Free Exercise Clause 
1.  Originalism and the Free Exercise Clause 
The Free Exercise Clause was originally meant to provide limited 
protection for the free exercise of religion. First, the Clause restrains 
Congress from passing certain kinds of laws,577 but it does not restrict 
actions taken by private citizens.578 In this sense, the Free Exercise 
Clause is quite different from the Thirteenth Amendment which guards 
against private actions.579  
Second, the Free Exercise Clause specifically restrains congressional 
law making but not federal judicial or executive law making. And the 
Free Exercise Clause says nothing about religious freedom and law 
enforcement discretion. The Free Exercise Clause thus contrasts with 
the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids the states from making or 
enforcing laws that abridge or shorten or lessen the rights or privileges 
or immunities of citizens on the basis of religion. 
Third, the Free Exercise Clause only prevents Congress from making 
laws “prohibiting” or targeting the free exercise of religion, but the 
Clause does not on its face block laws that merely abridge or burden or 
infringe on religious liberties.580 Samuel Johnson’s 1786 Dictionary and 
                                                                                                                     
 576. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520–24 (1997) (discussing the history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 577. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise 
[of religion] . . . .”). 
 578. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1113 (making this argument and noting that the Clause 
addresses one of Madison’s primary concerns about republican government which was to 
protect “citizens generally from government officials pursuing their own self-interested agendas 
at the expense of their constituents”). 
 579. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 580. See Lash, supra note 389, at 1113 (making this argument); see also Reynolds v. 
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Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary both defined “prohibit” as “to forbid; 
to interdict by authority.”581 In 1856, prohibit appeared to have the same 
meaning.582 The Free Exercise Clause thus contrasts with the Free 
Speech Clause which bars Congress from even “abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”583 Laws that limit access to government welfare benefits 
and to charity may “abridge” the free exercise of religion, but it is hard 
to say that they “prohibit it.” The original meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause thus is hard to square with Sherbert v. Verner,584 although that 
case is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination 
command. 
Finally, there is considerable debate over what kinds of religious 
activity the Free Exercise Clause protects. In Reynolds v. United States, 
the Supreme Court said that the Free Exercise Clause only protected 
rights of conscience,585 which probably also included a right to take 
action by worshiping in ceremonies of worship.586 The Clause does after 
                                                                                                                     
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162–64, 166 (1878) (evaluating the original meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause and holding that a law criminalizing polygamy did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause because the law did not prohibit religious beliefs but religious acts); cf. Lyng v. Nw. 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (emphasizing the significance of 
the word “prohibit” in the Free Exercise Clause). Professor McConnell puts together an 
extensive analysis of this subject. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1486–88. 
McConnell notes that the word “infringing” was initially proposed but was replaced with 
“prohibiting.” Id. at 1486. McConnell also cites a report of the Department of Justice that the 
original meaning of the Clause only prevents Congress from passing laws that prohibit the free 
exercise of religion. Id. Yet, somewhat curiously, McConnell ultimately concludes that the Free 
Exercise Clause bars even laws abridging or infringing on religion, not just those prohibiting it. 
Id. at 1488. 
 581. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 719 (Harrison & Co., 
1786) [hereinafter SAMUEL JOHNSON’S 1786]. Also, Webster’s defined “prohibit” as: 
1. To forbid; to interdict by authority; applicable to persons or things, but 
implying authority or right. God prohibited Adam to eat of the fruit of a certain 
tree. The moral law prohibits what is wrong and commands what is right. We 
prohibit a person to do a thing, and we prohibit the thing to be done. 
2. To hinder; to debar; to prevent; to preclude. 
 
“Forbid” definition, NOAH WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828), available at 
http://www.1828-dictionary.com/d/search/word,forbid. 
 582. See GOODRICH, supra note 41, at 353 (defining “prohibit” as “to interdict by authority, 
as the law prohibits what is wrong.—SYN. To forbid”). 
 583. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 584. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (striking down the denial of unemployment compensation to 
someone who was lost their job for religious reasons). 
 585. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. 
 586. Cf. McConnell, Origins, supra note 344, at 1506–09 (discussing rights to conscience 
and worship). 
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all on its face protect the free “exercise” of religion and not merely 
“freedom of conscience” or “belief.” It strains credulity not to read the 
Free Exercise Clause as at least protecting a right to take action in 
ceremonies of worship and to decline to serve in the military. But 
Professor Michael McConnell has argued much more boldly that the 
Free Exercise Clause protects not only the taking of action in 
ceremonies of worship but also all other religiously motivated conduct 
as well.587 McConnell’s view is based on the fact that initial drafts of 
the Free Exercise Clause protected only “rights of conscience,” while 
the final draft more broadly protected the “free exercise of religion.”588 
Dictionary definitions at the time of the Framing defined the word 
“exercise” as involving the “labour of the body” or other physical 
activities, whereas the word “conscience” was restricted to apply only to 
“private thoughts” or “knowledge.”589 
2.  Role of the Anti-discrimination Command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on Free Exercise Questions 
After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, analysis of the 
incorporated Free Exercise Clause should have changed to take into 
account the Amendment’s ban on all forms of discrimination on the 
basis of religion. We agree with Bernadette Meyler that the courts 
should have taken an equal protection approach to free exercise claims, 
but we disagree with her as to the doctrinal test that should be used.590 
Instead of inquiring whether a congressional action prohibited the free 
                                                                                                                     
 587. See id. at 1488–90. 
588.  See id. at 1475–76. 
 589. McConnell reports: 
The choice of the words “free exercise of religion” in lieu of “rights of 
conscience” is therefore of utmost importance. As defined by dictionaries at the 
time of the framing, the word “exercise” strongly connoted action. The 
American edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, 
published in Philadelphia in 1805, used the following terms to define 
“exercise”: “Labour of the body,” “Use; actual application of any thing,” 
“Task; that which one is appointed to perform,” and “Act of divine worship, 
whether public or private.” Noah Webster’s American dictionary defined 
“exercise” as “employment.” James Buchanan’s 1757 dictionary defined 
“exercise” as “[t]o use or practice.” “Conscience” was more likely to have been 
understood as opinion or belief. Johnson equated “conscience” with the terms 
“knowledge,” “Real sentiment; veracity; private thoughts,” “Scruple; 
difficulty,” and “reason; reasonableness.” Webster defined it as “natural 
knowledge, or the faculty that decides on the right or wrong of actions.” 
Buchanan defined it as the “testimony of one’s own mind.” 
Id. at 1489 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (citing various dictionaries). 
 590. See generally Meyler, supra note 15, at 326–27 (approaching equal protection claims 
as matters of discrimination, as opposed to matters of classification). 
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exercise of religion, we think the Supreme Court should instead have 
asked whether a state law abridging religious freedom was a forbidden 
form of class legislation that discriminated on the basis of religion. As 
with any other form of forbidden class legislation, the Court must 
consider two questions: (1) does the law or government action 
discriminate on the basis of religion, and (2) is there a public purpose 
served by the law such that the law is a general law enacted for the good 
of the whole people? To be clear, granting a specific religious group a 
unique privilege or immunity simply because the government wants to 
help that religion—perhaps in an attempt to rectify past discrimination 
or out of sympathy for its current unpopularity—is not a law that should 
be seen as having a legitimate public purpose. Similarly, dishing out 
unique burdens simply because a particular religion does not comport 
with majoritarian norms is also unacceptable. A law serves a public 
purpose and is not class legislation when it is designed to benefit society 
as a whole and not just a special interest group. Additionally, since the 
free exercise of religion is undoubtedly a fundamental right—enshrined 
in the text of the Bill of Rights and guarded in three clauses in the 
Constitution and in the Bill of Rights—a court should subject any law 
that abridges religious liberty to strict scrutiny.591 This is doubly the 
case since most religions in the United States are arguably discrete and 
insular minorities that qualify yet again for protection via strict scrutiny 
under Carolene Products Footnote Four. Accordingly, a court should 
evaluate laws that abridge religious liberty by asking whether the 
government interest underlying the law is being pursued using the least 
restrictive means and whether the law in question benefits the general 
public as a whole. 
The easiest application of the ban on class legislation that 
discriminates on the basis of religion is to laws that are facially neutral 
but that are clearly intended to discriminate against religion. For 
instance, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu, the Supreme Court 
unanimously struck down a city ordinance banning animal sacrifice.592 
The legislative history showed that the city council passed the law in 
question in response to the practice of adherents of the Santeria religion 
who performed animal sacrifice in their ritual ceremonies of worship.593 
This law was rightly held to be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 
It also violates the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because: (1) it directly discriminates against religion, and 
(2) it lacks a public purpose because it fails to serve the general good of 
the whole people. The ban on animal sacrifice should have been 
subjected to strict scrutiny, which it could not possibly have survived.  
                                                                                                                     
 591. See supra p. 87. 
 592. 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993). 
 593. Id. at 526–28. 
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Constitutional analysis gets harder when courts are asked to assess a 
facially neutral and generally applicable law that lacks any specific anti-
religious intent but which uniquely burdens religion. Whether the Free 
Exercise Clause mandates religious exemptions from facially neutral 
laws is a question that has triggered considerable scholarly debate.594 
The Supreme Court has taken two divergent approaches. A brief 
summary of the Court’s case law in this area is necessary.  
Until 1990, the Supreme Court generally balanced the government 
interest in adopting a facially neutral law that burdened religion against 
the severity of the burden imposed on the religious individuals who 
were forced to choose between complying with the law and sacrificing 
their religious beliefs.595 In Sherbert v. Verner, as was mentioned above, 
the Supreme Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits to 
Seventh Day Adventist who would not work on Sabbath violated the 
Free Exercise Clause, even though the law in question was religion-
neutral, facially neutral, and applied to all citizens generally.596 The 
Court explained that depriving a religious individual of unemployment 
benefits if he or she was fired for refusing to work on the Sabbath 
placed him or her in the uncomfortable position of having to choose 
between his or her religion and the government welfare benefits in 
question.597 In holding that such governmental pressure violated the 
Free Exercise Clause, the Sherbert Court laid down a two-step test for 
evaluating Free Exercise Clause claims. First, does the government 
                                                                                                                     
 594. Philip A. Hamburger explains that many Framers believed that exemptions were 
unnecessary because civil government and religion served different roles and simply operated in 
different jurisdictions. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An 
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 936–37 (1992). Religious dissenters around 
the time of the framing sought an end to establishments but did not seek exemptions. Id. at 946. 
And the notion that individuals might have a right to religious exemptions from generally 
applicable civil laws was so bizarre that supporters of religious establishments used the notion to 
smear anti-establishment proponents. Id. at 941. In his concurrence in City of Boerne, Justice 
Scalia noted that in the years following ratification of the Constitution there is no record of any 
state or federal cases in which a court struck down a generally applicable law because it failed to 
provide a religious exemption. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 542 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part).  But, there were at least two cases in which a religious exemption was 
denied. Id. at 543. But see McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 444, at 27 (arguing that the 
Free Exercise Clause required religious exemptions, as long as those exemptions did not 
interfere with important government interests); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 546 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Court should return to its pre-Smith jurisprudence in which it 
balanced the government interest against the burden on religious exercise because the Free 
Exercise Clause created “an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious 
practices and conduct without impermissible governmental interference, even when such 
conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law”). 
 595. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963); see also Thomas v. Review 
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). 
 596. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410. 
 597. Id. at 404. 
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action in question substantially burden an individual’s ability to exercise 
his or her religious belief? 598 And second, does the government have a 
compelling state interest that overrides the individual’s religious liberty 
claim?599 The Supreme Court implied that these two questions were 
interrelated and that they required balancing the importance of the 
government interest in question against the degree to which the free 
exercise of religion was impaired.600 The answer to this question 
depended in part on whether the government pursued its compelling 
objective in the least restrictive way.  
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court used the Sherbert 
balancing test to hold that Amish parents could not be compelled to 
send their children to school past the eighth grade.601 The court 
explained that the government’s interest in forcing Amish children to 
attend ninth and tenth grades was not sufficiently compelling relative to 
the substantial burden the law imposed on Amish parents’ religious 
beliefs.602 Sherbert and Yoder thus seemed to herald the dawn of a new 
age in which the Free Exercise Clause would be read broadly as 
protecting the access of religious people to welfare benefits and to their 
own ideas about the education of children. 
In its 1990 decision in Employment Division, Dept. of Human 
Resources v. Smith, however, the U.S. Supreme Court abruptly changed 
course one hundred eighty degrees. The Court in Smith rejected the 
Sherbert-Yoder balancing test and held that facially neutral criminal 
laws banning the use of peyote in religious ceremonies did not need to 
be accompanied by a religious exemption under the Free Exercise 
Clause.603 The Court declared that facially neutral laws that prohibit 
action in a religious ceremony do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, 
as long as they do not target a specific religious group, even though 
specific religious groups or religious people in general might face a 
significant burden on their religious beliefs or practices.604  
In 1993, in the wake of the Smith decision, Congress passed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which purported to 
reinstate the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test.605 RFRA said that the 
                                                                                                                     
 598. Id. at 403. 
 599. Id. at 406. 
 600. See 6 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.8(b) (4th ed. 2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court, in 
Sherbert v. Verner, applied a two-part balancing test when it held that unemployment benefits 
“could not be denied” to a woman because of her religious affiliation and religious observance). 
 601. 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). 
 602. Id. at 217–18. 
 603. Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85, 890 (1990). 
 604. Id. at 877–78. 
 605. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993) (invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
536 (1997)). 
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“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
[their] religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability . . . .”606 If a government action does burden religious 
exercise, it must satisfy strict scrutiny. Namely, the government action 
must (1) further a compelling government interest, and (2) accomplish 
its goal with the least restrictive means.607 RFRA applied to both the 
states and the federal government.608 Congress justified RFRA on the 
grounds that it was overturning Smith and enforcing the Free Exercise 
Clause as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment under its 
Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.609 
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA 
as it applied to the states.610 The Court explained that Congress could 
only enforce the Free Exercise Clause if there was “congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end.”611 The Supreme Court said that Congress 
could not legislatively “overturn” a Supreme Court decision like the one 
in Smith and that it could not invent a new substantive right restricting 
state governments while pretending to “enforce” the Fourteenth 
Amendment.612 The Supreme Court did not, however, strike down 
RFRA’s application to the federal government,613 and in a later case the 
Court unanimously held that RFRA was valid as to the federal 
government.614 Thus the Obama Administration’s recent decision to 
force some organizations—whether religious or not—to provide 
contraceptive coverage to their employees615 will have to survive strict 
scrutiny under RFRA. 
We think that Justice Scalia’s approach in Smith is open to two 
criticisms. First, on the facts of Smith, a group of Native Americans was 
barred from ingesting peyote in a religious ceremony of worship 
because of state anti-narcotics laws.616 The constitutionality of this law 
seems dubious because the Native Americans literally wanted to engage 
in the exercise of religious worship, which is precisely the primary type 
                                                                                                                     
 606. Id. § 2000bb-1(a). 
 607. Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 608. Id. § 2000bb-2. 
 609. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512, 516–17. 
 610. Id. at 536. 
 611. Id. at 520. 
 612. Id. at 535–36. 
 613. Id. at 520, 532–33, 536. 
 614. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 
(2006). 
 615. Richard Wolf & Cathy Grossman, Obama Mandate on Birth Control Coverage Stirs 
Controversy, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/ 
2012-02-08/catholics-contraceptive-mandate/53014864/1.  
 616. Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). 
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of “exercise” that the Free Exercise Clause protects. Allowing the 
government to simply declare a mode of worship illegal appears to gut 
the Free Exercise Clause of any meaning. And the Native American 
worship did not harm any third parties as might a human sacrifice in a 
Neo-Aztec ceremony of worship or the burning of a widow on her 
husband’s funeral pyre as in the ancient Asian Indian practice called 
suttee. Justice Scalia thus seems wrongly to say in Smith that the Free 
Exercise Clause actually protects only freedom of conscience and not 
the “exercise” of any religious liberties. 
Second, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith seems to imply that so long 
as a law is facially neutral and is motivated by no discriminatory intent 
it will survive Free Exercise Clause scrutiny.  This seems to us to be 
plainly wrong. A law can be facially neutral but still be discriminatory if 
it is written in a way that targets a suspect class or that treats unlike 
things as if they are like things. The laws in the South in the 1880s that 
allowed anyone to vote whose grandfathers had been eligible to vote 
were facially neutral, but they were also plainly designed to 
discriminate on the basis of race. Similarly, laws today that require that 
all healthcare providers fund access to contraceptives and abortion 
discriminate on the basis of religion even if they are written in a way 
that is facially neutral. These are all facts that everyone in society just 
knows, and they arise from the fact that since religious people and 
secular people are different in some respects a law that treats them as if 
they were exactly the same is in fact discriminatory. This phenomenon 
was mentioned as long ago as by Aristotle in The Politics: 
[T]he political good is justice, and justice is the common 
benefit.  Now everyone holds that what is just is some form 
of equality . . . . For justice is something to someone, and 
they say it should be something equal to those who are 
equal. But equality in what and inequality in what, should 
not be overlooked. For this involves a problem and political 
philosophy.617 
The basic point is that a law that requires that everyone take Sunday as 
their legal day of rest may be facially neutral and nondiscriminatory, 
and it may not even by motivated by a discriminatory intent. But such a 
law does in fact discriminate on the basis of religion to the detriment of 
Jews and Muslims. 
We think that Justice Scalia was quite properly concerned in Smith 
by his correct dislike for disparate impact analysis in Title VII race 
discrimination cases where the Supreme Court held that whenever an 
employment practice had a racially disparate impact the practice was 
                                                                                                                     
 617. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 86 (C.D.C. Reeve trans. 1998). 
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unlawful unless the defendant could prove it was justified by business 
necessity.618  Early in his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia 
joined an important opinion in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,619 
which sought to limit disparate impact analysis and which Congress 
then tried to overturn by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991.620 In his 
separate concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano,621 Justice Scalia even asked 
whether Title VII disparate impact analysis might itself violate 
constitutional equal protection doctrine,622 which has been held since 
Washington v. Davis623 to require proof of discriminatory intent as well 
as disparate impact.624 Disparate impacts often emerge for totally 
benign reasons, and we think it is a huge mistake in race discrimination 
or religion discrimination cases to shift the burden of proof only 
because of a disparate impact. 
The real question in any Fourteenth Amendment discrimination case 
is whether the government has denied to any class of people the same 
legal rights as were held by white men under federal and state law in 
1868. Members of every race, sex, and religion have the same legal 
rights, today, as were enjoyed by white men in 1868. A law is 
discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment without regard to 
proof of discriminatory intent or of disparate impact if it gives a class of 
people fewer legal rights than were enjoyed by white men in 1868. 
Citizens of every race, sex, and religion have, in the words of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, “the same right[s]” as were enjoyed in the 1860’s 
by white citizens.625 Class legislation is unconstitutional unless it is in 
the form of a general law enacted for the good of the whole people, not 
a subsection of society.626 
We think that disparate impact analysis in cases where 
discrimination on the basis of religion is alleged must take account of 
the fact that it is often well known how a facially neutral law will 
impact religion prior to its enactment. Because the discriminatory 
impact certain laws will have on a known religion is so obvious and 
inescapable, discriminatory intent can be more easily inferred in cases 
involving discrimination on the basis of religion than in cases involving 
discrimination on the basis of race. Justice Field discussed this issue 
while riding circuit in 1879 in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,627 a case in which 
                                                                                                                     
 618. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 619. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 620. Id. at 659–60. 
 621. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 622. Id. at 594. 
 623. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 624. Id. at 239. 
 625. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 626. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
 627. 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,456). 
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the court struck down an ordinance that permitted prison guards to 
shave the heads of prisoners, even Chinese prisoners who wore a queue 
for religious reasons.628 In that case, the government was well aware 
that shaving the queues of Chinese individuals would violate their 
religious beliefs.629 Despite the possible benefits of the ordinance, 
Justice Field was disturbed by the way in which “the ordinance acts 
with special severity upon Chinese prisoners, inflicting upon them 
suffering altogether disproportionate to what would be endured by other 
prisoners if enforced against them.”630 For that reason, the court struck 
down the ordinance as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban 
on class legislation discriminating on the basis of religion.631  
If Justice Field had used the test of Smith in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 
the prison ordinance requiring the shaving of queues should have 
survived because it was a neutral, generally applicable law regarding 
hair length in prison. But Justice Field recognized that the disparate 
impact on Chinese religious practices was well known and severe and 
for that reason the law in question did constitute impermissible class 
legislation.632 Justice Field further discussed how a facially neutral law 
could be considered “intended hostile legislation” merely because of the 
“exceptional severity” such legislation inflicted on a particular class, 
such as believers in a minority religion.633 Justice Field described, for 
example, how a law requiring all prisoners to eat pork would violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment because of such a law’s obvious disparate 
impact on observant Jews.634 Justice Field also said that laws “enacted 
with the avowed purpose of imposing special burdens and restrictions 
upon Catholics” would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even if they 
were facially neutral.635  
Justice Field’s point is that the existence of certain religious 
practices is often well known before legislation is adopted, and for that 
reason severe disparate impacts on religion, unlike severe disparate 
impacts on the basis of race, can be easily predicted. We therefore think 
that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents lawmakers from simply 
ignoring obvious and inevitable disparate impacts that facially neutral 
laws will have on religion unless those laws are needed to avoid harm to 
some third party—for example, a widow being burned on the funeral 
pyre of her husband. But under Smith, the Supreme Court seemed to say 
                                                                                                                     
 628. Id. at 256–57. 
 629. Id. at 253–54. 
 630. Id. at 253, 255. 
 631. Id. at 255–57. 
 632. Id. at 255. 
 633. Id. at 255–56. 
 634. Id. at 255. 
 635. Id. at 255–56. 
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that lawmakers could force Chinese prisoners to shave their heads, Jews 
to eat pork, and Catholics to pay for contraception and abortions, as 
long as the laws in question are facially neutral and generally 
applicable. We think that result is wrong and violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment for the reasons Justice Field gave in 1879.  
In a footnote in Carolene Products, the U.S. Supreme Court said that 
the Fourteenth Amendment banned laws that disparately impact 
religion.636 As discussed earlier, Footnote Four cited one case, Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters,637 for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment 
banned discrimination on the basis of religion.638 In Society of Sisters, 
the Oregon law at issue was not one that facially discriminated against 
one religion or all religions.639 It was a facially neutral, generally 
applicable law that merely had a disparate impact on religion because it 
banned all private schools.640 The law in question applied to all school 
children, and the Court in Society of Sisters cited no examples of anti-
religious animus or of discriminatory intent in the legislative history of 
the Oregon law.641 Yet the Carolene Products Court still cited the 
Oregon law struck down in Society of Sisters as the primary example of 
a law “directed at” religion in violation of the anti-discrimination 
command of the Fourteenth Amendment.642 Why would the Supreme 
Court cite a disparate impact case in discussing discrimination on the 
basis of religion when it cited a case of facial discrimination for race?643 
The Court did not explain itself, but we can speculate that perhaps the 
justices recognized that disparate impacts on religion were more 
common than facial discrimination on the basis of religion? Or perhaps 
the Supreme Court just took judicial cognizance of the fact that 
everyone knew that Catholic parochial schools were the real targets of 
the Oregon law no matter what the law said on its face. Or perhaps the 
Supreme Court recognized that facial discrimination against religion 
was already banned by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment as it would be incorporated against the states, whereas the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command outlawed 
disparate impacts on religion as well as laws that discriminated on their 
face. Whatever the reason, Carolene Products Footnote Four reflects 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in a seminal opinion that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command broadly bans all 
                                                                                                                     
 636. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 637. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1952). 
 638. See supra Part III.C. 
 639. See Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 530 & n.*. 
 640. Id. 
 641. Id. 
 642. Carolene Prods Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 643. See id. (citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (involving a law that facially 
discriminated based on race)). 
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discrimination on the basis of religion, just as it bans all discrimination 
on the basis of national origin or race. 
We think that, instead of using the Smith rule, the Supreme Court 
should say that the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination 
command as applied in the context of religion mandates a variation of 
the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test. First, the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ban on discrimination on the basis of religion means that a law 
discriminating on the basis of religion can only be upheld if it promotes 
the general good of the whole people. The Sherbert-Yoder test merely 
required that a law burdening religion pursue an important government 
interest. Second, we also think that the Fourteenth Amendment demands 
an evaluation of the degree of harm to religious citizens that is inflicted 
by the law in question as well as by the need to protect a vulnerable 
third party from actual physical harm. Courts should take into account 
the magnitude of the harm inflicted on religion, as the Supreme Court 
did in its equal protection decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, and as 
Justice Field did in Ho Ah Kow.644 And courts should assess whether 
reasonable accommodations are possible, if not required, as is done in 
cases arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act645 and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.646 In contrast, the Sherbert-Yoder test 
simply required the government to pursue its interest using the least 
restrictive means. Thus, the Sherbert-Yoder test would have wrongly 
allowed a law to stand that discriminated on the basis of religion if that 
law served an important government interest, even if it did not promote 
the general good of the whole people. And the Sherbert-Yoder test 
would also wrongly permit a law to stand that inflicts substantial, 
irreparable harm on a religious group, so long as the law in question 
does so using the least restrictive means.  
Perhaps for these reasons the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test turned 
out to provide a pretty skimpy protection for freedom of religion even in 
the days between 1963 and 1990 when the test was widely used. 
Professor Adam Winkler points out that under the Sherbert-Yoder 
balancing test and under RFRA, seventy-two percent of all the laws that 
have been challenged have been upheld, even though the courts 
reviewing those laws were supposed to be applying strict scrutiny.647 In 
                                                                                                                     
 644. See Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 253–54 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,456) 
(balancing the benefits of the head shaving ordinance against the severe, negative impact on 
Chinese religious practices). 
 645. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117, 12201–12213 (1994). 
 646. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994). 
 647. See Winkler, supra note 501, at 860. Professor Winkler cites a similar study by James 
Ryan from the 1980s showing an astounding 87% survival rate. Id. (citing James E. Ryan, Note, 
Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 
1407, 1416–17 (1992)). Winkler also explains that claims for exemptions from generally 
applicable laws are rejected 74% of the time, and claims that laws intentionally target religious 
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contrast, in other areas of constitutional law where strict scrutiny is 
used, only thirty percent of the cases that get strict scrutiny resulted in 
the courts upholding the law being challenged.648 For this reason, some 
referred to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith as a “mercy killing” 
because the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test had proved to be such an 
ineffective protection for the free exercise of religion.649  
The laws that were struck down as unconstitutional in both Sherbert 
and Yoder may very well have been consistent with the original 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause itself. Denying welfare benefits or 
access to private charity schools may very well “abridge” the Free 
Exercise of Religion, but they do not “prohibit” it. The verb “prohibit” 
implies a government action that is backed up with criminal sanctions. 
It is completely implausible to say that a denial of welfare benefits is a 
“prohibition” on the free exercise of religion. A criminal truancy statute 
in the context of Yoder might well rise to the level of being a 
“prohibition,” but the denial of welfare benefits in Sherbert and in 
Thomas v. Review Board650 do not. 
The government’s actions in Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas all, 
however, do violate the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The laws in all three of these cases clearly discriminated 
on the basis of religion. The law in Sherbert denied a Seventh Day 
Adventist Sabbath observer unemployment benefits when she was fired 
because, under her religion, the Sabbath was celebrated on Saturdays, 
and she refused to work on that day.651 But for her religion, the plaintiff 
would not have been fired and would not have needed unemployment 
benefits. The law in Yoder, like the law in Society of Sisters, placed a 
substantial and irreparable harm on the parents of school children—in 
this case on the Amish.652 The Wisconsin legislature was probably 
genuinely concerned with the level of education that school children 
were receiving, but the Amish had a different approach to education 
based on their own religious values, which they ought to have been free 
to pursue. The Wisconsin law in Yoder was, in effect, a form of 
discrimination on the basis of religion, which was barred by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The law in Thomas denied unemployment 
benefits to a Jehovah’s Witness who refused to work for an employer 
who made military equipment.653 Here too, the law in question operated 
                                                                                                                     
practices are successful 100% of the time. Id. at 860–61. 
 648. Id. at 796. 
 649. Id. at 859 (citation omitted).  
 650. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (refusing to deny welfare benefits to an individual that ceased 
employment as a result of his religious belief). 
 651. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399, 400 n.3 (1963). 
 652. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 & n.2 (1972). 
 653. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 709 & n.1. 
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as a form of discrimination on the basis of religion. 
The basic problem in all of these cases is that the religious 
individuals who brought them were not similarly situated to secular 
individuals. The Seventh Day Adventist in Sherbert celebrated the 
Sabbath on Saturdays and not on Sundays. The Amish parents and child 
in Yoder thought that education mandated after eighth grade was bad for 
the soul. And, the Jehovah’s Witness in Thomas thought that it would 
violate his religion for him to work for an employer who made military 
equipment. In all three cases, religious citizens were treated as if they 
were identical to secular citizens when in reality they were not alike. 
Fourteenth Amendment principles are violated, not only when we treat 
two similar people differently, but also when we treat two people who 
are in reality different in the same way. Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas 
are thus not examples of Griggs v. Duke Power disparate impact 
analysis run amok.  They are instead a reminder that we may sometimes 
need to treat different people differently if we want to secure them a 
truly equal citizenship under the law. 
For this reason, the foundational religious liberty case of all time, 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters was correct because it involved an instance 
of discrimination on the basis of religion. In Society of Sisters, the 
facially neutral law in question applied much more harshly to religious 
families who wanted, as a matter of their faith, to send their children to 
private religious schools than it did to secular families. Even though 
there might be a public purpose served by requiring all children to 
attend public schools, the law would fail strict scrutiny equal protection 
analysis because it was partially aimed at closing down private religious 
schools, and it was not a general law enacted for the good of the whole 
people.654 Religious education is a critical part of a religious child’s 
upbringing, and forcing a child to attend a secular public school in 
which the child is taught in a secular way is clearly an irreparable harm 
that could be easily avoided with a religious exemption. The fact that 
religious education is not a critical part of a secular child’s upbringing 
does not mean that religious education can just be outlawed across the 
board. Religious children and secular children simply have different 
educational preferences. Treating both groups the same way when they 
are in fact different violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Finally, we think, as we implied above, that the decision in Smith 
was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. The law in Smith 
penalizing ingestion of peyote in a Native American religious ceremony 
should have been struck down since it directly burdened the exercise of 
religion in a ceremony of worship and posed no harm to other 
                                                                                                                     
 654. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 296 F. 928, 936–37 (D. Or. 1924), aff’d, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (discussing how the purpose of the Oregon law was to target parochial and private 
schools). 
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individuals. The harm to the Native Americans involved in this case 
was certainly substantial and irreparable with potentially far-reaching 
consequences. Although the drug laws do address a huge societal 
problem—one which likely can only be addressed by government—
allowing carve-outs for a few religious rituals would not undermine the 
efficacy of those laws.655 A narrow exemption for a legitimate religious 
practice should have been feasible. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme 
Court appeared to partially pare back Smith, by creating a significant, 
yet ambiguous exception to Smith’s general rule.656 In future cases, the 
Supreme Court should invoke the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on 
discrimination on the basis of religion as Justice Scalia would have done 
in his dissent in Locke v. Davey.657  This would allow the Court to avoid 
the Smith rule entirely without directly overruling a landmark precedent 
that it has relied upon for over twenty years. 
B.  Establishment Clause 
1.  Originalism and the Establishment Clause 
As an original matter, the Establishment Clause created only the 
most minimal limits on government.658 Prior to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Establishment Clause only applied to the federal 
government and not to the states. At the federal level, the Clause 
substantively guaranteed disestablishment.659 But beyond that, the 
Clause served simply as a structural tool of federalism, permitting the 
states to choose whether to have religious establishments or not and 
barring the federal government from having any say over this matter.660 
                                                                                                                     
 655. But see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39–41 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing 
that allowing an exemption to federal drug laws for medicinal users of marijuana would 
undermine a national scheme to fight drug abuse). 
 656. Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
821, 834 (2012). 
 657. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 658. See Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 
90, 100, 104 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000) [hereinafter “McConnell, Believers as Equal 
Citizens”] (describing how the Establishment Clause set up a pluralist state as opposed to a 
secular state). 
 659. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 106 n.40. 
 660. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32–41 
(1998); Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1113, 1132–35 (1988); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: 
The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1089–99 (1995); William K. 
Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of 
Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1201 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment 
and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2105, 2109 (2003) [hereinafter “McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment”]; 
Paulsen, supra note 14, at 317; William C. Porth & Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A 
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Whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Establishment 
Clause to apply against the states has been the subject of debate among 
originalists, with some arguing against incorporation661 and some 
arguing in favor of it.662 The evidence seems to us to more likely favor 
the incorporation argument. By 1868, twenty-seven out of thirty-seven 
state constitutions had some form of an establishment clause.663 This 
suggests that freedom from an established state church is a right that 
was deeply rooted in American history and tradition in 1868 when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. 
The Establishment Clause prohibits laws that “substantively 
institute, authorize, or otherwise establish religion,” as Professor 
Douglas Laycock has written.664 The Clause does not set up a wall of 
separation between church and state.665 As Professor Michael Paulsen 
has argued, the Establishment Clause should be interpreted using an 
equal protection approach.666 In 1786, Samuel Johnson defined the word 
“establishment” as mainly having financial connotations, as in a 
“[s]ettlement[,] fixed rate” or an “[a]llowance[,] income[,] salary.”667 
Samuel Johnson also defined “establishment” as being a 
“[f]oundation[,] fundamental principle” or a “[c]onfirmation of 
something.” 668 Samuel Johnson defined the verb form “to establish,” as 
meaning “[t]o settle firmly[,] fix unalterably,” “[t]o make [f]irm[,] to 
                                                                                                                     
Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 136–39 
(1987); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 
WASH. U. L. Q. 371, 406–07. Even Laurence Tribe concedes that the primary purpose of the 
Clause was “to protect state religious establishments from national displacement.” LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed. 1988). James Madison tried to 
create a national establishment clause that would restrict the states as well, but the effort was 
ultimately rejected. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 366, at 758–59. 
 661. See, e.g., Lietzau, supra note 660, at 1210 (“While many specific Bill of Rights 
incorporations have been criticized, none are so thoroughly contradicted by the historically 
discernible intentions of our forefathers than that of the establishment clause.”); Paulsen, supra 
note 14, at 314 (“The Supreme Court’s reading of the religion clauses is completely 
indefensible—historically, textually, and practically.”); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639, 678–79 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). The basic argument is that the Establishment 
Clause was designed primarily (or perhaps solely) to delineate federal power, barring Congress 
from interfering with states’ establishments. See Lietzau, supra note 660, at 1199. It is therefore 
incoherent to expand a principle of federalist structure to the states. See id. at 1207–08. 
 662. Phillip Hamburger argues that the Establishment Clause had a substantive element and 
was incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Philip Hamburger, Separation and 
Interpretation, 18 J.L. & POL. 7, 58 n.84 (2002); HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 106 n.40. 
 663. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 39, at 31–32. 
 664. Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 
376–78 (1992). 
 665. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 481–83. 
 666. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 315. 
 667. See SAMUEL JOHNSON’S 1786, supra note 581. 
 668. Id. 
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ratify,” “[t]o fix or settle in an opinion,” “[t]o found[,] to build firmly[,] 
fix immoveably.”669 Johnson’s definitions thus would seem to support 
Laycock’s assertion that an establishment was a substantial undertaking. 
Samuel Johnson also defines the verb “establish” as “[t]o settle in any 
privilege or possession.” 670 This definition suggests that the Framers 
may have included the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment to 
prevent Congress from forming a national monopoly religion by 
granting a special privilege to one religion but not to others. Read this 
way, the Establishment Clause represents a ban on a certain form of 
particularly obnoxious class legislation. 
Professor McConnell argues that six categories of laws fall within 
the original Eighteenth Century understanding of what constitutes an 
establishment of religion. These six categories include laws that: 
“(1) control . . . doctrine, governance, and personnel of the church; 
(2) [make] compulsory church attendance; (3) [give a religion] financial 
support; (4) prohibit[] . . . worship in dissenting churches; (5) [govern 
the] use of church institutions for public functions; and 
(6) restrict[] . . . political participation to members of the established 
church.”671 McConnell’s bright line categories effectively ask whether a 
particular law actively establishes religion.672 McConnell avoids such 
                                                                                                                     
 669. Id. 
 670. Id. 
 671. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra note 660, at 2131. 
 672. The modern Supreme Court’s tests for evaluating Establishment Clause cases are 
generally inconsistent with the Clause’s original meaning. For instance, the Court in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971), established a three part test to evaluate facially 
neutral laws: 1) “the statute must have a secular legislative purpose”; 2) the statute’s “principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and 3) “the statute 
must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”). These factors really 
have nothing to do with establishing a religion as was understood at the time of the founding. In 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Supreme Court appeared to modify the Lemon test. 
There, the Court said that in evaluating aid to religion, courts should ask whether the 
government had a permissible non-sectarian purpose and whether the law had a non-religious 
primary effect. See id. at 232–33. To determine whether an effect was permissible or non-
permissible, a court should evaluate three factors: (1) whether the aid supported religious 
“indoctrination”; (2) whether recipients of the aid were defined by a reference to religion; and 
(3) whether the aid program caused an excessive entanglement with religion. Id. at 234. Again, 
these factors are almost entirely irrelevant as an original matter. Unsurprisingly, using these 
factors has led to decisions that diminish religious liberty, instead of promoting it. For instance, 
in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), the Court struck down a law 
requiring employers to allow their employees to take off work on the Sabbath. Id. at 710–11. 
The Court explained that the law had the primary effect of advancing religion because it 
increased costs for employers and co-workers to accommodate the employee’s religious 
practice. Id. at 709–10. The repression of religious liberty in Thornton cannot be 
underemphasized. See also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 
(1994) (striking down a law creating a separate school district for a group of Chassidic Jews 
who were unable to benefit from the secular public school system). 
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nebulous concepts as whether a law “advances religion,” whether it has 
a “secular legislative purpose,” whether it “endorses religion,” whether 
it leads to “entanglement,” or whether it respects the “separation of 
church and state.” 
The Establishment Clause on its face seems only to bar actions taken 
by Congress, and not actions taken by the executive or the judicial 
branches of government.673 This point flows from the constitutional text 
which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”674 But actions taken by the President alone or 
by other executive branch or judicial officials do not violate the 
Clause.675 The point is that making an establishment of religion is a 
major undertaking that can only be accomplished with the participation 
of multiple branches of government, as is required for Congress to make 
a law. Accordingly, the President’s declaration of a day of prayer and 
Thanksgiving, his appointment of military chaplains, or the placement 
of religious symbols in the Oval Office or on the walls of the Supreme 
Court building plainly do not violate the text of the Establishment 
Clause.676 The text also seems to permit placing religious symbols 
anywhere on government buildings or in parks, even in courtrooms, as 
well as using the phrase “In God We Trust” as our national motto.677 
2.  Establishment Clause Questions After the Fourteenth Amendment  
Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager argue that Establishment 
Clause cases should be viewed from what they consider to be an 
equality perspective.678 They believe that the Establishment Clause’s 
                                                                                                                     
 673. See Hamburger, supra note 594, at 52. 
 674. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 675. See Hamburger, supra note 594, at 52. 
 676. Id. 
 677. The Clause’s emphasis on congressional actions also answers complaints that the 
participation of clergy members and churches in politics is an establishment of religion. The 
language solely restricts Congress from passing a law and in no way burdens religious 
individuals or organizations from involving themselves in politics. See Hamburger, supra note 
594, at 52–53. This is sensible because the purpose of the clause was to protect individual 
religious freedom. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 101. Barring religious individuals or 
organizations from politics also should violate the No Religious Test Clause. See U.S. CONST. 
art. VI. 
 678. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 456 (1994) (stating that the equal 
regard” principle “requires that government treat the deep, religiously inspired concerns of 
minority religious believers with the same regard as that enjoyed by the deep concerns of 
citizens generally. This principle takes stark inequalities of treatment as a sufficient ground for 
constitutional solicitude, and it applies to inequalities that burden non-believers as well as to 
those that target religion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gellman & Looper-
Friedman, supra note 16 (arguing that religious displays violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because they make non-believers feel marginalized). 
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equality principle requires a hermetically strict separation of church and 
state. Essentially, they think that almost any partiality that the 
government might show towards religion violates an equality 
principle.679 They thus conclude that religious exemptions, displays of 
religious symbols,680 and most voucher programs for school children are 
unconstitutional.681  
A wooden, textual reading of the Fourteenth Amendment analysis 
could in theory lead to a strict wall of separation between church and 
state, particularly if one starts from the assumption that religion plays 
and should play no role in people’s lives. If the Fourteenth Amendment 
bans class legislation, one could thus argue that the government should 
not be able to provide religion with special benefits not offered to the 
general population. A religious display during the holiday season could 
thus be construed a special privilege, allowing a particular religion to 
advertise itself or convey a message. And religious exemptions in 
general could be argued to be classic examples of special class laws that 
carve out a unique benefit for a single class of individuals and hold the 
rest of the population to a different standard. It is for this reason in City 
of Boerne v. Flores682 that Justice Stevens concluded that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act was an unconstitutional establishment of 
religion over irreligion.683 
The proper response to Justice Stevens and Professors Sager and 
Eisgruber requires that we recall that a critical feature of lawsuits 
challenging partial or special laws during the Antebellum Jacksonian 
period was that plaintiffs could only bring law suits when they had 
                                                                                                                     
 679. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 678, at 452–53. 
 680. See id. at 457. 
 681. Even though Eisgruber and Sager do say that there are some circumstances in which 
students could constitutionally receive vouchers to attend private religious schools, those 
circumstances are very difficult to come by. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 16, at 204–17. 
For instance, Eisgruber and Sager think that the voucher program in Zelman was 
unconstitutional because the secular public schools were inferior to the private religious schools. 
Id. at 214–15. Because urban public schools often, perhaps even always, are inferior to private 
schools, vouchers for religious schools would almost always be unconstitutional under their 
approach. And they think that it would be unconstitutional for a small town with a large 
Christian population to provide vouchers for religious education because minority religions 
would not have enough members to populate and support their own schools. Id. 207–08. 
Because small towns throughout the United States often have large populations of Christians 
and small populations of minority religions, Eisgruber and Sager effectively believe vouchers 
are unconstitutional in many, perhaps even most small towns. With both large cities and small 
towns unfit for vouchers, Eisgruber and Sager do not leave much hope for vouchers in the 
United States. So their endorsement of vouchers is more theoretical than real. And because their 
default educational system is public secular education without any funding of religious 
education, the effect of their “equal regard” approach is discrimination against religion. 
 682. 521 U.S. 507. 
 683. Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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suffered actual economic damages from a law.684 Litigation challenging 
special or partial class based laws was not initiated by average citizens 
under a theory that those laws caused emotional distress. Instead the 
plaintiffs who challenged class legislation during the Jacksonian era 
were always attempting to recover a tangible economic loss that had 
resulted from the law they were challenging.685 For this reason, there 
really was no difference between special laws, which convey a unique 
privilege, and special laws, which impose a unique burden, because 
both types of laws are economically burdensome. Thus, a standing 
requirement that a litigant have suffered actual and concrete legal injury 
was essentially built into all the pre-1868 class legislation cases. No one 
could have challenged as class legislation a law that caused them to 
suffer emotional distress unless they had also suffered real and actual 
economic damages.   
There is no reason whatsoever to think that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ban on class legislation overrode this standing 
requirement for challenges to class-based laws, and there is no historical 
evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment created a cause of action for 
unharmed citizens. In an Establishment Clause context, to the extent 
that a law creates a unique privilege or burden and causes actual 
economic damage, it constitutes class legislation, just as it would in any 
other context.686 But absent actual economic damages, a law is simply 
not class legislation in the sense in which that term would have been 
understood in 1868. Therefore the Supreme Court’s recent move toward 
tightening up the standing requirements in Establishment Clause cases 
is completely consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class 
legislation.687 
                                                                                                                     
 684. See Saunders, supra note 17, at 299 n.243 (noting that “none of the antebellum cases 
contain any suggestion that discriminatory intent, standing alone—that is, without 
discriminatory effect—would raise constitutional concerns”). 
 685. See, e.g., Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27–28 (Iowa 1849) (challenging a law singling 
out half-breed Indians for special disadvantage as land owners and attempting to recover 
property); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 332 (1825) (challenging a law granting certain persons a 
special right to appeal financial obligations between adverse parties); Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. 
(3 Hum.) 483, 483, 486 (1842) (challenging a special criminal law applicable only to employees 
of a certain bank); Jones’ Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59 (1836) (challenging a law 
granting a guardian of certain minors a special right to sell their property); Officer v. Young, 13 
Tenn. (5 Yer.) 320 (1833) (challenging a law granting a certain person a special right to 
prosecute an appeal in the name of a deceased person); Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121 (Vt. 1825) 
(challenging a law granting a debtor a special right to release from debtor’s jail without paying 
back his debt); Saunders, supra note 17, at 252 n.28. 
 686. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011) 
(“[P]laintiffs may demonstrate standing based on . . . direct harm . . . [or they] may demonstrate 
standing on the ground that they have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on account of 
their religion.”). 
 687. Id. (restricting the application of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)); Hein v. 
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Sager and Eisgruber’s belief that some abstract notion of equality 
requires courts to strike down almost any relationship between 
government and religion is wrong for multiple reasons. As we just 
explained, their argument has no basis in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ban on class legislation, which contained a standing requirement and 
never recognized the causes of action that Sager and Eisgruber endorse. 
Religious displays, President Obama’s annual Easter prayer breakfast, 
and the Supreme Court’s recent Christmas Party simply do not 
constitute class legislation because no one is legally injured by any of 
those government actions. Second, Sager and Eisgruber’s argument is 
irreconcilable with the original meaning of the Establishment Clause 
which required an actual establishment of religion, as Professors 
Laycock and McConnell have explained.688 Mere whiffs of religion are 
not to be mistaken for an establishment like the one that existed in 
England from 1607 to 1791.689 The idea that a religious display 
constitutes an establishment of religion because some peoples’ 
consciences are offended by it is frankly laughable. Many people’s 
consciences are offended by the teaching of Darwin in public and 
private schools.690 That does not mean that they have suffered a legal 
injury entitling them to sue. 
And third, using the Fourteenth Amendment or First Amendment as 
a sword, rather than a shield, to lash out at religion is bizarre given that 
those amendments were designed in part to guard and promote religious 
liberty.691 It would be repressive and not freedom-enhancing for a court 
to strike down religious exemptions designed to protect religious 
adherents damaged by a generally applicable law. For that reason, it 
would be repressive and not freedom-enhancing to refuse to grant 
vouchers to religious children who want to attend private religious 
schools or to refuse to provide vouchers for religious schools, even 
though vouchers are provided for private secular schools. Such refusals 
do not represent equality. They represent discrimination. And banning 
religious displays that people want and enjoy when those displays do 
not economically damage anyone is a restriction on religious freedom, 
not a promotion of it. Sager and Eisgruber’s “equal regard” principle is 
simply not consistent with either the original meaning of either the 
Fourteenth or the First Amendment, and it violates basic principles of 
                                                                                                                     
Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (refusing to apply Flast); Valley Forge 
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).  
 688. See Laycock, supra note 664, at 376; McConnell, Establishment and 
Disestablishment, supra note 660, at 2109. 
 689. See supra Part II.D.1.  
 690. See David J. Hacker, Warning! Evolution Lies Within: Preserving Academic Freedom 
in the Classroom with Secular Evolution Disclaimers, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 333, 345–46 
(2004). 
 691. See McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, supra note 658, at 104–05. 
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liberty and equality. In reality Sager and Eisgruber are promoting a 
secular state that is more in line with the traditions of France than it is in 
line with those of the United States.692 
3.  Voucher Programs do not Violate the Establishment Clause  
Government programs that provide tuition vouchers for students 
attending the private school of their choice, including private religious 
schools, do not violate the Establishment Clause or the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,693 the Supreme Court held 
that such vouchers do not violate the Establishment Clause.694 Voucher 
programs for the use of private schools do not constitute class 
legislation because they are general welfare benefits available to all 
residents, and they do not single out a class of people for unique 
benefits or burdens.695 Because students can use their education 
vouchers equally at both religious and at secular schools, voucher 
programs are really no different from general welfare payments which 
recipients can spend either on secular or religious goods and services. 
Suits challenging voucher programs should probably even be dismissed 
for lack of standing,696 as the Supreme Court held in Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Organization v. Winn.697 
School vouchers do not offend any of Professor McConnell’s six 
categories of laws prohibited by the Establishment Clause.698 Perhaps 
one could argue that vouchers provide financial support for religious 
institutions. But the kinds of financial support that are barred by the 
Establishment Clause are those instances where the government directly 
funds religion by paying the salary of clergy or providing for the upkeep 
of churches or synagogues.699 In contrast, vouchers for education give 
every student and parent the right to choose whether to use government 
money at a private school, be it secular or religious, instead of having to 
attend a secular public school.700 It would truly be a distortion of the 
Constitution to use the Establishment Clause, which guaranteed 
religious liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which guaranteed 
individual liberty, to strike down a program that actually enhances 
                                                                                                                     
 692. See LA CONSTITUTION 1958 CONST. art. 2 (Fr.) (“France is a Republic, indivisible, 
secular, democratic and social.”). 
 693. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 694. Id. at 662–63. 
 695. Id. at 649. 
 696. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (denying 
relief for a general citizens suit). 
 697. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 698. See supra p. 119. 
 699. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va, 515 U.S. 819, 868 (1995) 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
 700. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at  649. 
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individual educational choice. 
The history of the Blaine Amendment also indicates that vouchers do 
not violate the Establishment Clause. In 1875, James G. Blaine, who 
was at that point a Congressman from Maine, proposed an amendment 
to the federal Constitution banning state governments from funding 
religious schools and institutions.701 Although the Senate did not ratify 
the Blaine Amendment, thirty eight states and the District of Columbia 
eventually passed similar provisions over a period of time that stretched 
from 1848 to 1959.702 The fact that Congress and the States felt the need 
to pass the Blaine Amendment in 1875 to stop government money from 
going to religious schools and institutions itself shows that members of 
Congress in 1875 did not think that the Establishment Clause alone 
barred government funding of religious schools and institutions. If the 
Establishment Clause had already banned public funds from reaching 
religious institutions, then the Blaine Amendment would have been 
unnecessary. There is little historical evidence that members of 
Congress objected to the Blaine Amendment on the grounds that the 
Establishment Clause already did what the Blaine Amendment was 
supposed to do.703 Rather, the history supports the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Zelman. 
One counterargument is that in 1875 many members of Congress 
may not have believed that the Bill of Rights and, therefore, the 
Establishment Clause applied to the states. Accordingly, they may have 
simply wanted to restrict the states in the same way that the federal 
government was restricted. This explanation seems sensible in the wake 
of the Slaughter-House Cases, in which the Supreme Court implicitly 
ruled that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.704 It is also 
supported by statements made by members of Congress during the 
                                                                                                                     
 701. See Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 423, at 49–50 (citing Constitutional 
Guarantees of Religious Liberty, THE INDEX, Dec. 2, 1875, at 570). Blaine’s proposal provided 
that: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any 
State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund 
therefor, [sic] nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the 
control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted 
be divided between religious sects or denominations. 
Id. at 50. 
 702. See Duncan, supra note 3, at 513–15 & n.95; D.C. CODE § 44-715 (2012). There are 
currently thirty seven Blaine Amendments because Louisiana repealed its provision in 1974. 
Duncan, supra note 3, at 514 n.95. 
 703. See Green, supra note 423, at 38–39. 
 704. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 82 (1873). 
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Blaine Amendment debate in 1875 and 1876.705 But it is contradicted by 
the fact that Congress felt the need to add a Blaine-style provision to the 
D.C. Code, banning government funds to religious organizations in the 
District of Columbia and restricting U.S. Government expenditures in 
general.706 That provision would have been unnecessary if the 
Establishment Clause already barred public funds from reaching 
religious schools and organizations. And the discussion about 
incorporation was limited during the congressional debate, and there is 
little evidence that more than a handful of congressional members were 
concerned with the issue of incorporation.707 Rather, the focus of the 
debate was on the substantive merits of the Blaine Amendment.708  
V.  THE BLAINE AMENDMENTS 
Blaine Amendments play a significant role in the story of religion 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. We think that the various Blaine 
Amendments in thirty-seven states and in the District of Columbia 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on class legislation because 
they facially discriminate against religion, and they are not general laws 
that promote the good of the whole people. These Amendments, which 
were passed at the end of the Nineteenth and the beginning of the 
Twentieth Centuries, were motivated by anti-Catholic bigotry and to a 
lesser extent by hatred of other minority religions. That ugly history has 
been to some extent forgotten in the modern secular era, where Blaine 
Amendments are currently viewed as being general anti-religion 
clauses, and not as being clauses that target Catholics or another 
specific group. Blaine Amendments are a reminder of how insidious a 
neutral, generally applicable law that purports to only burden religion in 
general can be. Blaine Amendments have also received some cover in 
the modern era from the Court’s Free Exercise Clause case law because 
they do not on their face target a specific religion, such as Catholicism, 
and instead discriminate against all religions equally. We think that 
under a Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination analysis, Blaine 
Amendments should surely be struck down. Laws that barred 
government funds from going to organizations or schools run by racial 
minorities—say, historically black colleges—would surely violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment. We find it impossible to see why blocking 
government funds from going to religious schools and organizations 
should be any different. Blaine Amendments discriminate on the basis 
of religion in distributing government money, and they should thus be 
subjected to strict scrutiny and struck down. 
                                                                                                                     
 705. See Green, supra note 423, at 62. 
 706. See D.C. CODE § 44-715 (2012) (effective June 11, 1896). 
 707. Green, supra note 423, at 63–64. 
 708. Id. 
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The passage of the various Blaine Amendments in the nineteenth 
century, both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified 
in 1868, does make one wonder whether the original public meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command really did 
ban discrimination on the basis of religion. This question may be of 
interest to those who are original intent theorists, but it is irrelevant to 
those who believe in the original public meaning of the constitutional 
text. The objective original public meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as it was adopted in 1868 banned all forms of class 
legislation including class legislation targeted at religion. The fact that 
some framers or other politicians subjectively believed or expected that 
religion would not be included in this ban is quite simply irrelevant to 
determining the objective public meaning of the constitutional text. 
Thus the nineteenth century practice of discriminating on the basis of 
religion, just like the nineteenth century practice of discriminating on 
the basis of race, became unconstitutional on the day the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified. Practice is an imperfect guide in discerning 
the original public meaning of constitutional texts. 
A.  The History of the Blaine Amendments 
As we mentioned above, there are currently thirty-seven states with 
so-called “Blaine Amendments” in their state constitutions that prohibit 
government funds from reaching religious organizations such as 
schools.709 The District of Columbia has a comparable provision in the 
D.C. Code.710 These Blaine Amendments come in varying forms and 
state courts have used them to strike down many different kinds of 
government funding schemes.711 A typical provision reads: 
[N]o public money or property shall ever be appropriated, 
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, 
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or 
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any 
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or 
dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.712 
The bigoted and shameful history of Blaine Amendments has been well-
documented713 and is worth briefly recounting. 
                                                                                                                     
 709. Duncan, supra note 3, at 523. 
 710. D.C. CODE § 44-715 (2012). 
 711. See Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 1 
(1997) (discussing the various State Blaine Amendments and categorizing them according to 
levels of restrictiveness); Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 117, 128–31 (2000) (discussing different state court decisions). 
 712. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5 (1907). 
 713. See Green, supra note 423, at 41–42. 
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Conflict over funding religion began with the advent of the public 
schools in the 1830s and 1840s and continued through the nineteenth 
century. Public schools during this time characteristically taught the 
Bible from a Protestant perspective and imbued Protestant values in 
children.714 At the same time, large numbers of Catholics, and to a 
lesser extent Jews, began immigrating to the United States.715 The 
public education of children in an increasingly pluralistic religious 
environment led to conflicts among religious factions with deeply held 
religious values. The Protestant majority set up a public school 
curriculum designed to convey Protestant values, and many dissenting 
Catholics and Jews understandably resisted.716 But Protestant educators 
went a step farther and used public schools as a forum for denigrating 
Catholics and excluding non-majoritarian religious views.717 In an 
attempt to level the playing field, Catholics began requesting private 
school funding in such major cities as New York, Philadelphia, Boston, 
and Baltimore.718  
Protestants responded to these requests for government funding of 
parochial schools with a strong legislative backlash designed to prevent 
Catholics from ever controlling public schools or from ever receiving 
                                                                                                                     
 714. Id. 
 715. At the time of the Revolution, Catholics comprised only 1% of the population, but 
grew to 3.3% by 1840, 10% by 1866, and 12.9% by 1891. Duncan, supra note 3, at 504. The 
Jewish population followed a similar trend, growing from 2500 in 1800 to 15,000 in 1840 to 
125,000–200,000 in 1860 and approximately 1 million in 1900. From Haven to Home: Timeline 
1492–1695, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/haventohome/timeline/haven-
timeline_0.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). From 1845 to 1850 alone, one million Irish 
immigrants came to this country. See Meir Katz, The State of Blaine: A Closer Look at the 
Blaine Amendments and Their Modern Application, 12 J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 111 
(June 2011), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20110608_Engage12.1(June2011).pdf. 
 716. See Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 295 (2008). 
 717. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 220 (noting how public schools in New York 
City “required children to read the King James Bible and to use textbooks in which Catholics 
were condemned as deceitful, bigoted, and intolerant”); id. at 223 n.83 (citing the report of a 
special school committee that New York City public schools that “the books used in the public 
schools contain passages that are calculated to prejudice the minds of children against the 
Catholic faith”); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the 
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 300 (2001) (discussing the controversial practice 
of reading the Bible without interpretation); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, 
the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 666 
(1998) (observing that, while “[t]he American common school was founded on the pretense that 
religion has no legitimate place in public education . . . in reality it was a particular kind of 
religion that its proponents sought to isolate from public support”). 
 718. See DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 3–76 (1974); Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and 
Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 113, 145–
46 (1996). 
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any public funds. In 1842, the New York State legislature passed a law 
that banned government money from ever going to any schools where 
“any religious sectarian doctrine or tenet shall be taught, inculcated, or 
practiced.”719 In 1848, Wisconsin became the first state to amend its 
State constitution to impose a similar prohibition on government money 
ever going to a religious school.720 By 1875, another thirteen states had 
followed Wisconsin’s lead by adopting similar Blaine Amendments to 
their State constitutions.721 Although on their face these prohibitions 
appeared to neutrally prohibit all government funding of religious 
schools, protestant religious practice in the public schools was so 
common during this time period that it was clear that these states were 
not endorsing secularism in any way.722 Several State constitutions 
adopted during this period expressly used the word “sectarian,” which, 
in the nineteenth century, was taken to be a code word for “Catholic.”723 
At the national level, politicians jumped on the anti-Catholic 
bandwagon. The “Know-Nothings,” later known as the American Party, 
were dedicated to “remov[ing] all foreigners, aliens, or Roman 
Catholics from office” and opposed appointing Catholics to positions of 
power.724 The Know-Nothings and the American Party had enormous 
success in local and national elections.725 
Opposition to funding private religious schools was based primarily 
on a fear and hatred of Catholics and immigrants. Protestant fear of 
Catholics was partly motivated by the belief that Catholic doctrines 
were contrary to American principles of freedom, individuality, and 
perhaps democracy. For instance, the Catholic Church’s traditionally 
authoritarian structure, close connection between church and state, and 
tight regulation of individual rights and conduct was perceived as 
somewhat un-American.726 Opposition to funding religious schools was 
                                                                                                                     
 719. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 717, at 301; Joseph Viteritti cites the New York law 
as 1844 N.Y. LAWS ch. 320, § 12. See Viteritti, supra note 718, at 146 n.176. 
 720. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (adopted 1848) (“[N]or shall any money be drawn from the 
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries”). 
 721. ALA. CONST. art. XIII, § 8 (adopted 1875); ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (adopted 1870); 
IND. CONST. art I, § 6 (adopted 1851); KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 8 
(adopted 1859); MASS. CONST. of 1855, art. XVIII (amended 1917); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 40 
(adopted 1850); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2. (adopted 1857); MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 9 
(adopted 1869); MO. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (adopted 1875); NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (adopted 
1875); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (added 1851); OR. CONST. art. I, § 5 (adopted 1857); PA. CONST. 
art. III, § 18 (adopted 1874). 
 722. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 717, at 299. 
 723. See Green, supra note 423, at 43, 47–48. 
 724. See Katz, supra note 715, at 112, 118 n.15 (describing how the American Party used 
oaths to test Catholics’ loyalty and put Catholics in precarious situations); Michael F. Holt, The 
Politics of Impatience: The Origins of Know Nothingism, 60 J. AM. HIST. 309, 311 (1973). 
 725. Katz, supra note 715, at 112. 
 726. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 229–34 (discussing the church’s 
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also motivated by a nativist skepticism of all immigrants, particularly 
Irish Catholics.727 Yet this seemingly secular nativism ultimately 
blended into religious prejudice.728Anti-Catholic newspapers 
circulated,729 there were numerous incidents of mob violence against 
Catholics, and Catholic churches were burned down.730 Public schools 
were a means of assimilating Catholics, Jews, and other immigrants into 
the Protestant mold.731 
In the 1860s and 1870s there was also a wave of radical secularism 
that was committed to “the absolute separation of church and state.”732 
The goal of these secular humanists was to terminate “all public 
appropriations for sectarian educational and charitable institutions” and 
that “no privilege or advantage shall be conceded to Christianity or any 
other special religion” at both the federal and state level.733 Secularists 
also demanded that “our entire political system shall be founded and 
administered on a purely secular basis.”734 For these secularists, the 
Blaine Amendment was insufficient because it did not effectively wipe 
out religion from the public sphere. Secularists “viewed all Christians 
with the same fear and horror [that] Protestants reserved for 
Catholics.”735 Most shockingly, they even believed that “government 
benefits distributed on purely secular grounds could not be given to 
religious organizations.”736 
                                                                                                                     
condemnation of separation of church and state and reaction by American Protestants); STEPHEN 
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 61 
(2000) (noting that America’s “core principles of individual freedom and democratic equality” 
seemed to conflict with the Catholic Church’s “authoritarian institutional structure, its long-
standing association with feudal or monarchical governments, its insistence on close ties 
between church and state, its endorsement of censorship, and its rejection of individual rights to 
freedom of conscience and worship”); Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and 
Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little Blaine Amendment” and the Future of Religious Participation in 
Public Programs, 2 NEV. L.J. 551, 555 (2002) (noting that “[t]he Vatican Decree of Papal 
Infallibility of 1870 added to the anti-Catholic sentiment during this time”); Jeffries & Ryan, 
supra note 717, at 302–03 (describing the church’s opposition to secular education and freedom 
of conscience and noting that “Rome hampered attempts by American Catholics to abandon the 
Church’s legacy by issuing reactionary pronouncements ideally suited to confirm the rankest 
prejudice”). 
 727. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 202; Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and 
Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 130 (2001) (discussing the “long 
history” of American anti-Catholicism). 
 728. See HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 202; Berg, supra note 727, at 130. 
 729. Viteritti, supra note 717, at 667. 
 730. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 216–17. 
 731. Viteritti, supra note 717, at 668. 
 732. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 290 & nn.7–8, 292–93. 
 733. Id. at 294 n.22. 
 734. Id. at 294. 
 735. Id. at 302. 
 736. Id. at 305. 
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In 1875, the Blaine Amendment gained fervent momentum at the 
national level. President Ulysses S. Grant delivered an influential 
speech in which he said that Congress should “[e]ncourage free schools, 
and resolve that not one dollar, appropriated for their support, shall be 
appropriated to the support of any sectarian schools.”737 Lest anyone 
think that Grant was endorsing secularism, Grant added that children 
should receive a “good common school education, unmixed with 
sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas.”738 Grant’s speech was a clear 
attack on Catholics in an effort to align himself with Protestants as he 
sought a third term for President.739 On December 7, 1875, speaking 
before Congress, Grant called for “a constitutional 
amendment . . . prohibiting the granting of any school funds, or school 
taxes, or any part thereof . . . for the benefit or in aid, directly or 
indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination.”740 James Blaine 
followed Grant’s lead, and Blaine proposed his amendment to the 
federal Constitution on December 14, 1875.741 Blaine’s proposal was 
met with overwhelming support because it was seen “as a means of 
curbing the Catholic influence on school boards.”742 The national Blaine 
Amendment failed to clear the Senate, but states continued to amend 
their state constitutions with their own Blaine Amendments well into 
the Twentieth Century. 
B.  The Supreme Court and the Blaine Amendments 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitutionality 
of the thirty-seven Blaine Amendments in various State constitutions.743 
                                                                                                                     
 737. Green, supra note 423, at 47. 
 738. Id.  
 739. Id. at 48–49; Viteritti, supra note 717, at 670. 
 740. Green, supra note 423, at 52. 
 741. Id. at 50 (“No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State, for the 
support of public schools or derived from any public fund therefor, shall ever be under the 
control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised be divided between religious sects or 
denominations.”) (citing JAMES P. BOYD, LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF HON. JAMES G. BLAINE: 
THE ILLUSTRIOUS AMERICAN ORATOR, DIPLOMAT, AND STATESMAN 351–53 (1893)). 
 742. Id. at 53 (citing ZION’S HERALD, Dec. 16, 1875, at 4; The Blaine Amendment, Dec. 23, 
1875, at 4). 
 743. Various articles have argued that Blaine Amendments are unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, 
Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 617–25 (2003) 
(arguing that Blaine Amendments violate freedom of speech); Duncan, supra note 3 (arguing 
that Blaine Amendments violate the Free Exercise Clause); Heytens, supra note 711, at 140–52 
(arguing that Blaine Amendments violate equal protection); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, 
Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 962 n.204, 975 (2003) (indicating that some Blaine Amendments 
could violate free speech principles); Rebecca G. Rees, Note,  “If We Recant, Would We 
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The closest the Court came to passing on this question was in Locke v. 
Davey744 where the Court considered the State of Washington’s policy 
of not giving scholarship money to individuals seeking a religious 
education, even though it provided scholarships to individuals seeking a 
secular education. The plaintiff in Davey had his scholarship revoked 
once he took up religious study at a religious school but would have 
been able to maintain his scholarship if he had studied religion from a 
secular perspective.745 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion held 
that the states have “room for play in the joints” of the Establishment 
and the Free Exercise Clauses that allows the states in some contexts to 
facially discriminate against religion.746 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
explained that barring funding for religious education served the state’s 
“antiestablishment interests,” even though the Court in Zelman had 
declared that this kind of funding was completely permissible under the 
Establishment Clause.747 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the 
state did not impose “sanctions on any type of religious service or rite” 
or deny “to ministers the right to participate in the political affairs of the 
community” or force “students to choose between their religious beliefs 
and receiving a government benefit.”748 These actions would certainly 
have violated the Free Exercise Clause under existing Supreme Court 
precedent. Instead, the state had “merely chosen not to fund a distinct 
category of instruction.”749 This was a sufficiently rational basis for the 
law, even though choosing not to fund an activity on the basis of race or 
gender would obviously violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”750 
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the facts in Locke v. 
Davey warranted a direct application of the ban on facial discrimination 
on the basis of religion enunciated in Church of the Lukumi Babalu.751 
Justice Scalia cited Brown v. Board of Education752 and Craig v. 
Boren753 and compared facial discrimination in schools on the basis of 
religion to facial discrimination in schools on the basis of race and 
                                                                                                                     
Qualify?”: Exclusion of Religious Providers from State Social Service Voucher Programs, 56 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1291, 1315–28 (1999) (explaining how Blaine amendments improperly 
restrict free speech). 
 744. 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004). In Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) 
(plurality opinion), the Court noted the “shameful pedigree” of Blaine Amendments, but did not 
address their constitutionality. 
 745. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 716–17. 
 746. Id. at 718. 
 747. Id. at 719, 722; see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002). 
 748. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720–21. 
 749. Id. at 721. 
 750. Id. 
 751. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 752. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 753. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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gender, although he did not explicitly invoke the anti-discrimination 
command of the Fourteenth Amendment that we argue for in this 
article.754 Justice Scalia noted that Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith755 only permitted facially neutral 
laws that disparately impacted religious practice, not facially 
discriminatory laws like the ones upheld in Locke v. Davey.756 Justice 
Scalia emphatically argued that the state did not have a legitimate 
governmental interest in barring government funding for religious 
students when government funding for similar secular studies was 
allowed.757  
It is not clear, however, that the holding in Locke v. Davey should 
necessarily lead to upholding Blaine Amendments. Professor Douglas 
Laycock has argued that the holding in Locke v. Davey was a narrow 
one and that it only applies “to training of clergy, to refusals to fund that 
are not based on hostility to religion, and to cases that do not involve 
forums for speech.”758 Blaine Amendments are blanket bans on 
government funding of any religious school or institution, not just bans 
on government funding of the clergy.759 They were also clearly 
motivated by a strong anti-Catholic bigotry in the nineteenth century.760 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court could, consistent with Locke v. Davey, 
hold Blaine Amendments unconstitutional. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has 
similarly limited the application of Locke v. Davey in an important 
opinion by then-Judge Michael McConnell.761 In Colorado Christian 
University v. Weaver,762 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals struck 
down a state educational funding scheme that allowed government 
money to go to religious schools but that barred it from going to 
                                                                                                                     
 754. Davey, 540 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 755. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 756. Davey, 540 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 757. Id. at 734. 
 758. See Laycock, supra note 423, at 184.  
 759. See supra Part V.A. 
 760. See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 16 (discussing the anti-Catholic sentiment 
existing at the time of the Blaine Amendments). Some scholars argue that this overt bigotry 
alone should be sufficient to render Blaine Amendments unconstitutional. See, e.g., Thomas C. 
Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 
151, 199–208 (2003). Yet the Supreme Court has been skeptical of this argument. Davey, 540 
U.S. at 723 n.7; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 761. But other circuits have said that Davey supports the notion that the Equal Protection 
Clause only provides religion with simple rational basis protection, as long as the law remains 
between “the joints.” See, e.g., Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 282–83 (1st Cir. 2005); St. 
John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 638 (7th Cir. 2007); Bowman v. 
United States, 304 Fed. App’x 371, 378, 381 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 762. 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008). 
133
Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1042 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
“pervasively sectarian” schools.763 Writing for the majority, Judge 
McConnell explained that under Locke v. Davey, “the State’s latitude to 
discriminate against religion is confined to certain ‘historic and 
substantial state interests.’”764 Accordingly, Davey “does not extend to 
the wholesale exclusion of religious institutions and their students from 
otherwise neutral and generally available government support.”765 Only 
“minor burdens and milder forms of disfavor are tolerable in service of 
historic and substantial state interests” while “major burdens and 
categorical exclusions from public benefits” are problematic.766 Judge 
McConnell’s opinion also held that discrimination on the basis of 
religion is subject to “heightened scrutiny” and could violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.767 Thus, the Tenth Circuit applied some sort of 
intermediate scrutiny for religion in place of the usual rational basis test. 
C.  Blaine Amendments Constitute Class Legislation 
State Blaine Amendments easily violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ban on class legislation. Blaine Amendments facially 
discriminate on the basis of religion by explicitly carving out a special 
disadvantage for religious individuals as compared to secular 
individuals. Blaine Amendments fit precisely into the definition of class 
legislation “which is partial in its operation, intended to affect particular 
individuals alone, or to deprive them of the benefit of the general 
laws.”768 The plaintiff in Davey lost his scholarship once he took up 
religious study at a religious school, but he would have been able to 
maintain it if he had studied religion from a secular perspective.769 This 
is a blatant instance of the government discriminating on the basis of 
religion. Other applications of Blaine Amendments could include: 
(1) allowing vouchers for students attending secular schools, but not for 
students attending religious schools; (2) allowing the funding of secular 
charities, but not of religious ones; or (3) denying any other government 
benefits or welfare payments to religious groups while upholding them 
for secular individuals. Blaine Amendments therefore constitute blatant 
discrimination on the basis of religion, and they are impermissible in the 
absence of a very compelling public purpose. 
Blaine Amendments lack a legitimate public purpose because the 
types of funding that they outlaw are generally constitutional when the 
                                                                                                                     
 763. Id. at 1250. 
 764. Id. at 1255 (citing Davey, 540 U.S. at 725). 
 765. Id. 
 766. Id. at 1255–56 (quoting Davey, 540 U.S. at 720, 725) (internal quotations omitted). 
 767. Id. at 1266 (citations omitted). 
 768. Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 269 (1829) (Peck, J.) (defining a partial 
law). 
 769. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 716–17. 
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money goes to a secular school or institution. The Supreme Court has 
held that many forms of government funding of religious organizations 
do not violate the Constitution.770 These holdings are consistent with the 
original meaning of the Establishment Clause which only banned actual 
establishments of religion.771 So, it seems quite difficult to claim that 
the Blaine Amendments serve an “antiestablishment” purpose772 when 
the Supreme Court has itself said that many of these kinds of funding 
programs do not actually violate the Establishment Clause. States could 
certainly have provisions in their state constitutions that parallel the 
federal Establishment Clause without violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ban on discrimination on the basis of religion. For 
example, states could ban direct funding of the clergy consistently with 
the anti-discrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment. States 
could even augment the protections of the federal Establishment Clause 
in some contexts, as the states commonly do with other constitutional 
provisions. But states cannot augment a provision of the federal 
Constitution in a way that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on 
discrimination on the basis of religion. We do not allow states to 
strengthen free speech protections in a way that discriminates based on 
race because doing so would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Similarly, we should not allow states to strengthen federal 
Establishment Clause protections in a way that discriminates on the 
basis of religion.  
The simple desire not to fund religion, as a matter of conscience, is 
not a legitimate public purpose that can save the Blaine Amendments if 
the identical activity does get funded when done by a secular school or 
institution. The argument that taxpayers, as a matter of conscience, 
should not be forced to indirectly support religion by having their tax 
dollars go to religious organizations is not itself a public welfare 
rationale.773 The conscientious objection rationale may explain the 
                                                                                                                     
 770. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (holding that a 
government voucher program that benefited students attending religious schools did not violate 
the Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993) 
(holding that public employees may be placed in religious schools); Witters v. Washington 
Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986) (holding that public funds could support 
a blind person at a religious school without violating the Establishment Clause); Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion) (allowing states to loan “educational 
materials and equipment” purchased with federal funds directly to religious and private 
schools); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995) 
(holding that if a state university funds student magazines, it has to fund a student religious 
magazine). 
 771. See supra Part IV.B. 
 772. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 722 (explaining that not funding private religious 
organizations while funding parallel private secular organizations served an important 
antiestablishment interest). 
 773. See, e.g., AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, 
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ulterior motivations of supporters of Blaine Amendments, but it does 
not provide a constitutional defense for those amendments. To justify 
class legislation, a law must convey a general benefit that promotes the 
good of the whole people. Examples of class laws that promote the 
general good of the whole people include most of our police power laws 
which are designed to protect the public’s health, safety, and economic 
autonomy. Simply banning a specific class of disfavored people who are 
religious from receiving government money does not promote a public 
purpose. Undoubtedly, there are white supremacists who—as a matter 
of conscience—object to government funds being spent for the benefit 
of African-Americans. But, in our constitutional system, this is not an 
acceptable public purpose that could justify class legislation on the 
grounds that it was meant to benefit the general good of the whole 
people. Indeed, members of religious groups could argue quite plausibly 
that they conscientiously object to having their tax dollars used to fund 
a secular public school system. In Lawrence v. Texas,774 the Supreme 
Court struck down a Texas law banning sodomy because it lacked a 
“legitimate state interest,” despite the fact that the law reflected local 
morals and conscience.775 The Court stated that “[f]reedom extends 
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.”776 If the Court can conclude that laws targeting gays and 
lesbians lack a public purpose, even though homosexuality is nowhere 
mentioned in the Constitution, unlike religion, then the Supreme Court 
should surely be able to say that laws discriminating on the basis of 
religion are not general laws enacted for the good of the whole people. 
Such laws must instead be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
Davey’s license to discriminate on the basis of religion in the context 
of educational funding could easily be transferred to many other sorts of 
government programs. Educational funding is merely one type of 
general welfare program designed to benefit the public. Educational 
funding is thus no different in principle from Medicare, Social Security, 
or even the provision of local fire protection services.777 Under the logic 
of Davey, the legislature could ban Medicare recipients from going to 
religious hospitals or prevent Social Security recipients from making 
donations to religious institutions. Or perhaps local communities, in 
keeping with the local residents’ “freedom of conscience,” could 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.au.org/issues/religious-school-vouchers (last visited July 23, 2013). 
 774. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 775. Id. at 562–63, 578–79. 
 776. Id. at 562. 
 777. In Zelman, the Court effectively described Ohio’s voucher program as a general 
welfare program, referencing the “[p]rogram benefits” to “participating families.” 536 U.S. 639, 
653 (2002). 
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establish fire departments that protect secular schools and organizations, 
but not religious ones. The fact is that Davey is no more defensible than 
are any of these other forms of government discrimination on the basis 
of religion. What this shows is that Davey must be wrong. 
How can the Supreme Court change course? The answer is that in 
Davey, the Supreme Court was exclusively focused on the free exercise 
of religion question and it failed to ask whether the state law in that case 
violated the equal protection doctrine by discriminating on the basis of 
religion. The majority in Davey concluded that revoking Davey’s 
scholarship did not constitute a prohibition of religion within the 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.778 The parties and amici in Davey 
were also primarily focused on the Free Exercise Clause question. Some 
of the briefs mentioned the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but they did so only in passing.779 Neither the majority, the 
dissent, or any of the briefs gave any serious consideration to the 
Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination question. So the Fourteenth 
Amendment discrimination issue was not truly before the Court in 
Davey, even though it should have been. The parties never recognized 
that Washington State’s law was an impermissible form of class 
legislation which violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and so the Court 
did not truly pass on that issue. In the future, the Supreme Court could 
and should take up the Fourteenth Amendment discrimination question. 
D.  The Counterargument of the Blaine Amendments  
One possible counterargument to our thesis is that the sordid history 
of state Blaine Amendments shows that the original understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was such that the Amendment was not 
thought to protect religious freedom at all. Since nine states had Blaine 
Amendments in 1868, and another twenty-four states added Blaine 
Amendments to their state constitutions by the end of the nineteenth 
century,780 it could be argued both that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not incorporate the religion clauses of the First Amendment and that it 
did not ban discrimination on the basis of religion. This point is further 
underscored by the overt anti-Catholic and, at times, anti-religious 
bigotry that accompanied these Blaine amendments.  
This counterargument regarding religion actually mirrors a similar 
counterargument that could be made regarding discrimination on the 
basis of race and gender. In the years immediately following the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, racial segregation was 
widespread in the United States, especially from 1877 to 1954. During 
                                                                                                                     
 778. Davey, 540 U.S. at 719–21. 
 779. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 
2003 WL 22137308, at *44–45. 
 780. See supra pp. 128-29; Duncan, supra note 3, at 514 n.95, 519–20. 
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the period between 1868 and 1920 and then again from 1937 to 1971, 
discrimination on the basis of gender was also widespread, 
notwithstanding the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment781 in 
1920. The Supreme Court’s awful decisions in Plessy v. Ferguson,782 
Bradwell v. State,783 and Goesaert v. Cleary784 further justified and 
entrenched these discriminatory practices. The history of virulent 
discrimination against African-Americans and women following the 
ratification of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments has led some 
to believe that a deviation from the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is necessary to protect against racial or sex 
discrimination.785  
But these arguments are mistaken.786 The original expected 
applications of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, much like 
their subjective intent, are simply not relevant to ascertaining the 
objective public meaning of the text of the constitutional provision that 
they wrote. A fitting analogy is someone who contracts to sell his house 
and at the closing refuses to hand over the keys to his garage, noting 
that the contract does not specify that the garage, which he did not 
intend to sell, was included in the sale of the house. The seller’s 
expectations and subjective intent would be simply irrelevant in 
establishing the objective meaning of the contract which would instead 
be defined by local laws and customs. The Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment deliberately and knowingly used broad, unqualified 
language that went far beyond a simple ban on race discrimination. The 
original objective public meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to ban all forms of class legislation and all systems of 
caste. When the framers wanted to excise certain groups, such as aliens, 
from the broad protection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, they 
crafted a text that explicitly applied only to citizens. The fact that the 
text mentions neither race, nor gender, nor religion, means that a 
general ban on all forms of class legislation was enacted. The fact that 
some or even many framers or other politicians failed to understand 
                                                                                                                     
 781. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 782. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (articulating the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine). 
 783. 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (permitting states to prevent women from obtaining license to 
practice law). 
 784. 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (permitting states to prevent women from obtaining bartending 
licenses). 
 785. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal 
Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 161 (“Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing 
radically from the original understanding, is required to tie to the fourteenth amendment’s equal 
protection clause a command that government treat men and women as individuals equal in 
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.”). 
 786. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 19, at 46–51 (discussing why expected 
applications are not relevant to ascertaining the original meaning of the text). 
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what the Amendment had done and thought that discrimination on 
account of race or religion was still permissible is irrelevant to the 
objective original public meaning of the text.787 Instead, discrimination 
on the basis of race and religion became unconstitutional on the very 
day that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. To say otherwise is no 
better than the guy who wants to hold onto his garage. 
VI.  THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 
We think that our argument that Blaine Amendments violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment leads to a further and perhaps startling 
conclusion. We think that the current American public school system 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on all forms of class 
legislation for two basic reasons. First, we think that states discriminate 
on the basis of religion when they administer secular public schools that 
are unpalatable to religious individuals and that are funded with 
taxpayer dollars. As already discussed, discrimination on the basis of 
religion is a form of class legislation that is banned by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. And many religious children constitute a caste because 
their religious status is inherited from their parents and is effectively 
immutable until they grow up. Indeed, some religions, including 
Judaism and Islam, do not even acknowledge conversions of their 
members to other faiths as being valid. Second, we also think that 
public school systems violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they 
are state-operated monopolies. These state-run public school 
monopolies are no different in principle from the types of state-granted 
monopolies that the Jacksonian Democrats fought against in the 
nineteenth century and that the Fourteenth Amendment banned. To 
rectify these breaches of the Fourteenth Amendment, we think that 
states are constitutionally obligated to give tuition vouchers to all 
students that they can use, if they wish, at the private school of their 
choice. 
A.  Discrimination on the Basis of Religion 
Public schools discriminate on the basis of religion. Even though the 
education laws do not explicitly ban religious individuals from 
attending public schools, religious students are effectively excluded by 
the character of the public school curriculum, moral teachings in public 
schools, and general atmosphere at public schools.788 Public education 
                                                                                                                     
 787. See Harrison, supra note 18, at 388 (discussing how the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were concerned that the Amendment could have broader implications than they 
expected or intended because they recognized that the objective meaning of the text, not the 
subjective intent, was controlling); Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 31 (arguing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment banned anti-miscegenation laws, despite the Framers’ intent). 
 788. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 
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is generally advertised as being secular, neutral, and open to all 
students. Yet neutrality in education is probably impossible because 
conveying values to children is an inherent aspect of education.789 
Secularism and popular culture are incompatible with many religious 
belief systems, and public schools are simply incapable of teaching the 
religious values and doctrine that religious families often need. Indeed 
public education in America is neither neutral nor welcoming to all 
students, as public schools regularly promote political and social 
agendas at odds with religious views.790 
In modern society, it is impossible to create a “neutral” educational 
environment. Religious and secular educators advance polar opposite 
approaches on such controversial topics as sex education,791 
homosexuality,792 abortion,793 and standards of dress and decency. For 
instance, California recently enacted the California Fair Education Act 
which mandates that educators, textbooks, and instructional materials 
positively promote “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Americans” 
as role models.794 Needless to say, this produced a strong backlash from 
religious groups opposed to these lifestyles. Balancing religion and 
science has also never been simple. The debate over creationism versus 
                                                                                                                     
395, 396 (D.N.H. 1974); Brusca v. Missouri, 332 F. Supp. 275, 276 (E.D. Mo. 1971) 
(memorandum opinion); State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 755, 761 (Ohio 1976). 
 789. See Viteritti, supra note 718, at 181–82 (discussing how there is nothing neutral about 
education); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 131, 156–82 (1995) (discussing the difficulty of finding a set of common, neutral 
educational values). 
 790. See  Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State: Tuition Tax 
Credits, 92 HARV. L. REV. 696, 700–05 (1979) [hereinafter Government Neutrality] (arguing 
that the public school system violates the First Amendment’s neutrality principles); Paulsen, 
supra note 14, at 358 (recognizing that the current public school system is not neutral and 
constitutionally problematic). 
 791. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 171 (1993) (describing how the New York City 
public schools distributed condoms to all students without any opportunity to opt out, even 
though many parents complained that doing so violated their religious beliefs); Todd Starnes, 
Sex Education in NYC Schools Becomes Mandatory, FOX NEWS (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/08/10/sex-education-in-nyc-schools-becomes-mandatory 
(describing a controversial new program in New York City); see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, 
supra note 16, at 210 (acknowledging that “secular institutions are not neutral, in the sense of 
being acceptable from the standpoint of all religions”).. 
 792. See, e.g., Judson Berger, ACLU Sues Missouri School System for Censoring Gay 
Advocacy Websites, FOX NEWS (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/16/ 
aclu-sues-missouri-school-system-for-censoring-gay-advocacy-websites. 
 793. See, e.g., Marc Ramirez, Abortion referral puts spotlight on school-based health 
centers, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 25, 2010), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2011445397_ 
abortion26m.html. 
 794. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51204.5 (2012). 
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evolution is long-lived and impassioned.795 Which books should be 
read, or not read,796 as well as how to teach history are also regularly 
debated.797 And clashes between religious and secular factions 
frequently end up being litigated in court.798 
The facts of Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District799 are 
instructive of the religion versus secularism controversy in public 
schools.800 In Peck, a kindergartener had drawn a picture of Jesus as 
part of a class assignment.801 The school district censored the picture in 
furtherance of its anti-establishment interests.802 The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals sided with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, holding 
that schools may not censor students in this curricular context.803 But 
the First and the Tenth Circuits permit this form of censorship.804 One 
would not expect a neutral public school program, palatable to all, to 
produce a heated circuit split. 
The overall environment of public schools is also incompatible with 
many religions’ beliefs. Many religions forbid pre-marital sex and foul 
language and are simply repulsed by a popular culture that endorses 
these behaviors. Many religious groups are also skeptical of modern 
                                                                                                                     
 795. See, e.g., Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 
YALE L.J. 515 (1978) (describing the conflict between creationism and evolution in public 
school education); EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION (1997) (analyzing the Scopes 
trial). 
 796. See, e.g., Douglas Kennedy, Idaho School Shut Down Over ‘Religious Texts,’ FOX 
NEWS (Sept. 15, 2011), http://nation.foxnews.com/bible/2011/09/15/idaho-school-shut-down-
over-religious-texts (describing controversy over using Bible to teach history). 
 797. See, e.g., Michael Jennings, Kentucky Asks What Year Is It?: After evolution fights 
comes dispute over A.D. vs. C.E., CHRISTIANITY TODAY (May 31, 2006, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2006/mayweb-only/122-32.0.html (describing controversy 
over a school board’s proposal to substitute “C.E. (Common Era) for A.D. and B.C.E. (Before 
Common Era) for B.C.”). 
 798. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060, 1070 (6th Cir. 
1987) (upholding a school board’s decision to reject parents’ requests that their children be 
accommodated with readings that did not promote ideas contradicting their religious values); 
Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 2001) (disputing a “New Age” 
curriculum that parents claimed was religious). 
 799. 426 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 800. See Harry G. Hutchison, Shaming Kindergarteners? Channeling Dred Scott? 
Freedom of Expression Rights in Public Schools, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 365–66 (2007) 
(discussing Peck). 
 801. Peck, 426 F.3d at 620–22. 
 802. Id. at 622–23. 
 803. Id. at 632 n.9. 
 804. See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926–29 (10th Cir. 
2002) (permitting “educators to make viewpoint-based decisions about school-sponsored 
speech”); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 450, 456 (1st Cir. 1993) (allowing a public school 
committee to refuse to re-appoint a biology teacher who discussed abortion based on her opinion 
in class). 
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materialism which seems to equate happiness with physical possessions. 
And they are concerned about the way women are objectified in the 
media and popular culture, and how young girls and boys are 
consequently impacted. For these reasons, many religious parents are 
careful about which kinds of movies, television shows, or websites they 
allow their children to view. And, quite predictably, many religious 
parents do not want their children in a militantly secular school where 
their beliefs are trivialized or are described as being bigoted. 
Many religions also require that a specific religious curriculum be 
taught to students of their faith. For instance, Orthodox Jewish schools 
typically spend a large portion of the day teaching religious subjects that 
include the study of scripture, Jewish law, and Jewish ethics.805 Many 
Christian and Muslim schools have similar programs, depending on the 
needs of their respective student bodies. 
Today, public schools are almost all militantly secular institutions. 
This is in part the fault of the Supreme Court, which has outlawed 
prayer and Bible study in public schools. Under the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause case law, Bible readings and prayer in public 
schools are unconstitutional, even if some students are absent or can be 
excused from these activities.806 A school can also face litigation if it 
proscribes religious exercises,807 teaches creationism,808 distributes the 
Bible in school,809 or otherwise sponsors a religious message.810 Other 
potential landmines include voluntary prayer, moments of silence, 
student sponsored events, sporting events, and graduation 
ceremonies.811 
Public schools are also largely secular because most public school 
administrators believe that teaching a rigidly secular dogma is best both 
for public school students and for society. This is perhaps in part a 
result of the increased pluralism in American society which has created 
a need to find a middle ground common to everyone.812 Public schools 
have been forced by the courts to adopt a “no endorsement” policy in a 
                                                                                                                     
 805. See Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA) as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 
2003 WL 22087608, at *6–7, 13 (describing the central role of religious education for Jewish 
students); M. HERBERT DANZGER, RETURNING TO TRADITION: THE CONTEMPORARY REVIVAL OF 
ORTHODOX JUDAISM 149–51, 278 (1989) (describing how Orthodox Jews combine religious and 
secular studies). 
 806. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1963). 
 807. Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 808. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987). 
 809. Goodwin v. Cross Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417, 419 (E.D. Ark. 1973). 
 810. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). 
 811. See 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 762–63. 
 812. Hutchison, supra note 800, at 363. 
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futile attempt not to alienate anyone.813 But in practice, many religious 
students are in fact alienated and marginalized.  
Modern secular humanism is a core, almost religious belief system 
of modern liberalism. Secular humanists distrust—and sometimes even 
dislike814—religion. Modern secular humanism teaches values and 
opinions that are often wholly inconsistent with religious teachings.815 
Though so-called modern “liberals” pretend to favor concepts such as 
“neutrality,” “tolerance,” and “independent thinking,” liberal educators 
in practice often have little or no tolerance for religious views that are 
incompatible with the tenants of modern liberalism.816 Excluding 
religious views from the classroom is in fact important to effectively 
convey liberal secular humanist ideology to public school students.817 
The result is that “common schools” are unable to incorporate different 
viewpoints and bring true religious diversity into the classroom.818 
The use of facial neutrality as a façade for the exclusion and 
intolerance of those who hold a religious belief is not a new practice for 
the public school system. From the moment public schools were 
founded by Horace Mann in the nineteenth century, they were infused 
with majoritarian intolerance of minority religions.819 Mann advertised 
his “common schools” as inclusive and open to everyone without a bias 
for any particular religious denomination. 820 The curriculum was 
designed to be a “pan-Protestant compromise, a vague and inclusive 
Protestantism.”821 In justifying the practice of reading the Bible without 
                                                                                                                     
 813. Id. at 377–78. 
 814. See Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. 
REV. 807, 826, 836–42 (1999) (arguing that vouchers disturb the balance of power between 
government and religion that the Establishment Clause was designed to control); Viteritti, supra 
note 718, at 180–81 (describing secularist John Dewey’s strong opposition to religion). Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 629, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) noted “religious strife” in other countries and remarked, “Whenever we remove a 
brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the risk 
of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy.” Justice Souter’s dissent 
similarly referenced “sectarian religion’s capacity for discord.” Id. at 715. 
 815. See Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the “Pall of Religious 
Orthodoxy”: Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 28; MARK G. 
YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN 
AMERICA 52–55 (1983). 
 816. Cf. Hutchison, supra note 800, at 382. 
 817. See, e.g., Jerry Buell, Florida High School Teacher, Suspended For Anti-Gay 
Facebook Posts, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2011, 6:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2011/08/19/jerry-buell-florida-high-_n_931941.html (updated Oct. 19, 2011); see also 
Hutchison, supra note 800, at 361 n.1 (describing controversies in San Francisco). 
 818. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the 
Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. 169, 178 (1996). 
 819. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 717, at 299–300. 
 820. See id. at 299. 
 821. Id. 
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commentary, Mann said that “[o]ur system earnestly inculcates all 
Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of religion; it 
welcomes the religion of the Bible; and in receiving the Bible, it allows 
it to do what it is allowed to do in no other system, to speak for 
itself.”822 Yet Mann’s schools were not at all bastions of religious 
inclusiveness. Instead their curricula were based solely on Protestant 
teachings and were wholly intolerant of any other form of Christianity 
or of any other religion.823 While reading the Bible without commentary 
might seem to be neutral on its face, such a practice was in truth 
designed to shut out non-Protestant teachings and was deeply offensive 
to Catholics.824 Mann said that “sectarian books and sectarian 
instruction, if their encroachment were not resisted, would prove the 
overthrow of the schools.”825 The word “sectarian” here was code for 
Catholic. Mann’s schools reflected a national trend in public education: 
states operated public schools that were allegedly “nonsectarian” but 
that were in fact incredibly intolerant of non-Protestant 
denominations.826 Other countries have had similar historical 
experiences where majoritarian groups integrate allegedly neural values 
into systems of public education that turn out to be nothing more than a 
façade for the oppression of religious minorities.827 If history is any 
indicator, there is nothing neutral about neutrality in the context of 
public education.  
Public education has long been advertised as being a government 
benefit that is available to the whole population, but it is in reality a 
form of class legislation because it is simply unacceptable to religious 
individuals unless they have no other choice. A widely recognized 
phenomenon in anti-discrimination law is to understand that a racially 
hostile environment or a sexist or harassing environment is a form of 
race and gender discrimination. Public schools could not and should not 
be able to teach racist or sexist literature, and public school teachers 
                                                                                                                     
 822. See ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 267 (1950) (quoting Report to the Board of Education in 1848).  
 823. Viteritti, supra note 717, at 666 (“The American common school was founded on the 
pretense that religion has no legitimate place in public education. But in reality it was a 
particular kind of religion that its proponents sought to isolate from public support. The 
common-school curriculum promoted a religious orthodoxy of its own that was centered on the 
teachings of mainstream Protestantism and was intolerant of those who were non-believers.”). 
 824. See Duncan, supra note 3, at 504. 
 825. See STOKES, supra note 822, at 267 (quoting Report to the Board of Education in 
1848). 
 826. Viteritti, supra note 717, at 666–67. 
 827. See, e.g., STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF 
PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 55–56 (2009) (describing the experience 
of the Netherlands in the Eighteenth Century); Asher Maoz, Religious Education in Israel, 83 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 679, 682–83 (2006) (describing how religious groups in Israel successfully 
blocked secular attempts to define a set of common universal values). 
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cannot and should not be able to make racist or sexist comments in 
class. The same principle applies to discrimination on the basis of 
religion in schools. It is not enough for the government to avoid 
discrimination in hiring teachers or admitting students. The government 
must also not create a hostile learning environment for devoutly 
religious students. Teaching Orthodox Jews or fundamentalist 
Christians or devout Muslims that non-marital sex is acceptable creates 
a forbidden form of a religiously hostile environment. Banning prayer 
and Bible study in classes does the same thing. For this reason alone, it 
is obvious that the modern day secular public schools are engaged in a 
systemic form of discrimination on the basis of religion. 
This point can be further illustrated with an analogy. Suppose a state 
decided to buy clothing for its residents. But instead of buying different 
clothing for men and women, the state just bought men’s clothing and 
offered it to everyone on equal terms. Undoubtedly the program would 
be unconstitutional because men’s clothing is fundamentally unfit for 
women. Similarly, our militantly secular public schools are 
fundamentally unfit for religious students. They offer a learning 
environment that is hostile to religion and therefore discriminates on 
account of religion. 
Consider another hypothetical. Suppose that the government decided 
to shut down the entire public school system and instead gave all 
students tuition vouchers, which they could use to attend the private 
school of their choice. Suppose further that the government stipulated 
that those education vouchers could only be used at secular schools, and 
not at religious ones. Such a selective funding program would clearly 
constitute facial discrimination on the basis of religion.828 Our current 
public school system is simply the publically operated version of that 
secular voucher program. Instead of funding only secular private 
schools, the government funds only secular public schools. Why should 
a program that funds only secular public schools be considered any less 
discriminatory than a program that funds only secular private schools?  
The discriminatory impact of the secular public school system is 
compounded by the enormous financial burden that the current system 
places on religious families. Religious families that are poor simply may 
not be able to afford private school tuition for their children.829 
Consequently, they are forced to send their children to secular public 
schools against their religious beliefs. Once there, students are exposed 
to a learning environment that is enormously hostile to their religious 
                                                                                                                     
 828. See supra Section V.C. 
 829. See Private Schooling, EDUCATION WEEK, Aug. 4, 2004, http://www.edweek.org/ew/ 
issues/private-schooling/ (discussing how the cost of private education prevents many families 
from sending their children to private schools and how this cost disparately impacts poor 
families and racial minorities). 
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beliefs. Racial minorities are especially likely to be disparately 
impacted by this predicament.830 And this problem is exacerbated by 
mandatory education laws which obligate all children between certain 
ages to attend a school. Even Wisconsin v. Yoder831 only exempted 
religious school attendance beyond the eighth grade.832 Poor religious 
parents who could not afford a private school for their first grader 
would undoubtedly be forced to send him or her to a secular public 
school with an environment that is hostile to their religion. For a 
religious family, sending a child to a secular public school could easily 
constitute a substantial and irreparable harm for the reasons described 
above. From a religious family’s perspective, the degree of harm could 
be comparable to the harm caused by discriminatory sterilization laws 
in Skinner v. Oklahoma.833 Religious children may grow up to be 
atheists, much to their parents’ profound dismay. Even religious 
families that can afford private schools suffer substantial damage from 
the public school system because private school tuition is often 
expensive.  
The financial burden is compounded by the gross inequity of forcing 
religious families to pay for secular public schools as taxpayers in 
addition to paying private school tuition.834 Public schools are paid for 
by taxpayers at the local, state, and federal levels, yet private schools 
are funded solely by parental fees and private donations. Religious 
families are therefore forced to subsidize the education of secular 
students—while religious families get nothing in return. This form of 
wealth redistribution based purely on religious distinctions is 
reminiscent of the religious taxes placed on members of disfavored 
minority religions, such as Jews and Catholics, in Europe.835 
Governments at all levels in the United States have effectively decided 
that secular education is the winner, religious education is the loser, and 
that religious families must therefore open their pocketbooks. If the 
                                                                                                                     
 830. Id. 
 831. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 832. Id. at 225. 
 833. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 834. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973), the Supreme Court recognized the burden that the current system places on families 
sending their children to private schools. Id. at 783. But the Court struck down a tax benefit plan 
for families sending their children to private schools because “[h]owever great our 
sympathy . . . for the burdens experienced by those who must pay public school taxes at the 
same time that they support other schools because of the constraints of ‘conscience and 
discipline,’ [this may not] justify an eroding of the limitations of the Establishment Clause now 
firmly emplanted.” Id. at 788–89 (citations omitted).  
 835. See, e.g., Virtual Jewish History Tour: United Kingdom, supra note 360 (describing 
the rule of Henry III and the Barons Wars (1217–1290)); Ybo Buruma, Dutch Tolerance: On 
Drugs, Prostitution, and Euthanasia, 35 CRIME & JUST. 73, 78 (2007) (discussing special taxes 
on Catholics in the Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century). 
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ACLU has conscientious objector taxpayer standing to object to 
Christmas and Hanukkah displays, then surely religious parents have 
conscientious objector status to sue over being taxed to pay for 
militantly secular public schools with a learning environment that is 
illegally hostile to religion. 
To make matters worse, the government’s policy of discriminating 
on the basis of religion incentivizes religious individuals to actually 
become secular. This is true because government programs fund only 
secular education,836 and this encourages religious individuals to attend 
militantly secular public schools in violation of their core religious 
beliefs. The obvious consequence is that those students will be less well 
educated in their own religious traditions, less committed to their 
religions, and more likely to embrace militant secularism and 
materialism. Governments in the United States have not outlawed 
religious schools, which might violate the Free Exercise Clause, but 
they have gone around the Free Exercise Clause by creating a very 
substantial financial incentive for children to abandon the religious 
traditions of their families.837 And the proof is in the pudding: since the 
Supreme Court began striking down religious instruction and prayer in 
schools in the early 1960s,838 religious affiliation has dropped from over 
ninety percent of the American public to approximately seventy-seven 
percent.839 Over the same time period, the percentage of individuals 
who have no religious identification has increased from around two 
percent to approximately sixteen percent.840 When schools lack 
religious instruction or maintain a learning environment that is hostile to 
religion or even openly denigrate religion, children will simply lack the 
connection and the education they need to lead a virtuous and religious 
life. Therefore, despite the Supreme Court’s affirmation in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters841 that families have a constitutional right to educate 
                                                                                                                     
 836. See Government Neutrality, supra note 790, at 703–05 (describing how government 
programs provide construction aid for secular private schools, but not religious ones, 
incentivized religious schools to become more secular so that they could qualify for the 
funding); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 837. In the free exercise context, the Supreme Court has recognized the coercive power of 
forcing individuals to choose between government benefits and their religious beliefs. See 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 404 (1963); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717. 
 838. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 205 (1963).  
 839. Frank Newport, This Easter, Smaller Percentage of Americans Are Christian, 
GALLUP, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/117409/easter-smaller-percentage-
americans-christian.aspx (see table). 
 840. Frank Newport, In U.S., Increasing Number Have No Religious Identity, GALLUP, 
May 21, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/128276/increasing-number-no-religious-identity. 
aspx (see table). 
 841. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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their children according to their own religious beliefs,842 the public 
school system in the United States transforms that right into a mere 
fantasy for families who are unable to overcome the financial burdens 
of paying for a private religious education. The end result is a 
government-mandated subsidy of secularism. 
The words of the Supreme Court underscore the paramount 
significance of private religious education. In Society of Sisters, the 
Court struck down a state law that would have forced children to attend 
public school because the law “unreasonably interferes with the liberty 
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children.”843 The Court said: 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all 
governments in this Union repose excludes any general 
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing 
them to accept instruction from public teachers only.  The 
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.844 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court added that “the values of 
parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their 
children in their early and formative years have a high place in our 
society.”845 And in Abbington School District v. Schempp,846 Justice 
William J. Brennan wrote, “The choice between [public secular and 
private or sectarian] education is one—very much like the choice of 
whether or not to worship—which our Constitution leaves to the 
individual parent. It is no proper function of the state or local 
government to influence or restrict that election.”847 But our current 
public school system with no education vouchers for religious students 
violates these core principles by strongly favoring a secular education 
and by economically penalizing a religious education. 
Discrimination on the basis of religion in this context cannot be 
defended on the ground that funding public schools is a general law that 
promotes the good of the whole people and that therefore serves a 
compelling government interest. As already explained, the public 
schools are unacceptable to religious individuals because they are 
permeated with a learning environment that is openly hostile to religion. 
                                                                                                                     
 842. Id. At 534–35. 
 843. Id. At 511, 534–35. 
 844. Id. At 535. 
 845. 406 U.S. 205, 213–14. 
 846. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 847. Id. At 242 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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For a law to be a general law, it must benefit almost everyone or at least 
be available for almost everyone. Roads and parks can be created by the 
use of powers of eminent domain because they are available for 
everyone. Many occupational licensure laws and requirements that one 
have a driver’s license to drive are for the same reason general laws that 
benefit the whole people. But the funding of public schools with an 
environment that is hostile to religion coupled with a refusal to give 
religious students an education voucher is not a general law that 
promotes the good of all the people nor is it justified by any compelling 
governmental interest. If the government wants to fund education, then 
public funds must be made available to all individuals in a way that 
does not require the religiously devout to learn in an environment 
permeated by hostility to religion. If a government policy had a 
disparately negative impact on a racial minority or on one gender, it 
would certainly be intolerable. Policies that have such an impact on 
religion should not be viewed any differently. We would never tolerate 
a public school that approvingly taught a racist book like Little Black 
Sambo by Helen Bennerman, or a sexist magazine that contained 
pornographic material denigrating women. We should be equally 
intolerant of a system of public education that forces devoutly religious 
children to learn in an environment that is saturated with contempt for 
religion. 
Even if the secular public school system served a compelling public 
interest and was a general law enacted for the good of the whole people, 
the discriminatory impact of the current public school system on 
religion fails the Sherbert-Yoder balancing test. That test requires the 
government to pursue its goal in a manner that has the least restrictive 
impact on religion. What is the government’s goal? If the goal is to 
educate children broadly, then the least restrictive means requires that 
the government fund education for all children and not only for secular 
children. Paying for only secular public schools but not for religious 
ones is not the least restrictive means by which the government can 
pursue its objective. And if the government’s true goal is to narrowly 
provide only secular education, but not religious education, then that 
goal is impermissible because it discriminates on the basis of religion. 
There is simply no good reason for the government to decide that 
education devoid of religion is objectively better than education 
involving religion. As a policy matter, asserting that secular education is 
superior to religious education is utterly baseless because religious 
schools have existed for several millennia and have successfully 
educated students over that whole period of time. Most of our major 
private universities, including Yale and Harvard, originated as religious 
schools. And secular public schools in this country have had, shall we 
say, somewhat mixed results. But more critically, deciding that 
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education devoid of religion is objectively better than education 
involving religion is an illegitimate goal because it constitutes 
discrimination on the basis of religion. The government certainly could 
not maintain an education policy designed to educate whites but not 
blacks or men but not women. Why should an education policy 
designed to benefit only secular children and not religious children be 
any different? 
Some argue that private schools should not be funded by the 
government because only wealthy families send their children to private 
schools. This argument is problematic for several reasons. First, private 
school populations often include many children from low and middle 
income families.848 The words of Maimonides, the great twelfth century 
Codifier of Jewish Law, exhibit the extremity to which fervently 
religious people will go to pursue religious study:  
Every Israelite is under an obligation to study Torah, 
whether he is poor or rich, in sound health or ailing, in the 
vigor of youth or very old and feeble. Even a man so poor 
that he is maintained by charity or goes begging from door 
to door, as also a man with a wife and children to 
support . . . [as scripture says,] ‘But you shall meditate 
therein day and night.’849 
Needless to say, individuals with Maimonedes’ perspective will not be 
dissuaded from attending private religious schools, even if doing so 
comes at great financial hardship. Second, the argument is premised on 
the notion that wealthy families should be entitled to fewer government 
benefits than non-wealthy families. That logic is itself a classic example 
of class legislation, violating Locke’s maxim that there should be “one 
rule for rich and poor.”850 And third, many wealthy families send their 
children to public schools without paying extra fees or tuition.851 So, the 
notion that educational benefits are distributed based on wealth is 
utterly without merit. The real dividing line between the public and the 
private schools is religion. Those families who can tolerate secular 
education—whether rich or poor—can enjoy tuition-free education. 
And those families whose religious beliefs require that their children 
attend religious schools or who object to a public school learning 
environment that is hostile to religion must pay through the nose for 
their private school education. That is discrimination on the basis of 
                                                                                                                     
 848. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: CPS OCTOBER 2010-DETAILED 
TABLES tbl. 3, available at www.census.gov/hhes/school/data/cps/2010/tables.html. 
 849. MISHNAH TORAH, Book 1 haMadda (book of knowledge), The Laws Concerning the 
Study of the Torah, Ch. 1, Halacha 8 (citing Joshua 1:8). 
 850. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 133, at 459. 
 851. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 848, at tbl. 3. 
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religion—plain and simple. 
Just to be crystal clear about our argument, the problem with 
American public schools is one of discrimination on the basis of 
religion, not one of the denial of fundamental rights. The government 
has no obligation to fund religious education as a substantive right, just 
as it has no obligation to fund abortions, church construction, or most 
other substantive constitutional rights that private individuals enjoy. If 
the government would choose not to fund any education at all that 
would be constitutionally permissible. But what the government cannot 
do is fund education discriminatorily. If the government chooses to fund 
education, as it has, it must do so even-handedly without distributing 
benefits by discriminating on the basis of religion.852 
B.  Education Monopoly 
The public school system is a monopoly, no different from the 
nineteenth century government-granted monopolies which the 
Fourteenth Amendment outlawed along with all other class legislation. 
As already discussed, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had a 
Jacksonian concern with the evils of government-granted monopolies or 
government grants of special “privileges” or “immunities” conferred on 
only a few crony capitalists. The Privileges or Immunities Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause were originally understood as banning 
monopoly and class legislation by securing equally to all citizens all of 
the privileges or immunities of both federal and of state citizenship. 
Professor Calabresi has set out the originalist argument that state 
government grants of monopoly violate the Fourteenth Amendment in 
extensive detail in another article, and we will therefore not repeat those 
arguments here.853  It suffices here to say that government grants of 
monopoly are only permissible under the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment if they are contained in general laws that 
benefit the whole people. Occupational licensure laws for brain 
                                                                                                                     
 852. This reasoning does not require the government to fund abortions, even though it 
funds live births, because there is a significant public purpose in favoring live births over 
abortions. See Government Neutrality, supra note 790, at 701 n.34 (arguing that the need for 
government neutrality in educational funding is much more compelling because education is 
much more expensive than abortion). But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 484–85 (1977) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government must subsidize abortions if it subsidizes 
live births because the funding disparity skews individual choice away from abortions, thereby 
infringing on the right to privacy). Additionally, religion as a right is unquestionably protected 
in the text of the Constitution itself, whereas the existence of a constitutional right to abortion is 
hotly debated. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979–80 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 853. See Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa Price, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History 
of Crony Capitalism 42–61 (Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 12-20, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130043. 
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surgeons and airplane pilots undoubtedly satisfy this test, but the present 
day militantly secular public school monopoly does not. 
The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Albert 
Shanker, once remarked about American education that, “public 
education operates like a planned economy . . . . [O]ur school 
system . . . more resembles the communist economy than our own 
market economy.”854 Indeed it does. In 2009–2010, approximately 
ninety percent of all K–12 students attended public schools.855 In the 
context of the private economic sector, that statistic would by itself 
easily trigger an antitrust lawsuit.856 But here we just call it a public 
service that is secured by a government grant of special privilege. Years 
ago, some states tried to gobble up that final ten percent by banishing 
private education, but the Supreme Court slammed on the breaks in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.857 Currently the fifty states retain their 
dominant market position by simply relying on their financial power. 
The states refuse to fund private education at all, or they choose to fund 
only some private schools that meet certain very specific criteria. The 
unsavory effects of the government conferred public school monopoly 
are the same as the unsavory effects that appear with most government 
grants of monopoly power. There are: (1) fewer consumer choices, 
(2) higher costs to consumers, (3) lower quality services, and (4) a 
discriminatory benefit that only accrues to the monopolist in this case 
public school administrators and teachers.858 
It is important to stress that the public school monopoly is 
government-granted, just as were all monopolies prior to the adoption of 
the Sherman Antitrust Law in 1890.859 When the Jacksonians railed 
against the evils of monopolies, their principal objection was to 
government grants of special privileges to a single citizen or class of 
citizens. The government has granted itself control over the public 
schools, just as it granted control of the railroads to particular private 
companies which were given the power to take private land by eminent 
domain.  
                                                                                                                     
 854. See Charles Fried, Comment, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 164 n.4 (2002) (citing Reding, Wrighting, & Erithmatic, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 2, 1989, at A14). 
 855. COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN PRIVATE EDUCATION, FACTS AND STUDIES, http://www.cape 
net.org/facts.html (last visited July 23, 2013). 
 856. See JOHN MERRIFIELD, THE SCHOOL CHOICE WARS 9 (2001); Fried, supra note 854, at 
164 n.4. 
 857. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 511, 534–35 (1925) (striking down a law 
forcing parents to send their children to public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 
(1923) (striking down a requirement that both public and private schools teach only English). 
 858. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 
150–88 (1980) (discussing the problems with public schools). 
 859. See generally Calabresi & Price, supra note 853. 
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But the public school monopoly is especially pernicious because the 
revenue for the public schools comes from all taxpayers. Consumers are 
forced to pay for a monopoly system of public education, whether they 
want to or not, so the public schools do not even have to go out and 
convince consumers to purchase their services. In contrast, no 
legislature has ever in any other context forced consumers to actually 
purchase products from a government-granted monopoly. When English 
Kings and Queens granted a monopoly on the right to produce playing 
cards to a royal favorite, they never required that the public buy those 
playing cards and thus pay the monopoly rent. Governments in the 
United States have sometimes favored specific companies, such as 
railroad companies, and they have also created unfair marketplaces 
where consumer choice is limited,860 but they have never in any other 
context actually forced consumers to pay for the monopolist’s services 
whether they used those services or not.  
The fact that the consumers of education are forced to pay for the 
government’s educational services is especially problematic in light of 
this country’s religious diversity. As already explained, a public school 
that creates an environment that is openly hostile to religion is simply 
not an option for many religious families.861 Families for whom religion 
is an integral part of their lives are therefore forced to pay for militantly 
secular public schools to which they would never send their own 
children—not in their wildest dreams. Public funding of militantly 
secular schools is equivalent to forcing a consumer to a buy a product 
for himself which he abhors, telling him that the product is actually 
good for him, and then refusing to give him back his money when he 
demands it. Even the most overbearing government and private 
monopolies cannot actually force consumers to buy a product that they 
do not want. Most monopolies survive and flourish by taking advantage 
of consumers who already want to purchase their product. But 
generating revenue from people who actually detest the product being 
offered requires a level of coerciveness that is unique to the public 
school system. Forced support for militantly secular public education is 
not at all similar to state laws that require that we all purchase car 
insurance. Such laws are general laws that promote the good of the 
whole people and that are justified by a compelling governmental 
interest. Nor are the laws establishing the public school monopoly at all 
similar to government funding of roads and parks which are open and 
available to the entire public. They are instead comparable to President 
Obama’s individual mandate which compels individuals to purchase 
health insurance, even though those individuals might have wanted to 
                                                                                                                     
 860. See id. at 6 (describing how Queen Elizabeth I dished out harsh punishments for 
violating monopoly laws). 
 861. See supra pp. 139-51. 
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stay out of the health insurance market altogether. In the education 
context as with the healthcare mandate, the states force individuals to 
pay tuition to public schools, even though those individuals might never 
want to attend a public school.  
To make matters worse, families that manage to send their children 
to private schools are forced to pay two tuitions: one for public school 
and one for private school. Even the most onerous monopolies would 
never be able to force consumers to purchase their products even though 
those consumers had already gone out and purchased a competing 
product. The combination of the economic inefficiency and injustice of 
this result is truly staggering. 
As with any monopoly, the public school system decreases consumer 
choice by eliminating competition. A monopoly’s dominant market 
position allows it to muscle competitors out of the marketplace. Here, 
competing services (i.e., private schools) are dramatically 
disadvantaged because public education is offered free of tuition. This is 
a powerful and unique feature of the public school monopoly. Few, if 
any, typical monopolies have the luxury of offering their products for 
free and generating income from the government based on the number 
of people who sign up for their free products. Private schools obviously 
cannot seriously compete with free tuition, as parents face enormous 
economic pressure to send their children to public schools. For poor 
families, there is simply no alternative. For wealthier families, the 
economic burden is coupled with the knowledge that their tax dollars 
already pay for public schools. Consequently, private school enrollment 
is effectively capped, as supply and demand are artificially low for 
private schools and artificially high for public schools. 
And like most monopolies, the people who are coerced into 
consuming the public schools’ services get stuck with a service that has 
many undesirable elements. In a competitive market, consumers can 
choose from different products, selecting the one that matches their 
tastes and preferences. But a monopoly eliminates that choice, giving 
consumers only one product that they may or may not like. There is 
strong evidence that public education is quite undesirable even for 
families whose children attend the public schools. A 2011 Gallup poll 
showed that only thirty-four percent of Americans have “a great deal” 
or “quite a lot” of confidence in their public schools.862 Only eight 
percent of Americans are “completely satisfied” with K–12 education 
today, and only thirty-seven percent are even “somewhat satisfied.”863 
                                                                                                                     
 862. Lymari Morales, Near Record-Low Confidence in U.S. Public Schools, GALLUP (July 
29, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148724/Near-Record-Low-Confidence-Public-Schools 
.aspx. 
 863. Education, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1612/education.aspx (last visited 
July 23, 2013). 
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These numbers show that consumers of education are not getting the 
kinds of services that they want. Unsurprisingly, several polls have 
shown that a strong majority of public school parents would prefer to 
send their children to private schools if they could afford to do so.864 
Part of the explanation for these poll numbers could be that public 
schools are entirely secular, while approximately eighty percent of all 
Americans identify themselves as religious.865 In 2009–2010, only eight 
percent of all K–12 students attended private religious schools,866 
indicating that consumers of education, eighty percent of whom are 
religious, may not be receiving the kind of education that they want. 
Alternatively, they could just be upset about the low quality of secular 
academics or poor school administration.867 Either way, people are 
unhappy with the service that they are consuming.  
The experiences of other countries are instructive. When the 
government does not monopolize the market for education, families 
often choose to send their children to private schools in substantially 
higher numbers than they do when the government operates a public 
school monopoly as in the United States. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, the government pays for the full cost of education for all 
                                                                                                                     
 864. See Private Schooling, EDUCATION WEEK (Aug. 4, 2004), http://www.edweek.org/ 
ew/issues/private-schooling (citing a Gallup Poll that puts this percentage at 59%, as well as 
another study that puts the percentage at 67%); School Choice and Ownership Society, CATO 
INSTITUTE, http://www.cato.org/special/ownership_society/school-ownership2.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2012) (citing several polls that put support for school vouchers between 49% and 62% 
of Americans); Joy Pullman, Poll: 71 Percent of Moms Support School Choice, THE FRIEDMAN 
FOUNDATION FOR EDUCATIONAL CHOICE (May 9, 2012), http://www.edchoice.org/Newsroom/ 
News/Heartlander---Poll--71-Percent-of-Moms-Support-School-Choice.aspx (finding that 69% 
of adults support free access to school vouchers, and that 37% of the respondents said they 
would choose to send their children to private schools if given the choice). 
 865. See, e.g., BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, TRINITY COLLEGE, AMERICAN 
RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY 3 (2008), available at http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/ 
2011/08/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf; THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGIOUS LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS 
LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-
landscape-study-full.pdf (finding that approximately 83% of Americans identified themselves as 
religious). 
 866. COUNCIL FOR AM. PRIVATE EDUC., FACTS AND STUDIES, http://www.capenet.org 
/facts.html (stating that 10% of all students attend private schools); STEPHEN P. BROUGHMAN ET 
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2009–10 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE 
SURVEY 7 tbl. 2 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011339.pdf [hereinafter “PSS 
SURVEY”] (stating that 80% of private school students attend religious schools). 
 867. A 1998 report comparing math and science performance among students from 
different countries ranked the United States eighteenth, just ahead of Lithuania and Cyprus. See 
JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY 4 (1999). See generally NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY: THE REDESIGN OF URBAN 
EDUCATION (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 1999).  
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students at both public and the private schools.868 Consequently, seventy 
percent of school children in the Netherlands attend private schools, 
with the vast majority attending private religious schools.869 In 
Australia, where the government funds approximately fifty to seventy-
five percent of private school costs,870 approximately one-third of all 
Australian students attend private schools.871 In Israel, where the 
government funds between sixty percent and one hundred percent of 
private school expenses, forty percent of Israeli students attend private 
schools.872 But in the United States, where the government barely funds 
private schools at all, only ten percent of students attend private 
schools.873 These statistics show that when families have a meaningful 
choice, they often choose to send their children to private schools.  
Because public schools are insulated from competition, they, like 
most monopolies, can afford to operate inefficiently and deliver sub-
optimal services. The basic reason is that competition forces market 
players to provide the highest quality services possible at the lowest 
possible cost.874 But a monopoly can afford to slack off and provide 
lower quality services at a higher expense and just stick the cost back on 
the consumer. This problem is especially pronounced with public school 
education because consumers do not choose to pay tuition but are 
instead forced to cough up taxes to the government. Theoretically, 
consumers of other monopolized services could still choose whether to 
buy those services or not. Unsurprisingly, the evils of monopolies are 
readily apparent to anyone who looks at our public schools. They are 
wasteful, bloated, bureaucratic monstrosities that fail to effectively 
educate children.875  
For poor children, the injurious effects of government’s monopoly 
are especially pronounced. Generally speaking, public schools in poor, 
                                                                                                                     
 868. COLIN FRASER, FRONTIER CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, THE PUBLIC SCHOOL MARKET 
IN THE NETHERLANDS: MONEY FOLLOWS THE CHILD 1–3 (2003), available at 
http://www.fcpp.org/pdf/FB16%20Dutch%20School%20Model.pdf. 
 869. See Helen F. Ladd et al., Parental Choice in the Netherlands: Growing Concerns 
about Segregation 6 (National Conference on School Choice, 2009), available at 
http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP%20182.pdf. 
 870. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, REVIEW OF SCHOOL FUNDING, FINAL REPORT, 15 
(December 2011) (describing how both government and private schools receive funding from 
the federal government, local governments, parental fees, and various other private sources). 
 871. JENNIFER BUCKINGHAM, CTR. FOR INDEP. STUDIES, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS ix 
(2010), available at http://www.cis.org.au/images/stories/policy-monographs/pm-111.pdf. 
 872. ISR. RELIGIOUS ACTION CTR., EDUCATION IN ISRAEL, http://www.irac.org/Issue 
Papers.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
 873. COUNCIL FOR AM. PRIVATE EDUC., supra note 866 (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). 
 874. See generally FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 858, at 9–38. 
 875. See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S 
SCHOOLS (1990) (explaining how public schools’ unresponsive bureaucratic structure impairs 
the quality of education provided). 
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urban neighborhoods provide the lowest quality education.876 These 
schools are fraught with crime, dilapidated facilities, and often sub-par 
teachers and administrators.877 They consistently produce high drop-out 
rates, low scores on standardized tests, and few graduates going on to 
college.878 As Justice Thomas put it, “[t]he failure to provide education 
to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty, 
dependence, criminality, and alienation that continues for the remainder 
of their lives.”879 To make matters worse, poor students cannot opt out 
of this system because they cannot afford to attend private schools and 
are instead trapped in the jaws of the government’s educational 
monopoly. Their lot in life is truly a sad manifestation of the Court’s 
statement in Brown v. Board of Education: “it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.”880 For these reasons, the vast majority of 
low income parents support private school vouchers.881 Even some 
liberal political theorists hesitantly support vouchers to help poor 
children.882 
This economic monopoly also allows the government to exert 
ideological control over students. As Professor McConnell has pointed 
out, government control of ideology often has a strong majoritarian bias 
which in turn tends to smother minority groups and dissenting 
opinions.883 In the nineteenth century, Protestants used the public 
schools to attack Catholics, and now secularists and liberals use the 
public schools to attack religion and conservatism.884 For this reason, 
the strongest advocates of vouchers are members of religious minorities, 
especially Catholics, Evangelicals, and Jews, as well as political 
                                                                                                                     
 876. See VITERITTI, supra note 867, at 7 (describing the problems in urban public schools). 
 877. See Viteritti, supra note 718, at 167–70 (describing the funding problems and 
“separate and unequal” status of urban schools). 
 878. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 681–82 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (discussing these problems). 
 879. See id. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 880. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (cited in Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 881. See T. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 164 (2001) (“The 
appeal of private schools is especially strong among parents who are low in income, minority, 
and live in low-performing districts: precisely the parents who are the most disadvantaged under 
the current system.”); id. at 214 (Table 7-3) (showing support for vouchers is at approximately 
75% for public school parents with incomes under $20,000, 75% for black public school 
parents, and 71% for Hispanic public school parents); see also VITERITTI, supra note 867, at 7 
(describing support for vouchers amongst the poor and racial minorities); Fried, supra note 854, 
at 198 n.33 (citing various surveys and articles demonstrating widespread support for vouchers 
in low income and minority neighborhoods). 
 882. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious 
Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417 (2000). 
 883. See McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power, supra note 303, at 850–51. 
 884. Id. 
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conservatives.885 
The government’s monopoly of education also disturbs a critical 
balance of power between the government and parents. Nearly ninety 
years ago, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court recognized 
that parents, not the state, have the right “to direct the upbringing and 
education of children” because “[t]he child is not the mere creature of 
the State.”886 The Supreme Court has time and again reaffirmed that 
parents have a right to educate their children in the way in which they 
see fit.887 By monopolizing education through the creation of the public 
schools, the government has created a very uneven playing field that 
tilts the balance of power firmly towards government schools, 
substantially decreasing the likelihood that parents will be able to 
exercise their Society of Sisters rights. 
So, why does the education monopoly persist? There are several 
reasons why it is retained. First, fear and hatred of Catholics has existed 
since the nineteenth century, and Catholic parochial schools have 
historically comprised the majority of private schools.888 Anti-Catholic 
bigotry was most vividly exemplified in the nineteenth century school 
funding wars and in the history of the Blaine Amendments,889 and it 
continued fervently into the twentieth century and persists even today. 
Refusing to fund private schools is an effective way to express anti-
Catholic sentiment. Second, some people, especially elites, simply do 
not like religion of any kind, and they do not want their tax dollars used 
to support religion in general.890 They do not mind, however, using tax 
dollars obtained from religious people to teach secularism, Darwin, and 
the joys of extra-marital sex. This view is fueled by growing secularism 
and by misconceptions about the supposed need to maintain a “wall of 
separation between church and state.”891 Third, many individuals and 
                                                                                                                     
 885. Douglas Laycock, Why the Supreme Court Changed Its Mind About Government Aid 
to Religious Institutions: It’s A Lot More Than Just Republican Appointments, 2008 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 275, 283–84, 289–90 (2008) (describing historical Jewish support for government aid of 
religious schools and emerging support amongst Evangelicals). 
 886. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 887. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972). 
 888. In 2009–2010, the percentage of private school students attending Catholic schools 
dropped to 42.8%, down from 54.5% in 1989–1990, http://www.capenet.org/facts.html, and 
95% in 1961. Laycock, supra note 885, at 282. 
 889. See supra Part V.A. 
 890. See Viteritti, supra note 718, at 180 (describing the secular philosophy of John 
Dewey, Dewey’s goal of eliminating religion from schools, and Dewey’s impact on the 
Twentieth century). 
 891. The Supreme Court first cited this famous quote from Thomas Jefferson in See 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). Ironically, the holding in Everson actually 
permitted aid to religious schools. Id. at 17–18. And public funds have long been used to 
support religious hospitals, colleges, as well as religious organizations involved in community 
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organizations, namely teachers unions, school boards, administrators, 
and all other school personnel, benefit from a massive government-run 
school system, and they do not want to lose their jobs or give up their 
monopoly rents.892 The beneficiaries of a government grant of 
monopoly often wield substantial political influence and are able to 
sway elected officials to preserve their monopoly at all costs.893 Fourth, 
some wealthier communities are concerned that local tax revenues 
would be diverted away from schools in their communities.894 Some of 
these individuals also fear that poor, minority students from the inner 
city could start attending schools in their communities. Indeed the Ohio 
voucher plan from Zelman allowed inner city children to enroll in 
suburban public schools, if those schools would permit them to enroll, 
but no suburban public schools allowed them to attend.895 
The fact that the government is the beneficiary of the monopoly does 
not alleviate the Fourteenth Amendment violation. President Jackson 
vetoed the re-charter of the Second National Bank, which was partially 
owned by the federal government, on the ground that it gave monopoly 
banking privileges to a single federally chartered corporation. And the 
public schools fit the basic model of a special monopoly because they 
                                                                                                                     
development, housing, and other charitable purposes. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 
U.S. 639, 667 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing federal funding of higher education 
amongst others); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 299–300 (1899) (permitting funding of 
religious hospitals); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617–18 (1988) (allowing funding of 
religious charities); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81–82 (1908) (permitting the federal 
government to administer a trust fund for Native Americans that used tribal money to support 
religious schools); see also Natasha Mulleneaux, The Failure To Provide Adequate Higher 
Education Tax Incentives for Lower-Income Individuals, 14 AKRON TAX J. 27, 30–31 (1999). 
Also note that the court in Everson actually misquotes Jefferson because the court claims that 
Jefferson’s wall exists only as a result of the Establishment Clause. Jefferson actually referenced 
both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. See 16 JEFFERSON’S WORKS 281 (Monticello 
ed.1903) (“I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which 
declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & 
State”) (emphasis added). Jefferson thus said that both clauses were responsible for creating the 
wall of separation—the Free Exercise Clause just as much as the Establishment Clause. 
Jefferson was actually praising the way in which the First Amendment protected religion by 
keeping government away from it.  
 892. See, e.g., Paul T. Hill, The Supply-Side of School Choice, at 140, 144–47, in SCHOOL 
CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY, IN SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY (Stephen D. 
Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) (discussing the development of the public school 
bureaucracy); MARK SCHNEIDER ET AL., CHOOSING SCHOOLS: CONSUMER CHOICE AND THE 
QUALITY OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 33 (2000) (discussing the growth and increased complexity of 
the public school bureaucracy in the Twentieth century); see also CHUBB & MOE, supra note 
875 (strongly criticizing teachers unions for their opposition to vouchers). 
 893. See Calabresi & Price, supra note 853, at 56–57 (describing this concern with the 
railroads at the end of the nineteenth century). 
 894. See Fried, supra note 854, at 169 n.22 (discussing this form of opposition). 
 895. Id.  
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single out a class of people for a special benefit and consequently 
burden all other classes of people.896 Jackson himself decried laws that 
sought “to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the 
rich richer and the potent more powerful.”897 But public schools do just 
that, perpetuating themselves through their statutory power over 
taxpayers and exerting their ideological control over religious 
dissenters. 
C.  The Solution: Endorse Pluralism 
To rectify the way in which the public schools breach the Fourteenth 
Amendment both by discriminating on the basis of religion and by 
establishing a monopoly which does not promote the general good of 
the whole people, the Supreme Court should order state governments to 
make education vouchers available to any student who wants a private 
education either secular or religious. If families choose to send their 
children to private schools, whether secular or religious, the government 
should fund that education, just as it funds public school educations 
today. The Supreme Court would not have to change its case law 
banning direct funding of religious education by the public schools, and 
it could instead simply require the states to implement voucher 
programs with the vouchers being redeemable at secular or religious 
schools based on the parents’ choice. The Supreme Court should not 
shy away from the fact that judicially mandated vouchers would cause a 
significant, perhaps revolutionary, change in American public school 
education. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court radically 
changed American public schools forever and for the better, by tearing 
down an educational system that discriminated based on race. The 
Supreme Court should be similarly enthusiastic about striking down our 
present-day public school system that discriminates on the basis of 
religion and that functions as a government-granted monopoly. 
Forcing the states to implement education voucher programs is not a 
revolutionary idea. Embedded in the philosophy of government 
vouchers to pay for school education is the principle of pluralism which 
is a foundational democratic value that permeates our whole 
constitutional system. For example, constitutional federalism recognizes 
that the fifty states might have varying values, tastes, and concerns; the 
electoral process recognizes that different people might vote for 
different leaders; and the First Amendment acknowledges that 
individuals might have different opinions and religious affiliations. 
Similarly, government funding of private school education recognizes 
                                                                                                                     
 896. See LAWRENCE FREDERICK KOHL, THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUALISM: PARTIES AND THE 
AMERICAN CHARACTER IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 61–62 (1989) (discussing Jacksonian fears of 
corporations, central banking, and monopolies). 
 897. POLE, supra note 203, at 145 (quoting Jackson); Yudof, supra note 19, at 1376.  
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that families might have different approaches to education. Frederick 
Douglass once said that, “education . . . means emancipation. It means 
light and liberty. It means the uplifting of the soul of man into the 
glorious light of truth, the light by which men can only be made 
free.”898 How can there be only one kind of educational “light and 
liberty?” The notion that the best way to achieve Douglass’ “light and 
liberty” is through a government-run secular school system with an 
environment hostile to religion is absolutely preposterous. There are 
many ways to educate children, and many different kinds of plausible 
schools. Instead of pursuing the impossible task of defining a set of 
common, neutral values to thrust upon all children,899 the government 
should instead embrace pluralism and recognize that different people 
have different values. Favoring public secular education over private 
religious education is the pinnacle of intolerance and contradicts 
democratic principles. 
Many other democratic countries have rejected the American “one 
size fits all” model and have instead endorsed a pluralistic model that 
requires the government to fund private religious education. Some of 
those countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, 
and New Zealand,900 England, and France,901 amongst others.902 Many 
of these countries are religiously diverse903 and choose to fund religion 
as a means of embracing and celebrating their diversity. The American 
system with its hostility to religious education stands out as a complete 
                                                                                                                     
 898. The Blessings of Liberty and Education: An Address Delivered in Manassas, Virginia, 
on 3 September 1894, in 5 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 623 (J. Blassingame & J. 
McKivigan eds. 1992). 
 899. Sherry, supra note 789, at 156–82 (discussing the difficulty of finding common, 
neutral educational values). 
 900. Joseph P. Viteritti, A Truly Living Constitution: Why Educational Opportunity Trumps 
Strict Separation on the Voucher Question, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 112 n.127 (2000). 
 901. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 902. See CHARLES GLENN & JAN DE GROOF, FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: FREEDOM, 
AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION (2002) (reviewing education in twenty-eight 
countries or communities). 
 903. In Canada, 44% of the population is Catholic, 29% is Protestant, 11% belongs to other 
religions, and 16% have no religious affiliation. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state 
.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168201.htm. In the Netherlands, approximately 29% of the population 
is Catholic, 19% is Protestant, 10% belongs to other religions, and 42% have no religious 
affiliation. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/ 168329.htm. 
And in Israel, although three-quarters of the population is Jewish, the differences in religious 
observance and belief are so vast that the sub-groups might as well be members of different 
religions. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/ 168266.htm. 
Seventeen percent of Israeli Jews are Orthodox, 39% are “traditional,” and 44% are secular. The 
other quarter of Israel’s population is composed of Muslims, Christians, and other 
denominations. Australia, England, and France are similarly diverse. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/. 
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anomaly.  
Comparing and contrasting the American experience with the Dutch 
experience highlights just how disgraceful the American system of 
public school education is. In the nineteenth century, both the 
Netherlands and the United States recognized that education was 
fundamentally important.904 And during that time, both countries faced 
enormous turmoil over how to fund education.905 In the United States, 
the conflict featured Protestants against Catholics; in the Netherlands, 
secular liberals faced off against Catholics and other Christians. 
American Protestants and Dutch secularists each controlled their 
respective public school systems and sought to teach children an 
allegedly consensus set of values that would unify society. In both 
countries public education turned out to be quite oppressive for 
religious minorities who did not subscribe to the majoritarian ideology. 
And so in both countries, religious minorities, mainly Catholics, 
objected to the educational systems and fought to obtain public funds 
for their private schools. But the outcomes were vastly different. Dutch 
Catholics joined forces with Orthodox Reformed groups and 
successfully obtained school funding from the Dutch government, while 
American Catholics got steamrolled by the Protestant majority and by 
today’s secular elite. 
The two countries’ disparate philosophies are striking. The 
Netherlands adopted the political philosophy of Abraham Kuyper, a 
Calvinist, who believed that tolerance and diversity—whether secular or 
religious—were crucial elements of a successful society.906 Kuyper 
rejected the notion of a single set of universal values or that one value 
system was necessarily better than another. Instead Kuyper favored 
pluralism and tolerance. So widely accepted was Kuyper that he served 
as Prime Minister of the Netherlands from 1901–1905. In 1917, the 
Dutch Constitution was amended to guarantee funding equality for 
public and private schools without regard to religious affiliation.907 
                                                                                                                     
 904. In 1868, thirty-six out of thirty-eight American states had provisions in their 
constitutions requiring their state governments to provide a public education. Calabresi & 
Agudo, supra note 39, at 108. The Dutch Constitution of 1848 explicitly granted individuals and 
organizations the right to set up private schools according to their convictions and without 
governmental interference. FRASER, supra note 868, at 1–2 (describing how the Dutch 
Constitution created freedom to establish schools, freedom of conviction, and freedom of 
organization). 
 905. See supra Part V.A. (describing this history in the United States); see MONSMA & 
SOPER, supra note 827, at 55–57 (describing this history in the Netherlands). 
 906. Id. at 57–59. 
 907. Id. at 57. The current Constitution reads: 
(5) The standards required of schools financed either in part or in full from 
public funds shall be regulated by Act of Parliament, with due regard, in the 
case of private schools, to the freedom to provide education according to 
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Kuyper’s pluralism was officially constitutionalized and has continued 
to play a central role in Dutch society since that time. In contrast, 
nineteenth century Americans endorsed religious intolerance and passed 
Blaine Amendments.908 Through the mid-twentieth century, Protestant 
themes and anti-Catholic bigotry pervaded American public schools. 
Starting in the 1960s, the Supreme Court struck back at Protestants and 
began eradicating all religion from public schools. Contemporary public 
school ideology has mutated into a mishmash of secularism, liberalism, 
and environmentalism.909 Religious families are left to fend for 
themselves. At a time when the Dutch were endorsing pluralism, 
Americans were endorsing intolerance. 
The fruits of these disparate philosophies are evident in 
contemporary education. Today Dutch children can attend the school of 
their choice, and the Dutch government pays the full cost whether the 
school is religious or secular, public or private. Consequently, seventy 
percent of Dutch children attend private schools, with the vast majority 
attending private religious schools.910 But in the United States, only 
eight percent of children attend private religious schools, even though 
approximately eighty percent of Americans identify themselves as 
religious.911 In the context of education, the Dutch embraced Fourteenth 
Amendment principles, but Americans did not. 
A voucher system would dramatically change American schools for 
the better.912 Vouchers would break up government’s education 
monopoly by giving students, particularly poor students, the ability to 
attend private schools.913 Students would thus enjoy all the benefits of a 
                                                                                                                     
religious or other belief . . . 
(7) Private primary schools that satisfy the conditions laid down by Act of 
Parliament shall be financed from public funds according to the same standards 
as public-authority schools. The conditions under which private secondary 
education and pre-university education shall receive contributions from public 
funds shall be laid down by Act of Parliament. 
NETH. CONST. ch. 1, art. 23. 
 908. See supra Part V.A. 
 909. See Robert H. Nelson, Rethinking Church and State: The Case of Environmental 
Religion, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 121 (2011) (arguing that environmentalism is a religion). 
 910. See Helen F. Ladd, Edward B. Fiske, Nienke Ruijs, Parental Choice in the 
Netherlands: Growing Concerns about Segregation, 6, prepared for the National Conference on 
School Choice, Vanderbilt University, (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.ncspe.org/ 
publications_files /OP%20182.pdf.  
 911. See American Religious Identification Survey, Trinity College, available at 
http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/2011/08/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf, 5 (2008); see also Pew 
Forum on Religious Life, available at http://religions.pewforum.org/reports (finding that 
approximately eighty-three percent of Americans identified themselves as religious). 
 912. See generally FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 858. 
 913. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism, and Its Effects on 
Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1172–73 (2003) (discussing how 
163
Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1072 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
free market, including more ideological and religious choices and 
greater quality education.914 Public schools themselves might even 
benefit from the increased competition which could motivate them to 
operate more efficiently and improve the quality of education 
delivered.915 The result would be greater pluralism, more diversity, 
enhanced religious freedom, and higher quality education. 
CONCLUSION 
After the Civil War, Americans amended the Constitution to 
guarantee equality for all people by eradicating systems of caste and 
class legislation. They did this because they had learned from their own 
mistakes—slavery, government-granted monopolies, and the like. They 
observed caste systems around the world from the Indian Caste system 
to European feudalism, and they recognized that it was fundamentally 
immoral to single out specific groups for special burdens or benefits that 
did not apply to the rest of society. Although limited bans on class 
legislation had been around since the founding, after the Civil War the 
sentiment was that society had changed to the point where a ban on 
class legislation had to be constitutionalized. From then on, legislation 
would have to provide a general welfare benefit, and the laws would 
have to be equally enforced. No longer could the government pick out 
winners and losers. The goal was a society of equals. Religion was 
certainly included in this protection. At this point in history, the United 
States stood out on the world stage as the standard-bearer for societal 
equality. 
Unfortunately, the Fourteenth Amendment’s goal of creating a 
society without systems of class, caste, or government conferred 
monopolies did not come to fruition quickly. Racist legislation and 
enforcement continued. Segregation persisted. Blaine Amendments 
were passed. Even after the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 
1920, gender discrimination lived on until 1971. In short, American 
legislatures got away with a lot of racist and sexist legislation, and the 
courts until Brown v. Board of Education failed to step in. Our history 
of Jim Crow and of sexism does not prove that the original meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment permitted racism and sexism. They only 
                                                                                                                     
vouchers would benefit the poor). 
 914. Out of ten empirical studies evaluating the impact of vouchers on student 
performance, nine showed that student performance improved and only one showed no impact. 
See Greg Forster, A Win-Win Solution: The Empirical Evidence on School Vouchers, THE 
FOUNDATION FOR EDUCATIONAL CHOICE (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.edchoice.org/CMSModules/EdChoice/FileLibrary/656/A-Win-Win-Solution---The-
Empirical-Evidence-on-School-Vouchers .pdf. 
 915. Out of nineteen empirical studies evaluating the impact of vouchers on public schools, 
eighteen showed that public schools improved and only one showed no impact. Id.  
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prove that the American people and their Supreme Court justices were 
not adhering faithfully to the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial 
and gender systems of class legislation and of caste. The fact that some 
people violate a law does not mean that the law permits the conduct in 
question. It just means that some people are engaged in lawlessness. 
Over time, American courts and legislatures have rectified many of the 
lawless violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, eliminating racial and 
gender discrimination, as well as other improper forms of class 
legislation. But as for discrimination on the basis of religion, American 
courts and legislatures still have significant work ahead.  
In the context of construing the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, government currently has way too much discretion to 
force religious individuals to comply with generally applicable laws. 
Smith and City of Boerne represented significant steps away from the no 
class legislation principles of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the 
Sherbert-Yoder balancing approach should be restored, albeit with a bit 
more backbone, and the various state Blaine Amendments should be 
struck down because they discriminate on the basis of religion.  
In the context of education, the situation is truly embarrassing. While 
the United States was once at the forefront of the equal rights movement 
back in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the current state of the 
American public schools has unfortunately moved the United States to 
the back of the pack. Countries all over the world have endorsed 
educational pluralism, the funding of religious education, and private 
schools of all stripes. But the United States persistently maintains an 
educational monopoly that favors secular education and secularism in 
general. The funding scheme grossly discriminates against religious 
families and ultimately diminishes the quality of education and 
educational choices for children. Most astonishingly, many states still 
have Blaine Amendments which facially discriminate against religion. 
The result is that the equality goals of the Fourteenth Amendment 
remain unrealized for religious families who are forced to pay for both 
public and private schools. And the assurance of Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters that everyone has a right to educate their children as they see fit 
remains an unfulfilled promise for many families who are coerced into 
sending their children to militantly secular public schools. Courts and 
legislatures should return to the principles of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and should endorse religious pluralism by requiring the 
states to implement voucher systems for both secular and religious 
public and private schools. 
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APPENDIX 
Austria 
Ch. I Article 7 Cl. 1
All federal nationals are equal before the 
law.  Privileges based upon birth, sex, estate, 
class, or religion are excluded. 
 
Ch. I Art 14 cl. 6 
Admission to public school is open to all 
without distinction of birth, sex race, status, 
class, language and religion, and in other 
respects within the limits of the statutory 
requirements.
Belize 
Part II, Art.3
[guaranteeing fundamental rights based on] 
“race, place of origin, political opinions, 
colour, creed or sex” 
 
Art. 16 cl. 3 
[banning discrimination based on] “sex, 
race, place of origin, political opinions, colour 
or creed”
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Article I, Paragraph 7
No person shall be deprived of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or Entity citizenship on any 
ground such as sex, race, color, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
Article II, Paragraph 4   
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
provided for in this Article or in the 
international agreements listed in Annex I to 
this Constitution shall be secured to all 
persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race, color, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status.
Brazil 
Title II, ch. 1, art. 5, cl. VI.
Guaranteeing equality for those who 
express their “freedom of conscience and of 
belief” 
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Bulgaria 
Article 6
(1) All persons are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. 
(2) All citizens shall be equal before the law. 
There shall be no privileges or restriction of 
rights on the grounds of race, nationality, 
ethnic self-identity, sex, origin, religion, 
education, opinion, political affiliation, 
personal or social status, or property status. 
Canada 
Section 15
(1) Every individual is equal before the and 
under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination based on race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or 
mental or physical disability.
Chechnya 
Article 16 (Equality, R.F. 19)
(1) All are equal before the law and in the 
courts of law. 
(2) The Chechen Republic guarantees equality 
of rights and liberties of individuals and 
citizens regardless of sex, race, nationality, 
language, origin, property or position, place of 
residence, religious affiliation, convictions, 
membership of public organizations, and any 
other circumstance. It forbids other forms of 
discrimination of citizens on the basis of 
indicators of social, racial, national, language 
and religious affiliation.
Croatia 
Ch. III , Part 1, art. 14
(1) Everyone in the Republic of Croatia 
shall enjoy rights and freedoms, regardless of 
race, color, gender, language, religion, 
political or other belief, national or social 
origin, property, birth, education, social status 
or other characteristics. 
(2) All shall be equal before the law. 
 
Article 17   
(1) During a state of war or an immediate 
threat to the independence and unity of the 
State, or in the event of severe natural 
disasters, individual freedoms and rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution may be 
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restricted . . . 
(2) The extend of such restrictions shall be 
adequate to the nature of the danger, and may 
not result in the inequality of persons in 
respect of race, color, gender, language, 
religion, national or social origin. 
 
Article 41   
(1) All religious communities shall be equal 
before the law
Cyprus 
Article 28
1. All persons are equal before the law, the 
administration and justice and are entitled to 
equal protection thereof and treatment thereby. 
2. Every person shall enjoy all the rights and 
liberties provided for in this Constitution 
without any direct or indirect discrimination 
against any person on the ground of his 
community, race, religion, language, sex, 
political or other convictions, national or 
social descent, birth, colour, wealth, social 
class, or on any ground whatsoever, unless 
there is express provision to the contrary in 
this Constitution.
Denmark 
Section 71
(1) Personal liberty shall be inviolable.  No 
Danish subject shall in any manner whatever 
be deprived of his liberty because of his 
political or religious convictions or because of 
his descent.
Estonia 
Article 12
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law. 
No one may be discriminated against on the 
basis of nationality, race, color, sex, language, 
origin, creed, political or other persuasions, 
financial or social status, or other reasons. 
(2) The propagation of national, racial, 
religious or political hatred, violence or 
discrimination is prohibited and punishable by 
law.  The propagation of hatred, violence or 
discrimination between social strata is equally 
prohibited and punishable by law.
Finland      Section 6(1) Everyone is equal before the law. 
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(2) No one shall, without an acceptable reason, 
be treated differently from other persons on 
the ground of sex, age, origin, language, 
religion, conviction, opinion, health, disability 
or other reason that concerns his or her person. 
France 
Title 0, Article 1
(1) France is an indivisible, secular, 
democratic and social Republic. It ensures the 
equality of all citizens before the law, without 
distinction of origin, race or religion. It 
respects all beliefs. It is organised on a 
decentralised basis.
Germany 
Article 3 
All persons shall be equal before the law.  
Men and women shall have equal rights.  The 
state shall promote the actual implementation 
of equal rights for women and men and take 
steps to eliminate disadvantages that now 
exist.  No person shall be favored or 
disfavored because of sex, parentage, race, 
language, homeland and origin, faith, or 
religious or political opinions.  No person shall 
be favored because of disability.
Hong Kong Bill 
of Rights 
      Part I, Section 5
(1) In time of public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, 
measures may be taken derogating from the 
Bill of Rights to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation, but these 
measures shall be taken in accordance with 
law. 
(2) No measure shall be taken under 
Subsection (1) that . . . 
(b) involves discrimination solely on the 
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion 
or social origin; 
 
Part II Sec. 8 
Article 1   
(1) The rights recognized in this Bill of Rights 
shall be enjoyed without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or 
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social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
Article 20   
(1) Every child shall have, without any 
discrimination as to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, national or social origin, 
property or birth, the right to such measures of 
protection as are required by his status as a 
minor, on the part of his family, society and 
the State. 
 
Article 22   
All persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to the 
equal protection of the law.  In this respect, the 
law shall prohibit any discrimination and 
guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Hungary 
Article 70A  
(1) The Republic of Hungary shall respect the 
human rights and civil rights of all persons in 
the country without discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, gender, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social 
origins, financial situation, birth or on any 
other grounds whatsoever.
Iceland 
Article 64
(1) No one may lose any of his civil or 
national rights on account of his religion 
 
Article 65  
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and 
enjoys human rights irrespective of sex, 
religion, opinion, national origin, race, colour, 
property, birth or other status.
India 
Article 15
(1) The State shall not discriminate against 
any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. 
(2) No citizen shall, on ground only of 
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religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any 
of them, be subject to any disability, liability, 
restriction or condition with regard to  
 
Article 16   
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for 
all citizens in matters relating to employment 
or appointment to any office under the State. 
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of 
birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible 
for, or discriminated against in respect of, any 
employment or office under the State. 
 
Article 29   
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into 
any educational institution maintained by the 
State or receiving aid out of State funds on 
grounds only of religion, race, caste, language 
or any of them. 
 
Article 30   
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to 
educational institutions, discriminate against 
any educational institution on the ground that 
it is under the management of a minority, 
whether based on religion or language. 
 
Article 325   
There shall be one general electoral roll for 
every territorial constituency for election to 
either House of Parliament or to the House or 
either House of the Legislature of a State and 
no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in 
any such roll or claim to be included in any 
special electoral roll for any such constituency 
on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or 
any of them.
Ireland 
Ch. XII Art. 40
(iii) (6.2) Laws regulating the manner in 
which the right of forming associations and 
unions and the right of free assembly may be 
exercised shall contain no political, religious 
or class discrimination.
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Art. 44 
(2.3) The State shall not impose any 
disabilities or make any discrimination on the 
ground of religious profession, belief or status. 
(2.4) Legislation providing State aid for 
schools shall not discriminate between schools 
under the management of different religious 
denominations, nor be such as to affect 
prejudicially the right of any child to attend a 
school receiving public money without 
attending religious instruction at that school. 
Italy 
Part 0, Article 3
(1) All citizens have equal social status and are 
equal before the law, without regard to their 
sex, race, language, religion, political 
opinions, and personal or social conditions. 
 
Article 8   
(1) Religious denominations are equally free 
before the law.
Japan 
Ch. III, Article 14
(1)  All of the people are equal under the law 
and there shall be no discrimination in 
political, economic, or social relations because 
of race, creed, sex, social status, or family 
origin.
Kenya 
Article 27
(1) Every person is equal before the law and 
has the right to equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
(3) Women and men have the right to equal 
treatment, including the right to equal 
opportunities in political, economic, cultural 
and social spheres. 
(4) The State may not discriminate directly or 
indirectly against any person on any ground, 
including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, dress, language or birth.
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Lithuania 
Article 29
(1) All people shall be equal before the law, 
the court, and other State institutions and 
officers. 
(2) A person may not have his rights restricted 
in any way, or be granted any privileges, on 
the basis of his or her sex, race, nationality, 
language, origin, social status, religion, 
convictions, or opinions.
Nepal 
Article 11
(1) All citizens shall be equal before the law. 
No person shall be denied the equal protection 
of the laws. 
(2) No discrimination shall be made against 
any citizen in the application of general laws 
on grounds of religion (dharma), race (varya), 
sex (li_ga), caste (jât), tribe (jâti) or 
ideological conviction (vaicârik) or any of 
these.
Netherlands 
Ch. 1, Article 1
All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated 
equally in equal circumstances.  
Discrimination on the grounds of religion, 
belief, political opinion, race, or sex or on any 
other grounds whatsoever shall not be 
permitted. 
Paraguay 
Article 88
(1) No discrimination will be permitted against 
workers for reasons of race, sex, age, religion, 
social status, and political or union preference. 
Poland 
Article 25
(1) Churches and other religious organizations 
shall have equal rights.
Portugal 
Title I Art. 13, cl. 2
No one shall be privileged, favoured, 
prejudiced, deprived of any right or exempted 
from any duty on the basis of ancestry, sex, 
race, language, place of origin, religion, 
political or ideological beliefs, education, 
economic situation, social circumstances or 
sexual orientation. 
 
Art. 59 
[banning various types of discrimination 
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against workers based on] “Regardless of age, 
sex, race, citizenship, place of origin, religion 
and political and 
ideological convictions”
Romania 
Title I Art. 4, cl. 2
Romania is the common and indivisible 
homeland of all its citizens, without any 
discrimination on account of race, nationality, 
ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, 
political adherence, property, or social origin. 
Russia 
Part I Ch. 1, art. 14
(2) Religious associations are separated 
from the state, and are equal before the law. 
 
Art. 19 
(2) The state guarantees the equality of 
rights and liberties regardless of sex, race, 
nationality, language, origin, property or 
employment status, residence, attitude to 
religion, convictions, membership of public 
associations or any other circumstance. Any 
restrictions of the rights of citizens on social, 
racial, national, linguistic or religious grounds 
are forbidden.
Serbia 
Article 21
(1) All are equal before the Constitution and 
law. 
(2) Everyone has the right to equal legal 
protection, without discrimination. 
(3) All direct or indirect discrimination based 
on any grounds, particularly on race, sex, 
national origin, social origin, birth, religion, 
political or other opinion, property status, 
culture, language, age, mental or physical 
disability are prohibited.
Singapore 
Article 12
(1) All persons are equal before the law and 
entitled to the equal protection of the law. 
(2) Except as expressly authorized by this 
Constitution, there shall be no discrimination 
against citizens of Singapore on the ground 
only of religion, race, descent or place of birth 
in any law or in the appointment to any office 
or employment under apublic authority or in 
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the administration of any law relating to the 
acquisition, holding, or disposition of property 
or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, 
business, profession, vocation or employment. 
 
Article 16   
(1) Without prejudice to the generality of 
Article 12, there shall be no discrimination 
against any citizens of Singapore on the 
grounds only of religion, race, descent or place 
of birth 
(2) Every religious group has the right to 
establish and maintain institutions for the 
education of children and provide therein 
instruction in its own religion, and there shall 
be no discrimination on the ground only of 
religion in any law relating to such institutions 
or in the administration of any such law. 
Slovakia 
Article 12
(1) People are free and equal in dignity and 
their rights.  Basic rights and liberties are 
inviolable, inalienable, secured by law, and 
unchallengeable. 
(2) Basic rights and liberties on the territory of 
the Slovak Republic are guaranteed to 
everyone regardless of sex, race, color of skin, 
language, creed and religion, political or other 
beliefs, national or social origin, affiliation to 
a nation or ethnic group, property, descent, or 
another status.  No one must be harmed, 
preferred, or discriminated against on these 
grounds.
Slovenia 
Article 7
(1) The state and religious communities shall 
be separate.  
(2) Religious communities shall enjoy equal 
rights; they shall pursue their activities freely. 
 
Article 14   
(1) In Slovenia everyone shall be guaranteed 
equal human rights and fundamental freedoms 
irrespective of national origin, race, sex, 
language, religion, political or other 
conviction, material standing, birth, education, 
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social status, disability or any other personal 
circumstance.  
(2) All are equal before the law. 
 
Article 16   
(1) Human rights and fundamental freedoms 
provided by this Constitution may 
exceptionally be temporarily suspended or 
restricted during a war and state of emergency. 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms may 
be suspended or restricted only for the 
duration of the war or state of emergency, but 
only to the extent required by such 
circumstances and inasmuch as the measures 
adopted do not create inequality  based solely 
on race, national origin, sex, language, 
religion, political or other conviction, material 
standing, birth, education, social status or any 
other personal circumstance.
South Africa 
Section 9
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and 
has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law. 
 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate 
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth. 
 
South Korea 
Ch. II, Article 11
(1) All citizens are equal before the law, and 
there may be no discrimination in political, 
economic, social, or cultural life on account of 
sex, religion, or social status. 
(2) No privileged caste is recognized or ever 
established in any form.
Spain 
Chapter II , Section 0, Article 14  
Spaniards are equal before the law, without 
any discrimination for reasons of birth, race, 
sex, religion, opinion, or any other personal or 
social condition or circumstance.
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Sweden 
Art. 12 
No restriction may be imposed solely on 
grounds of political, religious, cultural or other 
such opinions.
Switzerland 
Article 8
(1) All humans are equal before the law. 
(2) Nobody may be discriminated against, 
namely for his or her origin, race, sex, age, 
language, social position, way of life, 
religious, philosophical, or political 
convictions, or because of a corporal or mental 
disability.
Taiwan 
Article 7
All citizens of the Republic of China, 
irrespective of sex, religion, ethnic origin, 
class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before 
the law.
Thailand 
Section 5 
The Thai people, irrespective of their 
origins, sexes or religions, shall enjoy equal 
protection under this Constitution. 
 
Section 30  
All persons are equal before the law and 
shall enjoy equal protection under the law. 
Men and women shall enjoy equal rights. 
Unjust discrimination against a person on the 
grounds of the difference in origin, race, 
language, sex, age, physical or health 
condition, personal status, economic or social 
standing, religious belief, education or 
constitutionally political view, shall not be 
permitted. 
Turkey 
Article 10
(1) All individuals are equal without any 
discrimination before the law, irrespective of 
language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, 
philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any 
such considerations.
United Kingdom 
(This document is 
not a written 
Constitution (cf. 
Section 1), but rather 
Section 4
Everyone is equally entitled to all rights 
and freedoms without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social 
177
Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1086 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
a compilation of 
information material 
originally provided 
by the British 
Embassy for 
purposes of 
publication.) 
origin, property, birth, or other status. 
 
Section 8   
(1) Men and women of full age, without 
any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to found a 
family.  
 
Section 20 
(7) Officials working in central and local 
government have a long tradition of political 
neutrality.  A change of minister therefore 
does not involve a change of departmental 
staff, whose functions remain the same 
whichever political party is in office. 
Public offices are open to men and women, 
without distinction on grounds of sex, religion, 
race or color.
Vietnam 
Article 54
The citizen, regardless of nationality, sex, 
social background, religious belief, cultural 
standard, occupation, time of residence, shall, 
upon reaching the age of eighteen, have the 
right to vote, and, upon reaching the age of 
twenty-one, have the right to stand for election 
to the National Assembly and the People's 
Councils in accordance with the provisions of 
the law. 
Article 70   
(1) The citizen shall enjoy freedom of belief 
and of religion; he can follow any religion or 
follow none. All religions are equal before the 
law.
Zimbabwe 
Section 23
[banning laws that discriminate based on] 
“race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, 
colour, creed, sex, gender, marital status or 
physical disability”
 
Additional 
Provisions
Israel Declaration of 
Independence (not 
counted) 
“The State of Israel . . . will ensure 
complete equality of social and political rights 
to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, 
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race or sex”
Hawaii (not counted) Ch. 1 Art. 1 Sec. 1
(e) The right of everyone to be free from 
discrimination, regardless of race, creed, color, 
age, nationality, religion, gender or disability. 
 
Article III  Equal Protection 
 
Section 1  Protection against discrimination 
No law shall be enacted prohibiting or 
abridging the free exercise of these 
fundamental and enumerated rights, nor shall 
any individual person be deprived or denied 
the equal protections of these rights on 
account of race, creed, color, age, nationality, 
religion, gender or disability, without due 
process of law.
Historical: Soviet 
Union (not counted) 
Article 34 [Equality]
(1) Citizens of the USSR are equal before the 
law, without distinction of origin, social or 
property status, race or nationality, sex, 
education, language, attitude to religion, type 
and nature of occupation, domicile, or other 
status. 
(2) The equal rights of citizens of the USSR 
are guaranteed in all fields of economic, 
political, social, and cultural life.
 
179
Calabresi and Salander: Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Re
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
